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Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism (henceforth: Aristotelian naturalism) claims ethical 
goodness is a kind of human natural goodness, where natural goodness is a function of 
human nature. Call this the core thesis. The normativity objection claims the core thesis fails 
because ethical goodness is normative and natural goodness is not. In this study I aim to 
cast new light on this objection and propose a new strategy of response. 
My argument divides into two main moves. In the first, I side with critics in arguing 
that Aristotelian naturalism has a serious problem that concerns the normativity of human 
nature, although standard formulations of the normativity objection do not quite capture it. 
The problem is that there is an explanatory gap in Aristotelian naturalism’s account of 
ethical goodness. I argue that although facts about human nature and natural goodness are 
irreducibly normative in the evaluative sense, they are not necessarily normative in the 
practical sense. Hence, Aristotelians need to explain what makes such facts practically 
normative. They have not successfully done this. This explanatory gap threatens the 
viability of Aristotelian naturalism, for it leaves a central feature of ethical experience—viz. 
the practical normativity of ethical facts—unexplained. I call this the normativity problem. 
In the second main move of my argument I propose a two-part solution to the 
normativity problem. The first part consists in a new metanormative account of the source 
of normativity I call Aristotelian constructivism. It yields an objectivist, species-relative and 
naturalistic account of practical normativity. The second part of the solution is an account 
of practical reason that connects human final ends with human nature. Aristotelian 
constructivism explains the practical normativity of those final ends, and thus of facts 
about human nature, without reference to the evaluative status of those facts. Aristotelian 
constructivism thereby enables Aristotelian naturalists to retain their core thesis. 
1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism 
This study is about the ethical approach known as neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism.1 
Very roughly, Aristotelian naturalism is the view that ethical norms are based on human 
nature. What we ought to do is tied to what is good for us as rational animals. Although 
the view is strongly tied with the tradition of ethical reflection that arose from Aristotle’s 
texts, and although Aristotelian naturalists often develop their views in close conversation 
with the Aristotelian corpus, I will have little to say about how closely Aristotelian 
naturalists approximate the views of Aristotle himself. I am interested in the contemporary 
manifestations of Aristotelian naturalism and in examining its prospects as a viable 
approach to ethics. In the following chapters my goal is to cast new light on one of its 
most persistent objections and to sketch a powerful yet overlooked strategy of response. 
Some like to trace contemporary Aristotelian naturalism to G. E. M. Anscombe, 
and in particular to her well-known paper “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958). Although 
Aristotelian naturalism’s core ideas can be found in Anscombe’s writings (because she 
herself was Aristotelian in bent), and although Aristotelian naturalists often look to 
Anscombe as a source of inspiration, Philippa Foot was really the first contemporary 
                                                
 
1 For purposes of linguistic economy, I will usually simplify the name to Aristotelian 
naturalism, leaving the ‘neo’ and ‘ethical’ implicit. Aristotelian naturalism should not be 
confused with what we might call metaethical naturalism, the view that moral properties are, 
or reduce to, natural properties. Aristotelian naturalism could be taken as naturalistic in that 
sense too, but that is not the primary reason for the label. Aristotelian naturalism is 
naturalistic in that it claims moral goodness and moral judgments are based in some way on 
human nature. As Rosalind Hursthouse (1999: 193) puts it, this kind of “[e]thical naturalism 
hopes to validate beliefs about which character traits are virtues by appeal to human 
nature…” See Rehg and Davis (2003) for a discussion on the way in which Aristotelian 
naturalist’s use of the term ‘nature’ differs from other usages. 
2 
philosopher to articulate and defend Aristotelian naturalism in its current robust form.2 
Her contributions were further developed and extended in different ways by Michael 
Thompson, who studied under her, and by Rosalind Hursthouse, also well-known as an 
avid defender of Aristotelian virtue ethics.3 In this study I will primarily take these three 
philosophers as my paradigm proponents of Aristotelian naturalism, although I will also 
examine in some detail the contributions of one of the view’s younger defenders, Micah 
Lott.4  
Aristotelian naturalism can be understood as consisting in two main movements or 
levels.5 In the first, Aristotelian naturalists identify a particular form of evaluative judgment. 
It is the type we use when we assess the goodness or badness of an organism relative to its 
                                                
 
2 Hints of the view appear in Foot’s earlier writings, such as in her 1977 essays “Virtue and 
Vice” and “Euthanasia” (reprinted in Foot 2002k). But the view first appears in full form in 
her 1994 paper, “Rationality and Virtue” (see Foot 2002i) and her 1995 paper, “Does 
Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” (both reprinted in 2002f). Foot amplified and 
extended the same ideas in her monograph, Natural Goodness (2001). Her last published 
essay, “Rationality and Goodness” (2004), further clarifies the view. 
3 Michael Thompson’s work on the subject first appeared in Thompson (1995). He defends 
and extends the same approach in Thompson (2004). Content from his 1995 paper appear 
in revised form as Chapters 1-4 of Thompson (2008). For Hursthouse’s form of 
Aristotelian naturalism, see Hursthouse (1999; 2012). 
4 Although Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson and Rosalind Hursthouse are indisputably 
the most well-known defenders of Aristotelian naturalism, they are not its only defenders. 
Other defenders include Brown (2008), Hacker-Wright (2009; 2013), Jordan (2016; 2017), 
Lott (2012a; 2012b; 2014), whom I mentioned in the text above, and Teichmann (2011). 
Similar approaches to ethics include Annas (2005), Haldane (2009), Kraut (2009) and 
MacIntyre (1999). Judith Thomson’s work (1996; 2008) bears some obvious similarities 
with the Aristotelian naturalists, but also differs in crucial respects. For example, she thinks 
animal types, such as tiger or human being, are not “function kinds,” so “there is nothing 
tigers do about which it can be said that doing that is the function of a tiger” (Thomson 
2008: 20). Aristotelian naturalists like Foot (2001) and Thompson (2008) would disagree. 
See Chapter 2 for an elaboration of view that all organisms have a function or characteristic 
activity. 
5 There are other ways of slicing up its main features. See Thompson (2003). 
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kind.6 When we make judgments like this, we are evaluating an organism’s natural 
goodness. Natural goodness, on this view, is a function of the way in which an organism is 
characteristically constituted and the way it characteristically lives. For example, we evaluate 
deep, thick roots as good in an oak tree because oaks need deep, thick roots to secure 
adequate nutrition and to remain upright in high winds. We evaluate sharp eyesight in a 
hawk as good because hawks need sharp eyes to catch their dinner. Facts about how 
organisms are characteristically constituted and how they characteristically live are facts 
about an organism’s nature. So natural goodness is based on an organism’s nature. 
The second main movement in the Aristotelian naturalist approach is to claim that 
ethical goodness is simply a specific kind of human natural goodness. For example, 
Philippa Foot says: 
…I believe that evaluations of human will and action share a conceptual structure 
with evaluations of characteristics and operations of other living things, and can 
only be understood in these terms. I want to show moral evil as ‘a kind of natural 
defect’. (Foot 2001: 5) 
Similarly, Michael Thompson:  
The judgments in which I criticize the actions of individual persons as unjust or 
imprudent, or criticize the people themselves as unjust or imprudent people, will 
thus be special forms of what I called judgments of natural goodness or badness… 
(Thompson 2004: 59; emphasis in original)  
Rosalind Hursthouse does not put the point quite so explicitly, but it follows directly from 
her view, for she connects the notion of morally right action with the notion of natural 
goodness. Right actions are actions that the virtuous person would characteristically do in 
similar circumstances (Hursthouse 1999: chapter 1), where virtue and vice are understood 
                                                
 
6 See Foot (2001: chapters 2 and 3), Hursthouse (1999: chapters 9 and 10) and Thompson 
(2004: 47-56; 2008: chapters 1-4). I will explain this type of evaluation in detail in Chapter 
2. 
4 
as natural excellences or defects (1999: chapter 9). I will refer to this idea that moral 
goodness is a kind of natural human goodness as the core thesis. 
In the quotes above, we can distinguish two main ideas, both of which flow from 
the core idea thesis. One concerns the nature of moral virtue. Aristotelian naturalists hold 
that moral virtue should be understood as a kind of natural excellence, and moral vice as a 
type of natural defect. Natural excellences are those features an organism needs in order to 
live the life characteristic of its kind, where this is understood to include not only features 
that are instrumental to living the life characteristic of one’s kind, but also features that 
constitute such a life. Aristotelian naturalists and other theorists of a broad Aristotelian 
bent have argued in a variety of ways that moral virtues play precisely these roles in human 
life. For example, Anscombe (1981b), Foot (2001) and Hursthouse (1999) have all argued 
in various ways that the moral virtues are instrumentally and constitutively necessary for 
humans to engage in a variety of activities, including forming intimate relationships, caring 
for the young, dividing labor, persisting through adversity, and so on. Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1984) has argued that the virtues are necessary for achieving goods internal to a host of 
important human practices. In later work (MacIntyre 1999) he argued that, given the 
dependency of human beings on each other, especially in their early stages of life, many of 
the virtues are necessary, both on the side of parents, teachers and other caregivers, and on 
the side of the developing individual, for humans to develop into independent practical 
reasoners. Talbot Brewer (2009) argues that virtue is both necessary for and cultivated in 
friendship, a fundamentally important relationship in any good human life. All these 
strategies connect virtue with the notion of a characteristic human life or human nature, 
such that the normative significance of the latter is supposed to transfer to the former.  
5 
The other idea that arises from the quotes above from Foot and Thompson 
concerns the nature of ethical judgments and facts. Aristotelian naturalists hold that ethical 
judgments are a kind of natural goodness judgment, and ethical facts are facts about human 
natural goodness. On this view, what distinguishes specifically ethical judgments and facts 
from other judgments and facts about natural goodness is not some special normative 
structure or linguistic function but rather their objects. Ethical goodness is the natural 
goodness of our ethically relevant faculties, namely, our will, practical reason, their 
dispositions, and actions. So, ethical judgments are judgments of the natural goodness or 
badness of a person’s ethically relevant aspects, and the same for moral facts.  
For the Aristotelian naturalist, then, virtuous character traits, ethical judgments and 
ethical facts all lead back to the notion of natural human goodness, which is a function of 
human nature. For this reason, Aristotelian naturalism is sometimes understood as an 
attempt to ground ethical normativity in facts about human nature. 
 
2. The Normativity Objection 
Aristotelian naturalism has come in for heavy criticism on multiple fronts. Objections to 
the view fall into three main types. The first type takes aim at the notion of natural 
goodness. Critics argue that the Aristotelian naturalist’s notion of natural goodness is based 
on an understanding of essentialism, natural teleology and function that has been 
discredited by evolutionary biology.7 A second family of objections rejects the link between 
natural goodness and ethical goodness on the grounds that what is naturally good for us 
                                                
 
7 For versions of this objection see Adams (2006: 51), FitzPatrick (2000), Kitcher (1999), 
Lenman (2005), Lewens (2010), Millum (2006) and Williams (1985: 44). For Aristotelian 
responses, see Foot (2001: 32, n. 10), Hursthouse (2012), Lott (2012a), Thompson (2008: 
76-82) and Hacker-Wright (2009). 
6 
does not align with what is ethical good. One version of this objection holds that what is 
naturally good for us is ethically bad.8 Another version holds that human nature is too 
indeterminate to serve as a basis for substantive ethical norms.9 Yet another holds that 
human natural goodness is incompatible with commonsense moral requirements, such as 
the requirements to treat all human beings with serious moral consideration.10 
The third main type of objection to Aristotelian naturalism rejects the link between 
natural goodness and ethical goodness on very different grounds. This objection holds that 
ethical norms cannot be based on natural goodness or human nature because ethical norms 
are normative and human nature is not. This objection will be the primary focus of this 
dissertation. 
The worry begins with the deeply plausible idea that some, even many, moral 
judgments bear on what we have reason to do. If one rightly judges some action to be 
ethically good in some set of circumstances, one would have reason, maybe strong reason, 
to do that action if one were in those circumstances. The problem, according to this 
objection, is that facts and judgments about human nature and about human natural 
                                                
 
8 Elijah Millgram puts none too fine a point on it:  
when natural historians do take a close look at humanity, what they find is not 
necessarily justice: for instance it has been argued by those who work on such 
things that human females are fine-tuned by natural selection to murder their 
infants in a suitable range of circumstances…that human males are fine-tuned by 
natural selection to rape women in a suitable range of circumstances… that 
humans value occupying dominant positions in hierarchies to a degree not 
compatible with justice of any kind. (Millgram 2009: 561-2) 
Others who have pressed versions of this criticism include Andreou (2006), Slote (2003) 
and Woodcock (2006). 
9 Copp & Sobel (2004: 540), Prinz (2009), Williams (1985: 153), Woodcock (2015). This 
worry is also voiced in Watson (1997). 
10 See Gowans (2008) for a powerful, though ultimately unsuccessful form of this 
objection. Weaker versions of the same worry appear in McPherson (2012; 2015). 
7 
goodness are not normative. We can question why facts about the human species, and facts 
about human natural goodness and defect, matter for how I ought to live or what I have 
reason to do. For example, John Broome writes: 
Foot hopes to derive the conclusion that each human being should be virtuous, 
where ‘should’ is truly normative. But this conclusion cannot be drawn. Her 
premise is that each human being should be virtuous, where this is a matter of 
natural normativity. This means simply that being virtuous is necessary to the good 
of human beings. No truly normative conclusion follows. (Broome 2013: 12) 
Often, especially at conferences, the objection comes in the form of a rhetorical question. 
As David Copp and Sobel put it, 
Why should we accord any normative significance whatsoever to our membership 
in the species or to the fact that we have a particular form of life? (Copp & Sobel 
2004: 543) 
Perhaps the most memorable version of the objection comes from John McDowell, 
himself a friend of the Aristotelian ethical tradition, but a staunch critic of the Aristotelian 
naturalist idea that ethical norms can be grounded in human nature. He argues that reason 
enables us to step back from our impulses, inclinations and instincts and question their 
rational credentials: 
Reason does not just open our eyes to our nature, as members of the animal 
species we belong to; it also enables and even obliges us to step back from it, in a 
way that puts its bearing on our practical problems into question. (McDowell 1998: 
172) 
These are just a few samples of an objection that has appeared in various guises all over the 
place.11 The conclusion is supposed to be that Aristotelian naturalism is a nonstarter—even 
                                                
 
11 In addition to the examples quoted in the text above, see Antony (2000), Finlay (2007: 
837), Lenman (2005), Prinz (2009), and Watson (1997: 67). 
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that it is an obvious non-starter. The idea that natural goodness is a kind of ethical goodness 
is simply a dead end. I call this the normativity objection.12  
In syllogistic form, we may represent the objection as follows: 
 N1 Some ethical facts and judgments are normative. 
 N2 Facts and judgments about natural goodness are not normative.  
N3 So, ethical facts and judgments cannot be a kind of natural goodness fact or 
judgment. 
Now some philosophers take it as obvious that all ethical facts and judgments are 
normative, and thus may think N1 is too weak. For example, Michael Smith (1994: 5-7) 
claims that according to ordinary moral practice and discourse, “moral judgments seem to 
be, or imply, opinions about the reasons we have for behaving in certain ways,” and that 
this understanding of moral judgments is manifested in “ordinary moral practice as it is 
engaged in by ordinary folk.” But others may not find Smith’s view so obvious, holding 
instead that there could be ethical judgments—say about what is or is not admirable—that 
imply nothing about what we have reason to do.13 For my purposes, we need not decide 
this issue, since the problem arises even with the weaker idea that only some moral facts or 
judgments are normative.   
                                                
 
12 This objection should not to be confused with Derek Parfit’s (2011: 324-27) objection of 
the same name. His objection is against non-analytical naturalism, which holds that 
although normative claims and concepts cannot be reduced to non-normative claims and 
concepts, normative facts can be reduced to, or are identical with, non-normative facts. The 
argument I am calling the normativity objection does not take sides on this dispute. An 
Aristotelian naturalist could be a non-analytical naturalist, in Parfit’s sense of that term (in 
fact, most probably are), and a fellow non-analytical naturalist of a non-Aristotelian bent 
could consistently press my version of the normativity objection against the Aristotelian. 
13 I thank Linda Zagzebski for stressing this point in conversation. 
9 
 Aristotelians have not been silent. They have responded, predictably, by rejecting 
the second premise of the normativity objection—that natural goodness facts and 
judgments are not normative—arguing that they are normative, and thus that there is no 
conceptual or logical difficulty in moving from claims about what is naturally good for 
humans to claims about what we ought to do. For example, in her book Natural Goodness 
Foot considers two questions posed by Gary Watson: 
1. Can an objective theory really establish that being a gangster is incompatible with 
being a good human being? 
2. If it can, can it establish an intelligible connection between [this] appraisal and what 
we have reason to do as individuals?14 
Foot takes herself to have answered both questions in the affirmative. She answers the first 
question by way of her account of natural human goodness, and the second by way of her 
novel account of practical rationality,15 concluding that she has shown an “intrinsic link” or 
a “conceptual connection” between natural goodness and reasons (Foot 2001: 64-5). 
Similarly, Micah Lott, one of the “new cohort”16 of Aristotelian naturalists, makes much 
the same point, claiming that  
any substantive account of human form—any conception we might step back 
from—will already embody some understanding of how we have reason to act and to 
live… With a conception of human form, there can be no gap between what is normal and 
normative. (Lott: 2014: 771; emphasis in original) 
Both Foot and Lott lean heavily on the work of Michael Thompson (1995; 2004; 2008) 
who has labored long and hard on this issue, arguing that merely conceiving of an object as 
                                                
 
14 The questions come from Watson (1997: 67). Foot quotes them in Foot (2001: 53). 
15 I explain Foot’s account of practical rationality in Chapter 2, Section 4. 
16 This is Scott Woodcock’s (2015: 21) label for the small group of philosophers following 
the path forged by Foot, Hursthouse and Thompson. In this “new cohort” Woodcock 
includes Stephen Brown, John Hacker-Wright, Roger Teichmann and Micah Lott. 
10 
a living thing puts in place the conceptual materials for normative evaluations.17 The gist of 
the Aristotelian naturalist response, then, is that if one understands what Aristotelians 
mean by their key notions of nature or life form and natural goodness, one can see that facts and 
judgments about natural goodness are essentially normative, that normativity is built into the 
very conceptual structures that enable us to grasp something as a living thing. The 
conclusion is supposed to be that N2 is false and the normativity objection fails.  
I have long been intrigued by the normativity objection. I have deep sympathies 
with the Aristotelian naturalist approach, and yet I find the normativity objection 
compelling. In part, this study has been an attempt to diagnose my own sense that although 
Aristotelians have mounted powerful responses to the normativity objection, they have not 
managed to assuage the underlying concern that continues to motivate the objection and 
leaves critics apparently unmoved by the Aristotelian responses.  
 
3. The Argument in Prospect 
The argument of this study divides into two main moves. First, I will argue that there is 
indeed a problem in the Aristotelian naturalist approach that concerns the normativity of 
human nature, although the normativity objection as it is usually framed does not quite 
capture it, and Aristotelians have failed to see it. The problem is that there is an 
explanatory gap in the Aristotelian naturalist’s account of ethical goodness. They attempt to 
ground the normativity of ethics in human nature (e.g., by explaining the normativity of 
virtue by linking it with what is naturally good for human beings). And they do this because 
they think facts about human nature are intrinsically normative. But I will argue human 
                                                
 
17 For similar Aristotelian responses, see Haldane (2009: 48-9) and Annas (2005: 15).  
11 
nature is not intrinsically normative. So, if Aristotelians want to claim that human nature is 
normative, they need to offer an account of what makes human nature normative. They 
have not successfully done this. I call this the normativity problem. It is a problem because it 
threatens the viability of Aristotelian naturalism in general. To see why, recall the core 
thesis, which holds that ethical goodness is a kind of natural goodness. Ethical goodness 
clearly is normative, however, so if Aristotelian naturalists cannot explain the normativity 
of that region of natural goodness, they will have left a central feature of ethical experience 
unexplained. 
I use the term ‘normativity problem’ to distinguish this issue from the normativity 
objection. The normativity problem is not an argument against Aristotelian naturalism, so 
it does not amount to an objection. If one could argue that the problem has no solution, 
then one would have an objection. But I think the problem does have a solution, which 
brings me to the second main move of my overall argument.  
If Aristotelians want to retain their core thesis that ethical goodness is a kind of 
natural goodness, they need to explain what makes natural goodness normative. I believe 
the most promising strategy is quite different from what Aristotelian naturalists have so far 
attempted. I will propose a solution that has two key parts. The first is a metanormative 
account of the source of normativity. I will suggest that the most promising such account is 
a new version of constructivism I call Aristotelian constructivism. The label is not original, and 
my view has been heavily influenced by a variety of authors, but, as far as I can tell, the 
structure of the view I will propose is distinctive in the literature. It thus stakes out new 
territory on the theoretical map—territory that contains one half of the resources needed 
for a new kind of response to the normativity problem. The other part of the solution 
consists in a certain account of practical reason, which is essentially an expanded version of 
12 
the account Foot developed in her last published works. The basic idea is that the account 
of practical reason connects human final ends with human nature, and then Aristotelian 
constructivism explains the normativity of those final ends, but without appealing to the 
intrinsic normativity of human nature. This provides Aristotelian naturalists a way of 
explaining the practical normativity of human nature and natural goodness, thereby saving 
their core thesis. 
Here is how the argument will unfold. The first main move occupies Chapters 2 
and 3. In Chapter 2 I unpack the Aristotelian naturalist’s understanding of the concepts life 
form and natural goodness in detail, showing how these concepts are both conceptually linked 
together and logically fundamental in our thinking about living things. Then I explain how 
Aristotelian naturalists have attempted to connect these concepts with normative reasons 
for action. Two complementary accounts have been offered, one by Micah Lott (leaning 
heavily on Thompson’s work) and one by Philippa Foot, both of which rely on the idea 
that facts about human nature are intrinsically normative. My goal in this chapter is not 
only to explain the Aristotelian naturalist approach in detail but, as it were, to give 
Aristotelian naturalists their due by providing a sense of the depth of thought that underlies 
the approach. I do this because I think it is important to see that in a certain sense the 
Aristotelian naturalist response to the normativity objection does work. There is a normative 
structure embedded in our conception of living things. In this sense, the normativity 
objection, as it is sometimes framed, fails to stick. In Chapter 3, however, I argue that 
Aristotelian naturalism still does have an important problem.  
 I begin Chapter 3 by defending a distinction between two types of normative facts: 
practical facts, which are essentially linked with reasons, and evaluative facts, which are not, 
but are still irreducibly normative. Then I develop what I call the parity argument to show 
13 
that facts about natural goodness are evaluative but not practical. The reason is because 
facts about natural goodness are grounded in constitutive facts about a thing’s life form, 
and constitutive facts are not intrinsically practical. Having the evaluative/practical 
distinction clearly in view will help us diagnose the problem in Lott and Foot’s accounts. 
They fail because they assume, without argument, that human nature is intrinsically 
practical.  
My conclusion will not be that human nature is not practically normative. I readily 
grant that evaluative facts can be, and often are, practically normative. But since evaluative 
facts are not intrinsically practical, when they are practical, there must be something that 
accounts for their practical normativity. The same goes for human nature. Because it is not 
intrinsically practical, if Aristotelian naturalists want to maintain that it is practically 
normative, they need to explain what makes it so. They have offered no adequate account. 
This is the normativity problem.  
The second main movement of my argument spans Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4 
I begin building my two-part solution to the normativity problem by showing what type of 
explanation Aristotelians need. Following Ruth Chang, I distinguish between the bearers, the 
nature, and the source of practical normativity. What Aristotelian naturalists need is a 
metanormative account of the source of practical normativity. Noting this is important 
because Aristotelian naturalists by and large have not engaged with mainstream accounts of 
normative source. I propose to change that.  
Aristotelian constructivism is the metanormative theory that holds the most 
promise for helping to solve Aristotelian naturalism’s normativity problem. I begin 
unpacking the view by situating it with respect to several well-known distinctions in the 
metanormative literature. I understand constructivism to be a form of realism, to be a global 
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rather than a local theory, and I frame it in terms of a practical standpoint rather than in 
procedural terms. I briefly explain the two main forms of constructivism on offer in the 
literature, the Kantian and Humean versions, and show how Aristotelian constructivism 
falls in between them in several respects. Having located Aristotelian constructivism on the 
theoretical map, I begin sketching its basic outlines. The view is constructivist in that 
practical normativity arises only from within the first-person perspective, as a product of 
agents’ mental states. As a general thesis about the source of practical normativity, 
Aristotelian constructivism holds that facts are practically normative for some agent in 
virtue of following from within the practical standpoint of that agent’s life form. The core 
idea is that being an agent involves perceiving the world in a practical light—taking certain 
states of affairs as to-be-done or to-be-avoided—and that there are general facts about how 
agents of a particular life form normatively perceive the world. This practical standpoint 
grounds their reasons. Applied to humans, Aristotelian constructivism holds that facts are 
practically normative for humans in virtue of following from within the practical 
standpoint of the human life form, where this is understood as the standpoint of properly 
functioning human practical reason.  
Chapter 5 contains an account of human practical reason, the second part of my 
proposed solution to the normativity problem. The account connects our final ends to 
human nature. The way it does this is by invoking the Aristotelian naturalist’s 
understanding of the concept of a life form, explained in Chapter 2. Our understanding of 
a life form just is our understanding of how an organism is characteristically constituted 
and how it characteristically lives. The view, then, is that humans characteristically take 
human nature to be practically normative in virtue of taking as final ends those general 
activities that characterize the human life form. I unpack the view by elaborating its core 
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theses: (1) Human practical reason, like any natural power, can malfunction. So there is 
such a thing as its proper functioning. (2) Some of the standards of proper functioning for 
human practical reason are species-relative. (3) When functioning properly, human 
practical reason takes certain substantive states of affairs as final ends. (4) These final ends 
include those general activities that are constitutive of the human life form. Then I propose 
four examples that plausibly qualify as both characteristic human activities and final ends. 
I close in Chapter 6 by explaining exactly how Aristotelian constructivism, 
combined with my account of human practical reason, solves the normativity problem. The 
problem, again, is that Aristotelian naturalists have not adequately explained the practical 
normativity of human nature. The reason this is a problem is because it threatens the 
credibility of their core thesis, for it leaves a central feature of ethical experience 
unexplained. Aristotelian constructivism and my account of practical reason together solve 
the normativity problem because they offer a plausible account of the practical normativity 
of human nature and natural goodness, without attempting to ground that normativity in 
the evaluative-normative structure of human nature.   
In the Chapters below I can do little more than sketch the basic outlines of both 
theories. The development of this project has involved following out many threads which I 
ended up cutting for the sake of keeping the big picture in view. Well aware that I have left 
many claims undefended and assumptions unexamined, my hope is that in sticking to the 
big picture and showing how Aristotelian constructivism and my account of practical 
reason fit together to address Aristotelian naturalism’s normativity problem, I have made 
the case that both theories deserve further reflection, development and critical attention, 




Before I launch into the first main move of my argument, I need to make a few preliminary 
but important points. First, I need to ward off a concern which, unaddressed, might 
threaten to demotivate my whole project. Second, I need to clarify some of the 
terminology I will be using throughout this study.  
 
The Heart of Aristotelian Naturalism 
My solution to the normativity problem involves conceding the point critics have been 
hammering for a long time—that facts about human nature and natural goodness are not 
intrinsically normative in the practical sense. Why should Aristotelian naturalists be 
interested in my proposal if it means conceding that human nature is not normative after 
all? Isn’t the normativity of human nature part of the very heart of Aristotelian naturalism? 
And if so, why not look for other possible responses—perhaps a deep reexamination of 
the very concept of normativity, or something else?  
I am all for exploring multiple avenues of response, and would wholeheartedly 
endorse sustained reexamination of our thinking about normativity. But I also think the 
idea that human nature is the ground of practical normativity is not essential to the 
Aristotelian naturalist approach. The theoretical heart of Aristotelian naturalism is the claim 
I am calling the core thesis, the idea that moral goodness is a kind of natural goodness. It is 
the heart of Aristotelian naturalism, because it supports, in distinctive Aristotelian naturalist 
fashion, a variety of other important commitments that typify the Aristotelian naturalist 
approach.  
The first is cognitivism, the idea that moral claims, and normative claims more 
generally, are truth apt. Cognitivism holds that the mental states normative claims express 
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are beliefs about the way the world is, rather than non-cognitive motivational states, as 
non-cognitivists claim.18 Philippa Foot’s early work is pervaded by various arguments 
meant to support cognitivism and show the implausibility of non-cognitivism, especially in 
its prescriptivist and emotivist forms.19 The cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate no longer 
looms so large in Aristotelian naturalist writings, but it remains a key commitment. If moral 
goodness is a kind of natural goodness, then moral claims are claims about the natural 
goodness of something. For example, claims about the moral quality of a person, or 
character trait, or potential action, are claims about the natural goodness of the person, trait 
or action. Such claims express beliefs about facts, and thus are truth-apt. So, the core thesis 
supports Aristotelian naturalists’ commitment to cognitivism.  
The core thesis also supports objectivism. Moral objectivism, as I will understand it, 
holds that the truth of moral claims is not subject to the beliefs or desires of any individual 
agent, but is instead grounded in something more general, and thus more stable. 
Objectivism comes in degrees. One might hold that the truth of moral claims is grounded 
in facts about a given culture or linguistic community. On the other side of the spectrum, 
one might hold that the truth of moral claims is grounded in sui generous facts that are 
entirely metaphysically independent of the existence of individual agents—perhaps in God, 
or in some other type of non-natural fact. Aristotelian naturalists fall somewhere between 
these two views, holding that the truth value of moral claims depend on facts about our life 
form. The core thesis offers a way of defending this version of normative objectivism, for 
it entails that claims about what is ethically good or bad claims about human natural 
                                                
 
18 See Miller (2003: Chapter 1) for a helpful overview of the different versions of 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and the traditional arguments used to support them.  
19 See, for example, Foot (2002d; 2002e). 
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goodness or badness, and what is naturally good or bad for humans, is determined by 
general facts about the human life form, not by facts about any particular individual’s 
beliefs or desires. 
 Finally, the core thesis supports metaethical naturalism. Aristotelian naturalists 
characteristically reject approaches that ground practical normativity in something non-
natural, whether that be irreducible and impersonal non-natural facts or super-natural facts, 
say, about God’s nature or God’s commands. Aristotelian naturalism is an attempt to see 
ethics as continuous with, and fully explainable in terms of, the natural world. The core 
thesis supports this commitment because it construes ethical facts as a type of fact that is 
fully explicable without reference to the non-natural or supernatural.  
The core thesis makes possible a distinctly Aristotelian naturalist defense of these 
three core commitments. So, in giving up the idea that human nature is intrinsically 
practically normative, we do not lose much, so long as we can retain and defend the core 
thesis. A principal goal of this study is to do precisely that. 
 
On Reasons 
Since I will be talking a fair bit about reasons, I should note what type of reason I have in 
view. Reasons are often divided into the two main categories of explanatory and normative. 
Explanatory reasons illuminate phenomena or make it intelligible, whereas normative 
reasons support or justify acts, beliefs and emotions.20 I will be concerned with normative 
reasons. Within the domain of normative reasons, it is also customary to distinguish two 
                                                
 
20 These are rough categorizations, and may not be entirely distinct. See, e.g., Raz (2013: 26-
35) and Schroeder (2007: 10-15) for especially illuminating discussions on the relation 
between explanatory and normative reasons. 
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main types of reasons: theoretical or epistemic and practical. Theoretical reasons are normative 
reasons that determine how we should adjust our psychic states (beliefs and emotions) to 
“track how things are,” whereas practical reasons determine what we should do, in light of 
how things are. I will be primarily concerned with practical reasons, and I shall understand 
‘action’ in a broad sense to include not only intentional behaviors, but also intellectual 
actions, such as intentionally attending to an object, or trying to change one’s mood. 
One last terminological clarification: although Aristotelian naturalism is an 
approach to ethics, and although much of the debate is motivated by ethical concerns, I 
will usually speak of reasons in general, rather than specifically about moral or ethical 
reasons. In doing so I am following not only Philippa Foot, but also the general trajectory 
of metaethics in the last 40 years.21 Whereas metaethics in the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s focused 
almost exclusively on morality, and moral claims about right and wrong, most writers since 
that time have broadened their focus to practical reasons in general, treating moral reasons 
as a special class of practical reasons.22 This general emphasis fits well with the inclination, 
common in Aristotelian ethical approaches, to reject a rigid distinction between moral and 
non-moral action, focusing instead on what makes any action good or bad—where ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ is taken not in some special moral sense but in a more general sense linked with 
human nature.23   
                                                
 
21 Foot’s scholarly focus has never been far from ethical concerns, but in her mature work 
she proposes an entirely general theory of reasons for action (Foot 2001; 2004). I explain 
the essentials of her theory in Chapter 3. 
22 See Scanlon (2014: 1-2). 
23 For example, Elizabeth Anscombe (2005b: 209) defends the thesis that “All human 
action is moral action.” In so doing she was following the Thomistic understanding of 
action—see Aquinas (2008: ST I-II.1.3.c) and McInerny (1997: Chapter 1)—which arguably 
follows the Aristotelian understanding. See, e.g., Anscombe (2005a), who argues that the 
idea of a very special sort of reason or obligation we moderns call ‘moral’ cannot be found 
in Aristotle. Aristotle does speak of moral or ethical virtues (Aristotle 1984: Nichomachean 
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CHAPTER 2: NATURAL GOODNESS AND REASONS 
 
In Chapter 1 I described Aristotelian naturalism as involving two main movements. The 
first identifies a certain sort of evaluative judgment about living things. The first task of this 
chapter (Sections 1-3) is to explain the central notions implicated in those evaluative 
judgments, namely, the concepts life form and natural goodness. One must have a firm grasp 
on these concepts in order to understand the second main movement, in which 
Aristotelian naturalists extend this system of evaluation to human beings and the ethical 
domain. This is because in order for Aristotelian naturalists to claim that ethical goodness 
is a kind of natural goodness, and retain the plausible idea that some ethical facts are 
normative, they must be able to show that some facts about natural goodness are 
normative. And one cannot fully understand the Aristotelian naturalist account of this 
without understanding the notion of a life form and the related notion of natural goodness. 
In the final part of this chapter (Section 4) I explain how Aristotelian naturalists have 
attempted to connect these two notions with practical reasons, thereby attempting to falsify 
the normativity objection’s controversial premise.    
 
1. ‘Good’ 
The Aristotelian naturalist understanding of the concept good traces, as one might expect, to 
Aristotle. But Peter Geach, in his paper “Good and Evil” (1956), is usually credited with 
reviving the notion in contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy. He argued that 
‘good’, like ‘small’, is an attributive adjective. Attributive adjectives cannot be severed from 
                                                
 
Ethics 1103a1-10), but the point of the descriptor is to distinguish that type of virtue from 
intellectual virtues—not, as most moderns might think, from prudential virtues. 
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their subject without losing their sense, for the content of the adjective is determined by 
the noun or noun phrase it modifies. Predicative adjectives, by contrast, stand on their 
own, and thus can be detached from their subject without losing their sense. For example, 
‘red’ is a predicative adjective. So “X is a red apple'” can be split into “X is red” and “X is 
an apple,” each resulting in a proposition the contents of which are independently 
understandable. ‘Small’, by contrast, is an attributive adjective, and thus although “X is a 
small elephant” can be split into two apparently sensible locutions—“X is small” and “X is 
an elephant”—we find on reflection that the contents of both statements are not 
independently understandable. For “X is small” tells us nothing about the actual size of X 
until we know what X is. Is X a mouse? A dog? An elephant? A blue whale? Without 
knowing what kind of thing X is, we can say “X is small,” but we will not know whether, 
for example, we must look out lest we crush X or lest X crush us.  
What holds for ‘small’ holds for ‘good’, since ‘good’, on the Aristotelian naturalist 
view, is also an attributive adjective.  Hence, the bare statement “X is good” tells us almost 
nothing about how it is with X until we bring in some noun or noun phrase. This means 
that any statement of the form “X is good” must be understood as shorthand for “X is a 
good F,” where ‘F’ stands for some noun or noun phrase. And note that what stands in for 
‘F’ in some particular claim makes all the difference for how we assess both the claim and 
its object. I suspect we would think about Marjie rather differently if we are told she is a 
good mother than if we were told she is a good interrogator.  
As the foregoing suggests, the ‘F’ variable can represent a wide variety of evaluative 
standards. An oleander bush might be a good hedge and a bad meal. A bull might be a 
good sire and a bad pet. All of these statements are perfectly legitimate uses of ‘good’, for 
‘good’ is an evaluative term, and we can evaluate individual things relative to all sorts of 
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standards, including standards set by our purposes and desires. One particular sort of 
evaluative standard is of special interest to Aristotelian naturalists—and not only to them, 
but also to veterinarians, farmers, pet owners, zoologists, biologists, medical doctors, 
parents, and just about anyone who is interested in living things. To put it roughly, this is 
the standard we employ when we evaluate an organism as a member of its species. A good 
oleander bush is also a good hedge (in some contexts, at least24), but that is because good 
oleanders have the features we want in a hedge. What makes a particular oleander bush a 
good oleander is something else. Roughly, it is exemplifying those features that characterize 
its species. This is the type of evaluation of interest to Aristotelian naturalists—evaluating 
organisms as specimens of their species or life form. This is to say that an organism’s life 
form—or rather facts about its life form—can serve as standards of evaluation. In order to 
see how this works, we need to consider the notion of a life form in more detail.  
 
2. Organisms, Life and Activity 
It will be helpful to begin with a few truisms.25 Some things are alive. We call them 
organisms. Like other medium sized objects, organisms are composites of smaller things—
                                                
 
24 Oleanders are vigorous plants, tolerant of poor soil and low water conditions. The 
oleander is also poisonous, which is advantageous in some contexts (e.g. deer will not eat 
it). Of course, this makes it unfit as a hedge in other contexts where, e.g., domesticated 
animals are at risk of sampling its attractive leaves.  
25 This section is heavily informed by the Aristotelian account of goodness recently 
defended by Christine Korsgaard, known mostly for her extensive work in neo-Kantian 
ethics. In some recent publications she has emerged as an able defender of an Aristotelian 
conception of natural goodness. See Chapter 2 of her book Self Constitution: Agency, Identity, 
and Integrity (2009a) and her recent papers “The Relational Nature of the Good” (2013) and 
“On Having a Good” (2014).  
I should note that nothing in these paragraphs is meant to provide a definition of 
life or of what it is to be an organism. I am simply calling attention to phenomena that 
characterize organisms. 
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ultimately, things like electrons, protons and neutrons, and whatever they are made of. Since 
medium sized objects are all made of basically the same stuff, and since objects are 
different from each other, that difference must be explained by how that basic stuff is put 
together. Being composed of atoms that are internally configured in this particular way, and 
having its atoms put together in that particular way, makes this object a tree, as opposed to, 
say, a snowflake. Generally speaking, to be any particular object is to be structured or 
configured in a particular way. The traditional term for this is ‘form’, where this is 
understood to include not only shape but also internal structure. If the tree disintegrates 
into its component atoms, it is no longer a tree. Hence, to persist in being any particular 
thing is to persist in retaining one’s form. 
Things persist—they keep being what they are—in different ways, depending on 
the type of thing they are. Inanimate objects like chairs, snowflakes, or gold coins keep 
being what they are simply by not being destroyed. For an organism to remain in existence, 
however, it is not enough simply to avoid destruction, although obviously it must do that 
too. For an organism to remain in existence it must do things—or, more precisely, 
processes must be going on within it—processes that support and maintain its life. Some 
organisms also must do things in the ordinary sense in order to keep being what they are. 
They have to find food, for example, or mate, or run from a predator. They have to do 
these things in order for their internal vital processes to keep doing what they do. Living 
things, then, maintain their own existence not only through avoiding destruction by some 
external force but also by actively maintaining themselves. Living essentially involves 
activity.  
Since living involves activity, and activity involves physical motion, and physical 
motion requires energy in order to keep going, one activity all organisms must do is acquire 
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and processes energy. This involves activities like taking in nutrients, metabolizing them 
and eliminating waste and toxins. Organisms do these things in many different ways. For 
some organisms, these activities and processes happen, as it were, automatically. Trees, for 
example, take in water and nutrients by absorbing them. Other organisms must do things in 
the stronger sense of ‘do’ in order to support their vital processes. For example, many 
organisms must eat, which usually involves more specific activity types such as tearing grass, 
chewing, straining out krill from sea water, and so on. Many organisms must also move about, 
sleep, sun themselves, breach, and so on, in order to acquire and process energy. Many 
organisms also need to do another sort of activity in order to stay alive: they need to keep 
their bodies from becoming nutrients for other organisms. That is, they must defend 
themselves from predators. This may involve fleeing, flying, fighting, hiding, swimming, spraying or 
excreting foul-smelling substances, rolling into a ball, changing color and so on. All of these 
activities can be classified as self-maintaining activities. In general, any organism, in order 
to remain an organism, must do its self-maintaining activities to keep its vital processes 
going. An organism cannot long remain what it is if it stops undergoing or doing these 
things. If it stops, it will soon become an inanimate object. 
Given the way the world works as we know it, all organisms must die. If disease, 
injury, or predation do not take them, the stuff they are made of and the bonds that hold 
the stuff together begin to wear down and disintegrate. Also, given the way the world 
works as we know it, organisms do not simply spring into existence on their own. And, 
given these two facts, in order for there to be organisms around beyond the life-span of 
those that currently exist, at least some organisms must do an additional sort of activity. 
They must pass on their particular structure or configuration to more material. That is, they 
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must reproduce. So the activity of reproduction, like the activities involved in self-
maintenance, is essential to the continuance of life. 
To summarize, then, the first thing to notice is that an organism is a composite 
object that must do things in a certain sense in order to keep being what it is. The things it 
must do include self-maintaining activities and, for most organisms, reproduction. It is 
worth noting at this juncture that already we are very close to a certain notion of function. 
Organisms are things that are composed of smaller parts and systems organized such that 
they work together for a certain end or outcome, namely, the continued existence of the 
whole organism. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how we might conceive of living things 
other than as functional systems. If I am right, then there is room for a certain notion of 
function in our conception of organisms which is quite different from the notion of 
function employed within evolutionary biological explanations. Others have discussed this 
issue in detail, however, so having noted it, I will move on.26 
Here is a second thing to notice about organisms. Although organisms self-
maintain and reproduce in different ways, even radically different ways, it is not as though 
each individual organism has its own wholly unique way of maintain itself and reproducing. 
Rather, we find predictable patterns among groups of organisms. An organism’s offspring 
will tend to self-maintain and reproduce in basically the same way as its parent does or did. 
There is enough similarity across the generations of organisms that it is possible to form 
general descriptions of how organisms go about their self-maintaining and reproductive 
activities. Birds like this migrate to such-and-such a place at such-and-such a time. Plants 
                                                
 
26 See, for example, Adams (2006: 51), FitzPatrick (2000), Kitcher (1999), Lenman (2005), 
Lewens (2010), Millum (2006) and Williams (1985: 44). For Aristotelian responses, see 
Foot (2001: 32, n. 10), Hursthouse (2012), Lott (2012a), Thompson (2008: 76-82) and 
Hacker-Wright (2009). 
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like this bloom every year at such-and-such a time, and their blooms are of such-and-such 
color. Monkeys like that reproduce in such and such a way at such-and-such a time, and 
generate so many offspring. Living things, that is, have characteristic ways of living and 
reproducing—even dying. The judgments by which we express our understanding of these 
characteristic ways of living and reproducing turn out to be crucially important for the 
Aristotelian account of natural goodness, for what we are expressing in these judgments is 
our understanding of a particular form of life, or life form. To understand how a living 
thing is characteristically constituted and how it characteristically lives is to understand what 
it is, or its nature. 
Aristotelian naturalists claim that we can evaluate organisms as good ones or bad 
ones, or somewhere in between, by reference to this generalized conception of the 
particular life form in question. Roughly, if an organism’s parts and activities contribute in 
the characteristic way to its living the characteristic life of its species, it is a good one of its 
kind. If they don’t, the organism is in that respect defective. Thus, we rightly evaluate a 
hawk as defective—lacking in goodness—if it shares the visual capacities of a mole. It is a 
defective, and the mole is not, because for the hawk form of life, good eyesight is crucial 
for helping it find and catch its next meal. We would not, however, evaluate a mole as 
defective if it shares the visual capacities of our myopic hawk. For moles have humbler 
means of securing their food.27 
                                                
 
27 A full exposition of the notion of natural goodness would give special attention to the 
fact that good-making features of organisms do not always benefit the particular individual 
being evaluated, but rather benefit their offspring, or perhaps other species members. A 
bluebird that does not sit on its eggs may have more opportunities to nourish itself and 
perhaps maximize its chances of survival. Still, a bluebird that does not brood its eggs is in 
that respect defective. Honey bees are another commonly cited example. Honey bees die 
after stinging an attacker. So, in one obvious sense, stinging an attacker does not benefit 
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I have now identified three different pieces of the Aristotelian naturalist 
understanding of the basic evaluative framework. There is (1) the notion of a life form, (2) 
a certain type of generalized judgment by which we express our understanding of a life 
form, and (3) a different sort of judgment by which we evaluate particular organisms 
against facts about their life form. In the next section I will look at each of these notions in 
more detail, so that we can see the logical relations between them. I think it will be helpful 
to use a fictional example.  
 
3. The Life Form System 
Michael Thompson has done more than any other Aristotelian naturalist to theorize the 
notion of a life form and the associated notion of natural goodness.28 In this section I lean 
heavily on his 2004 paper “Apprehending Human Form.” He has shown that judgments 
about natural goodness are caught up in a web of logical connections with other distinct 
but related forms of judgment. Five forms of judgment in particular fit together in an 
interlinked system, such that forming a judgment of natural goodness (one of the five 
types) about some individual organism logically depends on, and implicitly commits one to, 
further judgments within what I will call the life form system. It is important to see the 
interconnected nature of this system, for that is what underlies the Aristotelian naturalist 
                                                
 
that particular bee. Still, a honey bee on guard duty who is not disposed to sting an attacker 
is defective in that respect. 
28 See his paper “The Representation of Life” (1995), later revised and amplified as 
Chapters 1-4 of his book Life and Action (2008). Many of the same ideas also appear in his 
paper “Apprehending Human Form” (2004). The significance of Thompson’s 
contributions is not lost on Elijah Millgram, who, though no friend of Aristotelian 
naturalism, says in his review of Life and Action: “Thompson's book stands a decent chance 
of becoming the Naming and Necessity of the next round of moral philosophy, and if it does, 
the attention it receives will be entirely deserved” (Millgram 2009: 563). 
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thought that claims about human nature entail normative claims about what is good and 
bad for humans. 
Type 1: Life form attributions. Suppose you are a conservationist happily poking 
around in the wood when you come across a new creature you have never seen before. It 
has dense, brown, coarse fur, a short, bony protrusion sticking straight out of its head, a 
thick, stubby tail, and a peculiar way of hobbling along through the underbrush. Since you 
have seen only one of these critters, there is much you do not know about it. You have not 
a clue whether, e.g., this is its normal mode of locomotion or whether it is injured; whether 
its short tail is typical of such creatures or whether it had an unfortunate encounter with a 
snapping turtle, and so on. As you follow it, however, suddenly you come upon a whole 
crowd of these things, all of them with the same horn, hobble, and tail.  
Of course, the critical scientist in you knows that it may be too early to say with 
certainty whether the horn, hobble, and tail, characterize these critters as distinctive form of 
life. It is possible, e.g., that each one of these individuals had an unfortunate encounter 
with that aggressive snapping turtle, or that they all came down with the gout. Still, as you 
discover more and more groups of these creatures, all sharing the same horn, hobble, and 
tail, you become more confident that what you are seeing is not merely a large clan of 
gouty, horned creatures of some other known type, but rather a distinctive form of life. At 
this point you have come to recognize that the similarity between the individual creatures is 
no accident. They are similar because they are the same type of thing; they share the same 
life form. You can now give their type a name—“horned hobblers,” you call them—and 
form a certain sort of judgment about each particular organism. Pointing to one of the 
brown, furry creatures you say, “That is a horned hobbler.” 
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This judgment is a life form attribution. It classifies the subject of the judgment as 
falling under a newly acquired concept, the concept we are naming horned hobbler. The 
general form of these judgments is “X is an S,” or “X is a bearer of life form S,” or “X is a 
member of species S.” In other circumstances, we might say. “Rufus is a hamster” or 
“Graham, is a human being,” or “That brown critter over there is a member of the species 
horned hobbler.” 
Type 2: Natural-historical judgments. Above I said that when you have observed enough 
horned hobblers to be able confidently to make type 1 judgments about them, you will be 
in position to know that their peculiar gait and abbreviated tail are not merely accidental 
similarities but are how horned hobblers are characteristically constituted. Eventually we 
are able to move from discrete observations about the constitution and activities of 
particular organisms to an implicit grasp of the general type, which we name horned hobbler. 
This implicit grasp of the general type can be articulated and made explicit in a second 
form of judgment. “Horned hobblers have a bony horn atop their heads,”' one might say, 
or “the horned hobbler’s tail is 5-8 inches long.” The following example judgments share 
this same logical form: 
[A] “The cottontail rabbit’s gestation period is 29-31 days.” 
[B] “Wolves have a cooperative method of hunting.” 
[C] “The mayfly breeds in the springtime.” 
[D] “The cheetah has four long and powerful legs.” 
These sentences express a second and logically distinct form of judgment which 
Thompson calls natural-historical judgments, presumably after the literary genre in which they 
commonly appear—natural history. We can represent them schematically in the canonical 
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form: “The S is/has/does F”, or “S’s are/do/have F,” or “This is part of how S’s live: they 
are/do/have F.” 
Natural-historical judgments are the generalized descriptions I briefly discussed in 
Section 2 above. They are also the backbone of this whole account, so it will pay to linger 
on them to bring out five key features. First is the interdependent relationship I already 
mentioned above between life form concepts and natural-historical judgments. A life form 
concept is the mental item that mediates experience. To recognize this particular hairy 
thing as a horned hobbler is to apprehend it under the concept horned hobbler. We can make 
this concept explicit to ourselves and to others by articulating various aspects of that life 
form in natural-historical judgments. Although I will need to qualify this in a moment, we 
can get at the interrelation by saying that natural-historical judgments express the content of 
a life form concept. 
Second, our understanding of particular life form concepts can be more or less 
complete, as reflected in the level of detail we could articulate in the associated natural-
historical judgments. Above I gave four examples of natural-historical judgments. Each 
judgment was about a different life form. We could, however, form a whole array of 
natural-historical judgments about any one of these life forms, and indeed about any life 
form with which we have sufficient experience. We might, for example, add to the 
judgment about rabbit gestation more natural-historical judgments about cottontails, such 
as: “The cottontail has long ears and five toes on each front paw, the fifth called a 
‘dewclaw’.” “Cottontails begin their breeding cycle in the early spring.” “The doe is able to 
mate the same day she gives birth.” And so on. If we keep adding true judgments to the list 
eventually we will have a whole catalogue of judgments that describe the cottontail rabbit 
life form. That is, we would have a complete set of judgments that describe how the 
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cottontail is constituted and how it maintains and reproduces itself. Following Thompson 
(2004: 50), we can call the complete class of such judgments the natural history of the 
cottontail rabbit. Similarly, we could also describe the horned hobbler in minute detail. We 
could describe not only how it mates and eats and defends itself; we could also describe 
how it digests, how its sensory systems work, and so on. The complete collection of such 
judgments would constitute the natural history of the horned hobbler. In general, a 
complete natural history makes fully explicit our understanding of what it is to be an 
organism of that type. Arguably our understanding of any particular life form is 
incomplete, however, and to that extent articulating a complete natural history is not 
possible. But no matter. We do know some things about some life forms—enough, e.g., for 
veterinarians to secure predictable results much of the time. 
Our conception of a life form, then, can be more or less complete. Third, it can 
also be mistaken. Hence, we need to register an important qualification on my claim above 
that natural-historical judgments express the content of a life form concept. In the abstract, 
this is true. But when it comes to actual natural-historical judgments that you and I grasp in 
thought and speech, it is more correct to say that natural-historical judgments express our 
understanding of a life form concept, which can indeed be mistaken. If my only experience of 
cottontail rabbits is with those owned by my rabbit-lover neighbor, whose cottontails have 
all been dewclawed, I might form the judgment “The cottontail has four toes on each 
paw.” I would be wrong. The cottontail rabbit actually has five toes, including the dewclaw. 
So I would be expressing a partially mistaken conception of the life form cottontail. So our 
conception of any particular life form can be erroneous. This suggests that the truth value 
of any particular natural-historical judgment is not determined by what I believe about the 
organism in question, nor is it determined by my desires or preferences. In this sense, 
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natural-historical judgments are objective. This is why Philippa Foot (1994: 163) describes 
these sorts of judgments as “autonomously species-dependent.” They are autonomous in 
that their truth value is determined independently of human interest and desire. They are 
species-dependent in that they are formed by reference to our conception of the species or 
life form of the individual in question. While the possibility of being mistaken indicates the 
possibility of a certain kind of objectivity, it also suggests that to some extent we should 
keep an open mind about our current understanding of any particular organism, including 
humans.  
Fourth, natural-historical judgments exhibit a distinctive sort of generality. 
Consider again the example judgments listed above, the judgments:  
[A] “The cottontail rabbit’s gestation period is 29-31 days.” 
[B] “Wolves have a cooperative method of hunting.” 
[C] “The mayfly breeds in the springtime.” 
[D] “The cheetah has four long and powerful legs.” 
Clearly, these are general descriptions. But what kind of generality do they exhibit? One 
might be tempted to read A-D as universally quantified claims, generalized from a set of 
observations of particular organisms. This would be a mistake. Universal generalizations 
are falsified by exceptional cases, for universal generalizations purport to be true of each 
individual in the domain over which the quantifier ranges. But natural-historical judgments 
are not falsified by exceptional cases. For example, the truth of B is not called into question 
by a free-riding wolf who idles through the hunt and then shares in the kill at the end; nor 
is D thrown into doubt by some particular cheetah who lost its leg in a poacher’s trap—or 
even a whole group of them who lost their legs to the same poacher. Or, consider another 
statement that often appears in the literature on this topic: “Humans have thirty-two 
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teeth.”29 This expression apparently expresses something true about human beings. Yet the 
fact that I am a human and that I do not have thirty-two teeth does not falsify it.  
If the kind of generality operative in natural-historical judgments is not universal 
quantification, should we then interpret such judgments as statistical generalizations? 
Perhaps such judgments are meant to express what is usually, or perhaps almost always, the 
case. Most cottontail rabbits gestate their young for 29-31 days; but not all do. Most 
cheetahs have four long and powerful legs; but not all do. Exceptional cases do not impugn 
the truth of statistical generalizations. So one might initially be inclined to assimilate 
natural-historical judgments to this familiar type of generalization. 
But if we interpret natural-historical judgments as statistical generalizations, once 
again we will have erred, and we know this for at least two reasons. Consider that the 
natural-historical judgment “The Mayfly dies shortly after breeding” is true, even though 
many Mayflies, living most of their lives as nymphs in the water, succumb to hungry fish 
long before they have a chance to breed. In general, it is possible (though not usual) for the 
predicate of a natural-historical judgment to fail to apply to the majority of individual 
organisms of the relevant kind, without impugning the truth of the judgment.30 The second 
reason is even more telling: natural-historical judgments exhibit inferential patterns that 
statistical generalizations do not. Even though natural-historical judgments are not 
universally generalized claims, they can be joined by inferences that are sound for universal 
generalizations but clearly invalid for statistical generalizations. For instance, the natural-
historical judgments “The S is F” and “The S is G” together entail “The S is both F and 
                                                
 
29 This example traces to G. E. M. Anscombe (1958), who used it to call attention to this 
very feature of such expressions. 
30 Thompson (2004: 50-1). Plantinga (1993: 200-1) makes a similar point about the notion 
of proper function not being reducible to statistical generalizations. 
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G.” For example: “The cheetah has long and powerful legs” and “The cheetah has a long, 
flexible tail” together entail “The cheetah has long, powerful legs and a long, flexible tail.” 
In this respect, natural-historical judgments are like universally quantified claims, for “All 
A’s are F” and “All A’s are G” together entail “All A’s are F and G.” And yet, such an 
inference would be invalid for any statistical generalization.31  
Now, if natural-historical judgments are not universal generalizations, then clearly 
their subject cannot be the collection of all organisms of that type. That is, if it is true that 
“The mayfly breeds in the springtime,” the grammatical subject of that judgment cannot 
refer to the set of all mayflies. (Again, many of them encounter hungry fish long before 
they have a chance to breed.) Similarly, if natural-historical judgments are not statistical 
generalizations, then clearly their subject cannot be a subset of all organisms of that type 
either. The best way to make sense of these judgments, according to Thompson, is to hold 
the subject of such judgments is not any particular organism or a set of actual organisms 
but rather the representation of a life form. That is, the grammatical subject of such 
judgments is singular—it represents a single life form concept. So, for instance, where the 
grammatical subject of the statement “that S is hobbling along” refers to that particular 
portion of flesh and bone, the subject of “The S hobbles along” refers to no particular 
organism at all, but rather to our conception of the life form itself. The generality of such 
judgments is explained by the fact that there are multiple bearers of the same life form.  
                                                
 
31 Thompson (2008: 69). Thompson also considers and rejects two other attempts at 
reducing the generality of natural-historical judgments to a more familiar form. One 
attempt is to interpret natural-historical judgments as universal propositions qualified 
against exceptions by a ceteris paribus clause. The other attempt interprets natural-
historical judgments using the linguist’s category of a generic sentence. I will not review the 
arguments here. For the argument details see Thompson (2008: 69-83). The upshot is that 
both attempts clearly fail. Kitcher (1999: 64-68) also discusses the problem with trying to 
understand an organism’s essence or nature in terms of what is statistically normal. 
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The fifth and last feature of natural-historical judgments I shall discuss is their 
peculiar temporal qualities. Although natural-historical judgments can register temporal 
relations, such as before and after, they have a kind of atemporality about them.32 Speaking 
of a particular organism, you might say, “That S is hobbling along.” If your claim is true, 
there is some animal out there hobbling along. By contrast, when asserting a natural-
historical judgment you would instead say, “The S hobbles along,” or “S’s hobble along.” 
From these claims we could not infer that any particular S is in fact hobbling along right 
now. To take another example, you might say of an individual youthful specimen, “This 2-
year old hobbler is developing her horn.” You would be describing how it is with that 
particular organism here and now. But if you expressed the similar natural-historical 
judgment, you might say, “the horned hobbler begins developing its horn in its second year,” 
perhaps pointing to our 2-year old specimen, adding, “like so.” This statement’s truth value 
would not, however, be affected in the least if, say, a plague had wiped out the previous 
year’s offspring, so that there are in fact no 2-year old specimens to serve as examples. 
Similarly, claim C above, “The mayfly breeds in the springtime,” is true at any time of year, 
whereas “Those yonder mayflies are breeding,” if true, could be said only during the 
springtime. Natural-historical judgments are, therefore, atemporal in a certain way. Of 
course, mayflies have to exist, or had to have existed, in order for natural-historical 
judgments about them to be true. But once they do exist, natural-historical judgments 
about them float free in a certain sense from the particular doings of particular mayflies at 
particular times. All this is perfectly consistent with significant change in a life form’s 
natural history, for life forms can evolve. Using my fictional example, suppose horned 
                                                
 
32 See Thompson (2004: 49). 
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hobblers evolved such that they began developing their horn in their first year of life. Then 
it would no longer be true to say “The horned hobbler develops its horn in its second 
year.” Thus, although life forms and natural histories are cut loose in the way I mentioned 
from the actual individual organisms with which they are associated, they are not eternal 
realities in some platonic sense (Foot 2001: 29).  
Type 3: Vital descriptions. Having a grip on a particular life form enables us to form a 
third type of judgment: vital description. These are like life form attributions in that their 
subject is always a particular organism. They describe what is going on here and now with a 
particular organism: “That horned hobbler is mating,” we say, as we see it mounting 
another one in the group. We might come back later to find the same creature munching 
away on the grass. “Now it is eating,” we might say. The schematic form of such 
judgments would be something like: “This S (or X) is/has/does G” (Thompson 2004: 51).  
Notice though that although the grammatical subject of a vital description is always 
singular and particular—a discrete collection of flesh, blood and bones that occupies a 
definite position in space and time—vital descriptions always make implicit appeal to (one’s 
understanding of) the subject’s life form. Following Thompson, I will express this idea by 
saying vital descriptions are life form dependent. Take as examples the two activities I just 
mentioned: reproducing and eating. These two vital activities can be physically constituted 
very differently in different forms of life. And, conversely, different vital processes can, in 
different forms of life, be physically constituted by the same sequence of events. Consider, 
for example, the process of cell division. For “amoeba-kind,” as Thompson puts it (2004: 
64), this process constitutes reproduction. For a human, it does not. Cell division is of 
course part of the process of human reproduction, as it would be for horned hobbler 
reproduction. But when your cells divide, for instance, as some of them did while you were 
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reading the last sentence, we cannot say there are now more humans in the room, whereas 
when amoeba cells divide, we can say there are more amoebae in the room. Something 
similar holds for all vital processes. We cannot so much as recognize some sequence of 
events going on in some region of space-time as a vital process of a particular type without 
implicit appeal to some understanding of its host life form. Hence, if I were to judge, truly: 
“That horned hobbler is mating,” or “That horned hobbler is eating,” then I must already 
have some implicit grasp on how horned hobblers characteristically reproduce and eat. If 
these judgments are true, I would have to know, e.g., that when one horned hobbler 
mounts another, it is not merely (or not always) a display of dominance or a form of play 
but in fact part of their reproductive process. And when it is munching grass, I would have 
to know, e.g., that it is not simply storing away the grass in an extra stomach, to be 
regurgitated at a later time for its young.33  
Type 4: Judgments of natural goodness or badness. Natural-historical judgments, together 
with vital descriptions, enable us to express a third distinctive form of judgment. Once we 
know something of how a certain type of organism characteristically operates, and the 
features it characteristically has, and once we have formed judgments about how it is with 
some particular organism of that type, we are in position to form a kind of evaluative 
judgment. Suppose we now know the natural-historical judgment that “The horned 
                                                
 
33 See Thompson (2008: 49-62) for more extensive argument and examples on this point. 
Note that it is a small step to the stronger claim that in order to cognize some particular 
physical process as a vital process at all, one must possess the concept of a life form. This 
is why the Aristotelian notion of a life form is not identical to the biologist’s concept of a 
species. The biologists notion of a species—or, I should say, the various competing 
notions, for there is no single agreed upon one—is logically posterior to her notion of an 
individual organism. If the biologist did not first identify a collection of living things, she 
would have no use for the notion of a species to begin with. Yet, we cannot so much as 
conceive something as alive, as undergoing certain vital processes, unless the Aristotelian 
notion of life form is already on the scene. See Thompson (2008: 66, n. 11). 
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hobbler’s head horn grows straight, perpendicular to its skull.” And suppose we notice that 
one individual’s horn is growing in a circular fashion. So we judge: “That horned hobbler’s 
horn is crooked.” We can now express the relation between this vital description and the 
natural-historical judgment with a third distinctive form of judgment, namely, a judgment 
of natural goodness or badness. Putting the point abstractly, we could say that from the 
natural-historical judgment “The S is/has/does F” and the vital description “This S 
is/has/does not F,” we can infer a new form of judgment: “The S is good/defective in that 
it is/has/does F” (Thompson 2008: 80). We can call this a judgment of natural goodness, 
or natural goodness judgment. We can see then that natural goodness judgments are like 
vital descriptions in being life form dependent. They reach beyond the particular organism, 
necessarily implicating the evaluator’s understanding of the organism’s natural history. 
The inference from a natural-historical judgment and a vital description to a 
judgment of natural goodness or defect is licensed primarily by the content of the concept 
defect. For the Aristotelian naturalist, to be defective just is to diverge in a certain way from 
its natural history.34 Natural goodness, for the Aristotelian naturalist, is essentially the 
                                                
 
34 The qualification ‘in a certain way’ is important. As Thompson describes it, natural defect 
is simply divergence from an organism’s natural history. But, as Foot (2001: 30) has 
pointed out, our concept of defect is more specific than that. In fact, we have a different 
concept that captures mere divergence from an organism’s natural history. It is the concept 
abnormality. Defect is different in that it is connected to a certain notion of harm. For 
example, if the horned hobbler’s crooked horn made no difference to its life as a horned 
hobbler, it would seem to be best classified as an abnormality. If, on the other hand, the 
crooked horn placed it at a disadvantage with respect to its ability to defend itself, or if the 
horn will eventually curve around and start growing back into its head, as can happen in 
some types of cows and sheep, then the divergence would count as a defect. Thus, an 
organism is defective if the particular way in which it diverges from its natural history 
implies some sort of harm. The notion of implying harm here is complex, however, since 
an organism might get lucky and never actually be harmed by what would intuitively count 
as a defect—e.g. if our crooked horned hobbler never actually had to defend itself in way 
that required use of its horn. See Foot (2001: 34-5) for discussion on this point. 
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absence of natural defect. Naturally good features are sometimes described as those that 
enable an organism to live its characteristic life well. But I think it is actually more helpful to 
think of naturally good features as those that enable an organism to live its characteristic 
life—full stop. Features that in some way hinder that life are natural defects. Hence, there 
is a conceptual link between natural-historical judgments (and thus the notion of a life 
form), vital descriptions, and judgments of natural goodness. This will prove important 
later in this chapter when we consider Aristotelian responses to the normativity objection. 
Type 5: Judgments of natural standard. We are now in position to see that in considering 
natural goodness judgments, a fifth form of judgment has already emerged, which we 
might call a judgment of natural standard. Its general form will be something like: “An S is 
defective/sound in a certain respect if it is/has/does G.” In the previous section we saw 
how we could generate natural goodness judgments from natural-historical judgments 
combined with vital descriptions. This was possible because an organism’s natural history 
can function as an ideal type or standard, against which we can compare particular 
individuals. Judgments of natural standard essentially make explicit this evaluative function 
of natural-historical judgments by employing an evaluative concept in the judgment itself. 
As Thompson puts it, “judgments of natural standard might be said simply to transpose 
our natural historical judgments into an evaluative key” (Thompson 2004: 55).  
Judgments of natural standard employ an evaluative concept, and specify some 
condition under which the concept applies. They specify what we might call natural norms. 
For, in our language, the conceptual connections between good, defect, and should, allow us to 
say that if an S is good in that it is/has/does G, then S’s should be/have/do G. Thus we 
say that a hen should brood her eggs, a lioness should teach her cubs to hunt, and a wolf 
should cooperate in the hunt. These claims follow as a matter of conceptual necessity from 
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the corresponding judgments of natural standard (e.g., a mother hen is defective in respect 
of reproduction if she does not brood her eggs, and so on).  
These five types of judgment, and the special concepts they employ, together 
constitute the life form system.  
 
4. Natural Goodness and Reasons 
I have suggested that Aristotelian naturalism can be understood in terms of two main 
claims or movements. The first identifies a certain mode of evaluation of living things. We 
have now considered this mode of evaluation in some detail, and noticed the way in which 
it is logically interconnected with related claims about an organism’s nature or life form. 
The second main movement extends this mode of evaluation to human beings, including 
the ethical domain. Moral goodness is thus understood as the natural goodness associated 
with our ethically relevant powers, dispositions and action. Critics have been wary of this 
move, in part because humans are rational animals, and it seems the introduction of reason 
makes trouble for any attempt to understand moral goodness as a kind of natural 
goodness. When it comes to how human beings reproduce, raise and educate their 
offspring, build their dwellings, acquire nourishment, work together as a community, 
interact with the environment and other animal species, and so on, only very general 
descriptions will be possible. This has led some thinkers to doubt whether judgments that 
are general enough plausibly to capture the “characteristic way of life” of human beings are 
substantive enough to play any interesting role in ethical theory.35  
                                                
 
35 See Conly (1988) and Copp & Sobel (2004). See also Gary Watson’s comment: “An 
objective account of human nature would imply, perhaps, that a good human life must be 
social in character. This implication will disqualify the sociopath but not the Hell's Angel” 
(Watson 1997: 67). Hursthouse (1999: Chapter 9) interacts with this worry. 
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But Aristotelian naturalists argue that the same conceptual naturalistic structure still 
applies. It is true that when moving from plants and non-human animals to humans, our 
conception of the human way of life ends up much thinner than, say, our conception of 
the chimpanzee way of life. But a thinner conception is not no conception. Philosophers of 
a broadly Aristotelian bent disagree both on how thick this conception is and on the way in 
which it relates to ethical norms.36 Aristotelian naturalism holds there are indeed 
substantive facts about how the human characteristically lives—substantive enough to 
support the idea that ethical goodness is a kind of natural goodness—and that these facts 
ground substantive ethical norms.37  
The normativity objection takes aim at precisely this idea, that natural goodness 
judgments can have any normative bearing on action. In order to see how Aristotelian 
naturalists defend the second main movement of their approach against the normativity 
objection, we need to see how they attempt to connect natural goodness and reasons. Two 
main strategies have been offered. They are consistent with each other, but come at the 
issue from opposite ends. Micah Lott, one of the “new cohort” of Aristotelians naturalists, 
starts by clarifying the Aristotelian notion of the human life form and attempts to show a 
logical continuity between claims about it and claims about what we have reason to do. The 
other main strategy, developed by Foot, starts by developing an account of practical 
                                                
 
36 Regarding the substantiality of general facts about human nature, see e.g. Mark LeBar 
(2013), who defends an Aristotelian account of practical reason, but holds a very thin 
account of human nature. I discuss LeBar in Chapter 4. Regarding the relation of human 
nature to ethical norms, see John McDowell (1998b), who, though also Aristotelian in 
approach, thinks it no part of Aristotelian ethics to ground ethical norms in human 
nature—at least, as neo-Aristotelians understand that nature. 
37 This is Foot’s view about human nature (see Foot 2001; chapters 1-4), it seems to be 
Thompson’s view (see his unpublished lecture), and it is certainly the way Aristotelian 
naturalism is interpreted by its critics. See also Hursthouse (1999: 222). 
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rationality and then showing how it is ultimately based in facts about natural goodness and 
human nature.38  
 
Micah Lott’s Account 
Micah Lott develops his account of the relation between natural goodness and reasons in a 
2014 paper titled “Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness, Reason, and the 
Authority of Human Nature.” The paper is an explicit response to the normativity 
objection. He begins by pointing out that the plausibility of the normativity objection 
“depends on an apparent gap between what [is] naturally good for us qua human beings 
(=the normal) and what has a claim upon our reason (=the normative)” (Lott 2014: 770). 
The gap appears to open when we abstract away from our understanding of human nature 
in order to subject it to critical scrutiny. It is in this space, between our conception of 
human nature and the standpoint we achieve by stepping back from it, that the normativity 
objection finds a grip. As Lott (2014: 770) puts it, once we step back to a position of 
rational reflection, “what is naturally good confronts us as a fact to be evaluated, not as an 
authoritative voice to which our reason must submit…”39  
                                                
 
38 Rosalind Hursthouse has written at some length both about natural goodness (see her 
1999: Chapters 8-9) and on reasons for action (1999: esp. chapter 6). Although she is 
sometimes interpreted as having attempted to connect reasons with our natural ends as 
organisms (see Hooker 2002 and Gowans 2008), in fact she avoids offering any account of 
the relation between human nature or natural goodness and practical reasons. See 
Hursthouse (1999: 170, 180) and (2002: 51). Allen Thompson makes a similar point (2007: 
253). 
39 The idea that we can step back from our own nature also appears clearly in John 
McDowell’s “Two Sorts of Naturalism” when he says, “[r]eason does not just open our 
eyes to our nature, as members of the animal species we belong to; it also enables and even 
obliges us to step back from it, in a way that puts its bearing on our practical problems into 
question” (McDowell 1998: 172). 
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Against this thought, Lott claims that the objection misunderstands Aristotelian 
naturalism. On the Aristotelian naturalist account of human nature, there is no logical 
space between human nature and the critical standpoint. The stepping back metaphor 
seems plausible only because it employs a non-Aristotelian conception of human nature. 
Once we understand the Aristotelian conception, we will see that “while any substantive 
conception of human form might be wrong, it will never be normatively inert… Rather it 
must embody a normatively significant understanding of human life and action” (Lott 2014: 
770; emphasis in original). 
To see how this works, consider three key Aristotelian naturalist ideas. The first is 
the fact, familiar by now, that the Aristotelian conception of a life form is a conception of 
an ideal type.40 Understanding the nature of, say, a mint plant involves some grasp of how a 
non-defective mint plant is characteristically constituted and of its characteristic life-cycle. 
Our conception of the mint life form is ideal in the sense that it is of a mint plant 
completely lacking in any defect. All natural goodness judgments of individual mint plants 
implicitly appeal to this idealized conception. Without it, we would not know, e.g., that 
yellowed leaves indicate natural defect in mint plants. The Aristotelian conception of our 
own life form, human, is idealized in exactly the same way. Understanding that this 
particular bit of flesh and bone is a human being—rather than, say, a grossly deformed, 
hairless ape—involves some grasp on how a non-defective human is characteristically 
constituted and on the human’s characteristic life-cycle.41  
                                                
 
40 See Fink (2006: 211-216) for a helpful discussion on the contrast between what he calls 
the “materialist” and the “idealist” conception of nature. Fink goes on to defend a third, 
broader conception of nature that includes both the materialist and the idealist 
conceptions. 
41 This first key idea should not be confused with the idea that our conception of the 
human life form is ideal in the sense that it is a reflection of our deepest values. For this 
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The second key idea is that the human organism possesses a certain natural power 
or capacity we call practical reason. This power enables us to conceptualize possible courses 
of action, to deliberate about their merits, and then use those conceptualizations to guide 
our behavior. Like any other natural faculty, practical reason can malfunction. This implies 
there are standards of proper operation for practical reason. Just as it is good for the 
human organism for its cardiovascular system and its digestive system to function in a 
certain describable way, it is also good for the human organism for its practical reasoning 
system to function in a certain way. And when these systems do function so, they are 
functioning properly.  
The third key idea is that although practical reason is like any other natural human 
faculty in being standard natural equipment, so to speak, for the human organism, and in 
implying certain standards of proper operation, practical reason is also unlike other natural 
powers in its importance for shaping our lives. The way humans characteristically live is by 
deploying all their other powers to think and act in a way that is responsive to and guided 
by reasons. This means there is a very close connection between characteristic human 
activities—i.e. the activities of a non-defective human—and practical reasons. Having a 
grasp on one involves having a grasp on the other. If human action is characteristically 
rational action, guided by reasons as they appear to that individual, then to have a grasp on 
how humans characteristically act is also to have some grasp on the reasons on which those 
                                                
 
view, see Nussbaum (1992; 1993; 1995; 2000). That this is not the Aristotelian naturalist 
conception of human nature shows up in the fact that we can form very specific and 
accurate conceptions of the nature and natural goodness of organisms whose flourishing is 
incompatible with our own. On any ordinary construal of ‘value’, we do not value, say, 
anthrax bacteria that have colonized in someone’s body. Yet this does not hinder our 
ability to form an accurate and detailed conception of the anthrax life form, and, based on 
that, an accurate conception of what is good and bad for such bacteria.  
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actions are done. Clearly, we do have some grasp on how human characteristically act. 
“Thus,” says Lott, 
what is naturally good in humans is a life in which practical reason is functioning 
properly—i.e. a life that is practically rational, in the positive evaluative sense. 
Therefore any substantive account of human form—any conception we might step 
back from—will already embody some understanding of how we have reason to act 
and to live… With a conception of human form, there can be no gap between what 
is normal and normative. (Lott: 2014: 771; emphasis in original) 
Of course, if there can be no such gap, there is no standpoint from which we can question 
the authority of human nature. 
To illustrate the practical reason response, Lott describes a case that initially 
appears to make trouble for his view and then shows why it actually does not (Lott 2014: 
771-2). The case involves students at a prestigious university who, in protest against the 
university’s discriminatory policies, undertake a hunger strike. They refrain from eating so 
long that they become sick. Clearly, their striking is naturally bad for their digestive 
systems. Yet it is also clear that they act well in undertaking the strike. They are acting on 
good reasons, and in so acting they bring some aspects of themselves into a naturally worse 
condition. Does this show that natural goodness and normativity come apart?  
No, says Lott, or at least not problematically. Practical reason is a kind of 
architectonic natural power for human beings. For humans, eating is not merely a 
biological process; it essentially involves an act of rational will. This is because of the 
particular way in which humans eat. Unlike some organisms, we cannot absorb nutrients 
through our skin. We find food, put it into our mouths, chew it and swallow it. If we 
cannot do this ourselves, someone else has to do these things (or some equivalent) for us. 
This means that, for humans, eating characteristically involves action—not mere 
movement, but intentional action, which is motivated and guided by reasons. And this in 
turn means that we cannot evaluate the natural goodness of particular instances of eating in 
46 
isolation from the reasons that motivate those instances of eating. The students acted on 
good reasons. In choosing to start striking and to continue striking, their power of practical 
reason was functioning properly, correctly determining what sort of response was 
appropriate for the situation. So in declining to eat they were being good humans. They were 
acting in the characteristic human way, given their circumstances.  
Now of course humans also have powers other than practical reasoning. And in 
this case, the student’s naturally good actions had bad effects on some of their subsystems. 
But there is nothing especially mysterious about this. It happens all the time. The most 
extreme type of case, which is also very common, occurs when an organism dies doing 
what is characteristic of that type of organism, as when a mother dies protecting her child 
from a kidnapper. The fact that the mother dies does not mean that she was behaving 
defectively in resisting the attacker. Quite the opposite, we might think. So the fact that, 
given actual circumstances, acting well qua human might not always conduce to the natural 
goodness of all our other systems, and might even sometimes bring out our own death, 
does not show that in such actions we act badly qua human. It simply means the world is 
such that it is not always possible fully to flourish in every respect, in everything we should 
do.  
Lott concludes there is no gap in the striking student case between natural 
goodness and moral goodness or normative reasons. Given the role of practical reason in 
the human way of life, having a grasp on how humans characteristically live is to have a 
grasp on what humans have reason to do. In his words: 
Because we are practically rational animals, we cannot begin to say how ‘the 
human’ eats, copulates, relaxes, etc. without at the same time saying how we do 
these things in a way that is properly responsive to reasons. Thus by saying how 
‘the human’ eats, copulates, relaxes, etc. we are already taking a stand on the sorts 
of reasons that we ought to recognize. (Lott 2014: 772)  
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To know something about our nature puts us in position to know something about what is 
good for us. And to know something about how good human practical reason operates is to 
know something about the reasons we ought to recognize as normatively significant. Thus, 
there is no logical gap between natural goodness and reasons. Facts about human natural 
goodness are in this sense intrinsically normative. For the idea is that we can move from 
claims about human nature and human natural goodness to claims about reasons, where 
the normativity of reasons is already built into, or comes from, our understanding of the 
human life form. 
 
Philippa Foot’s Account 
Those familiar with Philippa Foot’s work know she underwent a significant change in 
philosophical outlook during the late ‘80s, through the mid ‘90s, and which culminated in 
her 2001 book Natural Goodness.42 The change, by her own account, involved a rejection of 
the Humean account of reasons on which she had long been relying,43 and the 
development of a new account of practical reason which, she thought, finally linked natural 
goodness (and thus virtue) with reasons, thereby showing the rationality of morality.44  
                                                
 
42 John Hacker-Wright has written extensively in clarification and defense of Foot’s work. 
See Hacker-Wright (2009; 2013a; 2013b).   
43 See, for example, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” (Foot 1972). 
Actually, although she describes her early view as “more or less Humean,” in that she took 
desires to be the basic source of reasons, in some papers she also allowed “considerations 
of self-interest an independent ‘reason-giving’ force” (2001: 10). For example, in “Moral 
Beliefs” (1958) Foot argued that just actions are rational because possession of the virtue 
of justice is overall in our best interest, and possession of the virtue disposes one to act 
justly, even in those rare cases where it comes at high personal cost. See also “Reasons for 
Action and Desires” (1972). These essays are reprinted in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays 
in Moral Philosophy (2002). 
44 From what I can make out, Foot began broaching her new views “Ethical Naturalism,” 
given as the 1989 Romanell Lecture at the Pacific APA; in a series of three unpublished 
lectures she delivered at Princeton University, titled “Human Desires,” “Miklukho-Maklay 
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Her account of practical rationality can be condensed into five theses. I list the first 
four here, and will introduce the fifth presently. The first four theses are:  
Pluralism There are multiple, irreducibly distinct categories of facts that are 
reasons for action, including desire, self-interest, and moral 
considerations. 
Constitutivism  It is constitutive of human practical reason to recognize facts in 
each category as reasons. 
Parity Some reasons in each category are deliberatively on par with some 
reasons in each other category. 
Basicness  Some reasons in each category are basic. 
The first two theses articulate the basic structure of reasons and practical rationality, 
according to Foot. The third and fourth follow from the first and help further to clarify the 
relations between the different types of reasons. I will briefly unpack each one. 
According to the first thesis, 
Pluralism There are multiple, irreducibly distinct sources of reasons for 
action, including desire, self-interest, and moral considerations.45  
Foot’s theory therefore diverges from monistic theories that ground reasons in only one 
type of fact, such as facts about pleasure, or self-interest, or what would satisfy one’s 
                                                
 
and His Servant,” and the third untitled; and in two other unpublished papers titled “Virtue 
and Happiness” and “Happiness II.” (The unpublished lectures are mentioned by name in 
Quinn (1992: 81).) Foot’s new account of practical rationality first appeared in print in her 
papers “Rationality and Virtue” (1994) and “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” 
(1995), and was then clarified and amplified in Chapter 4 of Natural Goodness (2001), and in 
her last published essay, “Rationality and Goodness” (2004). 
45 Foot (2001: 61) and (2004: 8). Although Foot focuses on these three categories of 
reasons, she also thinks there could be other distinct sources of reasons, such as family or 
friendship relations (Foot 2004: 9). 
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desires.46 By ‘moral considerations’ she has in mind ordinary examples, such as the fact that 
I promised to pick you up from the airport at 10 P.M., or the fact that I notice my 
neighbor’s child wandering into the street. Moral considerations like these are, on Foot’s 
view, reason-giving independently of any connection to self-interest or desire.  
Whereas Pluralism is about the sorts of facts that are reasons, the second core 
thesis is about practical reason itself. According to  
Constitutivism It is constitutive of practical reason to recognize facts in each 
category as reasons.47 
The idea here, familiar now from Lott’s account, is that practical reason is a natural power 
that characterizes human beings, and thus, like any power possessed by any organism, is 
subject to standards of natural goodness and defect. Part of what it is for practical reason 
to operate well—i.e., for its possessor to be practically rational—is for it to take each 
category of fact as reason-giving. This is easy to see in the case of facts about desires and 
self-interest. Consider self-interest: there is something deeply wrong with someone who is 
utterly indifferent to her own well-being. We might even be inclined to think this a mark of 
insanity. Something similar holds with desire. There seems something deeply wrong with 
taking one’s desires to have no bearing on what one should do. Imagine, for instance, an 
ultra-rigorous modern Manichean who convinces herself that all her desires are 
manifestations of evil and ought to be resisted and expunged where possible. Something 
seems radically wrong with such an attitude. The more plausible view, according to Foot, is 
                                                
 
46 See Anderson (1993: chapter 6), Chappell (1998: 13-21) and Murphy (2001: chapter 2) 
for critiques of monistic theories of value. All these authors would agree with Foot’s 
formal pluralism, but disagree with her substantive claims about what the basic sources of 
reasons are. 
47 See Foot (2001: 12-13, 62-63; 2004: 8). 
50 
that desires do in some way rationalize action, even if they must be overruled in some cases 
by, say, prudential or moral reasons. Foot’s view is that what holds for self-interest and 
desire holds for moral considerations as well. That is, genuine failure to see certain moral 
considerations as reason to act would indicate the same sort of irrationality or psychic 
disorder as failing to see one’s desires or self-interest as reasons to act. As Foot puts it, 
each category “provides a test of practical rationality” (2004: 8). 
 Pluralism and Constitutivism express the basic structure of Foot’s account of 
practical reason and reasons. Pluralism, however, implies two further, and more specific 
theses about the relations between the different categories of reasons.  
In Natural Goodness Foot says that the different categories of reasons are “on a par”: 
As I see it, the rationality of, say, telling the truth, keeping promises, or helping a 
neighbor is on a par with the rationality of self-preserving action, and of the careful 
and cognizant pursuit of other innocent ends; each being a part or aspect of 
practical rationality. (2001: 11)  
In “Rationality and Goodness” she expresses the same idea by describing the three types of 
reasons as “logically equal” (2004: 8). Foot does not mean that reasons of all three types are 
of equal weight. In fact, she takes pains to argue that neither category of reason has special 
trumping power over any other.48 What she means is that all three categories of facts 
engage practical reason at the same level. I will put this as follows: 
                                                
 
48 For example, in Natural Goodness Foot says: 
it is not always rational to give help where it is needed, to keep a promise, or even, I 
believe, always to speak the truth. If it is to be said that ‘moral considerations’ are 
always ‘overriding’, it cannot be these particular considerations that we refer to, but 
must rather be the overall judgment about what, all things considered, should be 
done. (2001: 11) 
See also Foot (1977; 2004: 8). 
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Parity Some reasons in each category are deliberatively on par with some reasons 
in each other category. 
That is to say, there are some reasons in each category that do not rely for their rational 
force on reasons in another category.  
Pluralism also entails another subsidiary thesis. Not only are the various categories 
of reasons logically equal in the sense just described, they are also equally basic. So our 
fourth thesis is: 
Basicness  Some reasons in each category are basic. 
This follows from Pluralism, because if there are multiple irreducibly distinct categories of 
reasons, then there are at least some reasons in each distinct category that cannot be 
reduced to any other category, in the sense that their practical significance or normative 
authority is not conferred by reasons in any of the other categories. Their normativity is 
basic. Once again, this is easiest to see in the case of desire- and interest-based reasons. 
And Foot’s claim, given Parity, is that what goes for desire- and interest-based reasons also 
holds for moral reasons: 
Told that we should give up smoking we may ask ‘why should I?’ and be told that 
we should because smoking is bad for health, or that we could spend the money on 
something we really want. But we do not ask [1] ‘Why should I do what is in my 
interest to do?’ nor [2] ‘Why should I do what will best satisfy my desires?’ and 
what Quinn’s argument implies is that we can no more make sense of the question 
[3] ‘Why should I be moral?’ than we can make sense of the question ‘Why should I 
act self-interestedly?’ Or ‘Why should I do what will get me what I most desire?’ 
(2004: 8; emphasis in original; brackets added for reference) 
We cannot answer questions 1-3 because there is no deeper, more basic value by reference 
to which we could rationalize these three types of facts. Each sort of consideration enters 
into practical reason at the ground level.  
Finally, we come the fifth and final thesis, the one that I have not yet articulated. It 
is the thesis that connects reasons and natural goodness. It is introduced most clearly in her 
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last published essay, “Rationality and Goodness.”49 After proposing her pluralistic view of 
the basic types of reason-giving facts, she considers the objection that so far her theory 
merely amounts to a “verbal package,” for nothing has been said about why each of the 
three categories of facts happen to be reason-giving. Foot takes the objection seriously, 
feeling special pressure to respond because she suspects there could be other basic 
categories of reasons as well, such as a degree of partialism toward one’s friends and 
family.50 Unless she can explain what unifies the three categories already proposed, and 
thereby provide the criteria for including other basic sources of reasons into the account, 
the theory looks like a mere grab bag. What, then, unifies the basic categories of reasons? 
Foot thinks we can answer this question 
if we call in aid the idea of natural goodness as I defined those words in my Natural 
Goodness. It is, I think, by reference to facts about the way things of different 
species live their lives that we can see the unity of the three rationalizing categories 
that we set side by side for human beings. (2004: 9) 
The proposal, then, is that all three categories of reasons are related in a certain way to 
natural goodness. Their unity as a set consists in their mutual link to natural goodness. 
 To support this proposal, Foot draws our attention to some features of the lives of 
the more sophisticated animals: “we can see in animal life analogues of at least our three 
                                                
 
49 It also appears in Natural Goodness, where she credits Warren Quinn for helping her to see 
that she could employ her account of natural goodness and virtues as natural needs to 
explain the unity of her three basic categories of reasons (2001: 17). 
50 And, we might add, partialism toward oneself. Foot favorably references John Taurek’s 
(1977) well-known argument about partialism toward oneself and one’s friends and family. 
“In fact,” says Foot, 
it is often reasonable for agents to give themselves (never mind their families) 
preference over others. As John Taurek point out some time ago in an excellent 
article, it is not at all generally believed that, for example, one should incur the 
certainty of losing a limb even to save another from injury more serious than that. 
(Foot 2001: 79). 
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types of rationalizing considerations in human life” (2004: 9-10). Here are the analogues, 
labeled for clarity. 
[Desire analogue] Animals, like us, have appetites and other kinds of desires, which on 
the whole they do well to satisfy, either directly as when in the 
presence of food or water, or indirectly as when, being hungry, they 
go foraging for food. (2004: 10) 
[Interest analogue] They also do, by instinct or as learned behavior, things that are 
necessary for their survival, or for reproduction, not immediately 
but even a whole season away. (2004: 10) 
Then she draws a parallel between the way in which certain animals need social hierarchies 
and the way in which humans need certain normative practices: 
[Moral analogue]  some kinds of animals have social hierarchies that are as necessary 
to the flourishing of individuals, as are our own social conventions, 
codes of behavior and laws. Where animals have hierarchies and a 
kind of social order, humans have norms that include moralities…. 
The making of laws, and obedience to them, is as much part of 
human life as flying is of bird life or hunting in packs a part of the 
life of wolves. Good rules, including moral codes, are not mere 
conventions but things that are needed in human life. (2004: 10-11; 
see also 2001: 16) 
What all three categories of reasons have in common is that we need to see each of them as 
reason-giving in order to live a good human life—i.e. we need to see them as reason-giving 
in order to be naturally good human beings. Natural goodness, then, is the unifying 
principle of the three categories of reasons. We can therefore frame the fifth thesis as: 
Source The distinct categories of facts are reasons because it is naturally 
good for humans to see them as such. 
So in order to add another basic category of reasons to the account, one must show that it 
would be naturally good for humans to take that type of fact as practically significant. And 
in showing this, one would thereby show that such facts are indeed normative. Foot thus 
takes herself to have illuminated the close connection between natural goodness and 
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reasons. There is, she thinks, a “conceptual connection” or “intrinsic link” between natural 
goodness and reasons (Foot 2001: 64-5).  
Both of these accounts resist the normativity objection by attempting to undermine 
its second premise, that judgments and facts about natural goodness are not normative. 
They attempt to show a conceptual or logical connection between facts about human 
nature, natural goodness and reasons, thereby showing that natural goodness is normative 
after all. If these accounts succeed, then of course the normativity objection fails.  
  
5. Conclusion 
We should now have a grasp on the Aristotelian naturalist’s understanding of the concepts 
life form and natural goodness. These concepts belong within an interconnected system of 
concepts and judgments—the life form system, as I am calling it—that are fundamental in 
our thinking about living things. The conceptual relations between them are such that facts 
about an individual organism together with facts about that organism’s life form entail facts 
about the natural goodness or defect of particular organisms. I have also discussed two 
Aristotelian attempts to connect the notion of natural goodness with practical reasons. The 
basic idea underlying both is that when we apply the life form system to human beings, we 
can discern a conceptual connection between our understanding of the human life form 
and practical reasons. A proper understanding of human nature commits us to the 
normative authority of certain types of reasons.  
Although there remains much work to be done in developing the Aristotelian 
naturalist account of natural goodness, I think the view is quite plausible in its account of 
the life form-relative evaluative judgments we make all the time in judging certain 
organisms to be good or defective in various respects. I also think the view quite plausible 
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in its claim that these evaluative claims are conceptually linked to our understanding of an 
organism’s life form—an understanding that is logically prior to those claims. However, I 
also think that Lott and Foot’s attempts to connect natural goodness with reasons do not 
work. In the next chapter I explain why. 
Before I get there, however, I need to take a brief detour to flag a point that is 
deeply important for the Aristotelian naturalist project overall, but too complex to explore 
in depth in the present study. One might have been struck by the fact that, after a whole 
chapter on a neo-Aristotelian account of natures, life forms, and natural goodness, I have 
barely mentioned the one concept for which Aristotelian approaches to ethics are perhaps 
best known: the concept of eudaimonia or flourishing. My silence on this concept is not 
accidental. I believe Aristotelians need to put some careful thought into how they will 
understand this concept in light of their theoretical commitments. Here is why. 
It is natural for an Aristotelian sympathizer to think human flourishing occurs 
when a human engages in its characteristic activities—that is, performs its function—
excellently. What is the conceptual framework underlying this thought? First take an 
example of non-human functioning. Suppose I believe that my lawnmower is doing an 
excellent job cutting the grass. It is natural to understand the conceptual ingredients of this 
thought roughly as follows: first, I grasp the function of a lawnmower (to cut grass), and 
then add to this an understanding of what it is to do that function well as opposed to 
poorly (to cut it cleanly, evenly, etc). Moving beyond lawnmowers, the basic idea here, to 
put it crudely, is that we can start with our understanding of a function, then sharpen it up, 
improve it, make it do better whatever it does, and that is how we arrive at our 
understanding of the excellent exercise of that function.  
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It is natural to think of flourishing along the same lines. On this view, our 
understanding of human flourishing combines two distinct notions: first, our 
understanding of the human function, and second, our understanding of what it is to 
perform that function well. A passage from Aristotle’s function argument might seem to 
suggest this view: 
…if we say a so-and-so and a good so-and-so have a function which is the same in 
kind, …eminence in respect of excellence being added to the function (for the 
function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player to do so 
well: if this is the case…human good turns out to be activity of soul in conformity 
with excellence (Aristotle 1984: Nicomachean Ethics I.7, 1098a7-1098a17) 
It is easy to see how one might conclude from this passage that Aristotle understands the 
notion of a function to be logically distinct from the notion of the excellent exercise of that 
function. The thought here is not, as Aristotle points out, that there are two functions: the 
regular one and the excellent one. The thought, rather, is that an excellent function is a 
function with excellence added to it, so to speak. 
Whether or not we should attribute this view to Aristotle, it seems clear that an 
Aristotelian naturalist of the Foot and Thompson variety cannot accept it. This is because 
the norms by which we evaluate an organism as being good, excellent or defective are 
constitutive standards of the life form itself. It is a mistake to think our grasp of the 
function or characteristic operation of a thing is logically prior to our grasp of what is 
involved in the excellent performance of that function. On the Aristotelian naturalist 
schema I have sketched in this chapter, things go the other way around. Our understanding 
of a thing’s nature is the benchmark by which we evaluate individual organisms of that type 
as excellent or less than excellent specimens. So, it looks like the Aristotelian naturalist is 
committed to the view that human flourishing is simply the non-defective characteristic 
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activity of human beings. We should judge a human being to be flourishing when it 
perfectly aligns with our understanding of its life form.   
Admittedly, this sounds odd. Isn’t flourishing supposed to be more than that? 
Something higher, more excellent than merely non-defective activity? By my lights, the 
view of flourishing to which Aristotelian naturalists appear to be committed is more 
plausible than it might first appear, and it has important consequences for how we think of 
the moral life. I also think the natural way of understanding excellent functioning I described 
above faces serious challenges. So, I do not see this as a problem for Aristotelian 
naturalism. Still, given the historical centrality of the concept of flourishing in the 
Aristotelian ethical tradition, and the apparent conflict between the Aristotelian naturalist 
view and the natural way of understanding excellent functioning I described above, Aristotelian 
naturalists need to devote careful thought to how the concept of flourishing fits into their 
schema. This is not the place to undertake such an investigation, so having flagged this 
issue, I now lay it aside and return to the main thread of this study.  
In the next chapter I argue that the normativity objection is not quite on target. 
Yet, there is indeed a problem in the neighborhood, and Lott and Foot’s accounts do not 
solve it. Ultimately, then, critics are right that Aristotelian naturalism has a normativity 
problem, but it is not terminal, and I will argue in the following chapters that there is a 
solution. 
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Like critics, I am dissatisfied with the Aristotelian naturalist attempts to connect reasons to 
natural goodness, and I will explain why below. At the same time, there seems something 
amiss with the normativity objection. Its second premise claims that facts and judgments 
about natural goodness are not normative, and yet most of the arguments for this claim in 
the literature hold little or no water. Some beg the question by relying on substantive theses 
Aristotelian naturalists can reject. Others misunderstand the Aristotelian conceptions of 
human nature and natural goodness, and thus fail to appreciate the power of the 
Aristotelian naturalists’s case that natural goodness is normative, at least in a certain sense 
of ‘normative’. Yet, as I said, I am not satisfied with the Aristotelian naturalists’ attempts at 
connecting reasons to facts about human nature, and it has precisely to do with the sense 
in which facts about human nature and natural goodness are normative.  
My diagnosis of Aristotelian naturalism’s fundamental problem is quite simple. A 
few authors have gestured in its direction, but to my knowledge no one has developed the 
thought at length. I will argue that facts about human nature and natural goodness are 
indeed normative, but not in the relevant sense. This will require defending a distinction 
between two kinds of normative facts (Section 2): practical facts, which are reasons, or are 
essentially linked with reasons, and evaluative facts which have no necessary connection with 
reasons, but are still irreducibly normative. Then I develop what I call the parity argument 
to show that facts about human nature and natural goodness are evaluative, not practical 
(Section 3). It follows that such facts are not intrinsically normative. 
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Two related implications follow from the evaluative/practical distinction and the 
parity argument. The first, which I develop in Section 4, is that the Aristotelian naturalist 
attempts to connect natural goodness with reasons fail, because they mistakenly assume 
that facts about human nature and natural goodness are intrinsically practical. The result is 
that they equivocate between evaluative and practical concepts, and I show how this 
equivocation manifests in Lott and Foot’s accounts.  
The second implication is that Aristotelian naturalism is left with a genuine 
problem, but it is not quite the problem expressed in the normativity objection. The parity 
argument is entirely consistent with Aristotelian naturalism’s core thesis, that moral 
goodness is a kind of natural goodness. The conclusion of the parity argument is not that 
natural goodness is not or cannot be practically normative, but that it is not intrinsically 
normative. So if Aristotelian naturalists want to maintain that facts about natural goodness 
and human nature are normative, as they must in order to retain their core thesis, then they 
need to explain what makes such facts normative. This they have not done, so there is a 
serious explanatory gap in their account. This is the normativity problem. 
 
2. The Evaluative/Practical Distinction 
As I just said, a few authors have gestured in the direction of the strategy I will pursue. In a 
passage already quoted, John Broom criticizes Foot by saying: 
Foot hopes to derive the conclusion that each human being should be virtuous, 
where ‘should’ is truly normative. But this conclusion cannot be drawn. Her 
premise is that each human being should be virtuous, where this is a matter of 
natural normativity. This means simply that being virtuous is necessary to the good 
of human beings. No truly normative conclusion follows. (Broome 2013:12) 
A few lines before that, he says: “An oak’s having deep, sturdy roots could fairly be called 
‘a norm’, and that is enough to justify the term ‘normativity’. However, in the context of an 
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oak, natural normativity is not what I call true normativity” (2013: 12). There is the seed of 
an idea here that there might be two kinds of normativity. Broome ends up saying that 
Foot’s natural goodness is not normative at all, because it is not what he calls “true 
normativity.” But what he means by this is the sort of normativity associated with 
obligation and reasons. If we broaden our understanding of ‘normative’, as I will propose, 
we can make room for the idea that natural goodness might indeed be normative, although 
not in the sense of being conceptually linked with reasons. The same idea is briefly 
broached by Roger Teichmann, strongly Aristotelian in bent himself, but suspicious of 
identifying reason-related normativity with that found woven into Aristotelian naturalism’s 
life form system. Commenting on Michael Thompson, He writes: “the normativity 
embodied in ‘You are meant to keep your promises’ and that embodied in ‘A spider is 
meant to have eight legs’ surely have quite different sources” (Teichmann 2011: xviii). 
Once again, we see the suggestion that there could be more than one kind of normativity, 
or sources of normativity. I think these hints are on the right track, but to my knowledge, 
no one has developed them in detail. I propose to develop them in this chapter.   
 I begin with a note on terminology. The literature contains at least two ways of 
characterizing the normative. According to what I will call the reasons characterization, 
normative facts are reasons, or are necessarily linked with reasons. This is essentially how 
Broome was using the term ‘normative’.51 Joseph Raz also understands normativity in this 
way when he says that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, or 
                                                
 
51 Note, however, that Broome does not think normativity can be analyzed in terms of 
reasons. Rather, he treats the normative concept ought as basic, and explains reasons in 
terms of it. See Broome (2013: Chapter 4). 
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provides, or is otherwise related to reasons.”52 Indeed, this characterization of the 
normative dominates in the literature on reasons and rationality.  
Outside of these debates, however, it is common to find the term ‘normative’ used 
to refer to a much broader class of facts and judgments—not only those that are or are 
linked with reasons but also any fact or judgment that employs concepts like good, bad, 
should, ought, health, defect, and so on. A particularly clear example of this broad characterization 
appears in Derek Parfit’s On What Matters (2011b), when he attempts to describe the 
natural/normative distinction. He asks us to consider two lists of words: 
A: wrong, right, ought, duty, virtue, good, bad, excellent, mediocre, incorrect. 
B: kill, crimson, square, electric, cause, city, marble, alive, sister, tall, unexpected. 
(2011b, 265) 
“Words in list A,” he says, “are normative, as are the concepts, claims, and facts that we 
can use these words to express or state…Words in list B are naturalistic, and claims that 
use only such words, when they are true, state natural facts” (Parfit 2011b, 265). For Parfit, 
words in list A are normative even though some of them—e.g. ‘excellent’, ‘mediocre’, 
‘incorrect’—have no obvious conceptual or logical link with reasons. Peter Railton (1999: 
320) employs the same broad characterization when he says 
‘Normativity’ is, for better or worse, the chief term we philosophers seem to have 
settled upon for discussing some central but deeply puzzling phenomena of human 
life. We use it to mark a distinction, not between the good and the bad (or between 
the right and the wrong, the correct and the incorrect), but rather between the 
good-or-bad (or right-or-wrong…), on the one hand, and the actual, possible, or 
usual, on the other.53  
                                                
 
52 See Raz (1999: 67). Other examples of this characterization are easy to find. For a small 
sample, see Scanlon (2014: 2), Korsgaard (1996: 8) and Wedgwood (2007: 23). 
53 Other examples abound. See, e.g., the opening paragraphs of Thomson (2008). This way 
of articulating the conceptual characterization is of course a bit too simple, since many of 
the example terms in Parft’s list A can be used in non-normative senses. For example: 
“These raspberries ought to ripen in June.” This sentence uses the term ‘ought’, which is 
typically thought to be a normative term. But in this case it is used in a non-normative 
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The non-normative covers what is, could, or would be the case. The normative covers 
would should or ought to be the case, or what is good, bad, right, wrong, correct, incorrect, 
and so on. On the broad characterization, then, the following statements, and the facts they 
express, are all normative: 
1 It would be wrong to poison your mother. 
2 Parents should watch out for their children’s safety. 
3 Sally’s car has a good gasoline engine. 
4 That suture was tied incorrectly. 
They are normative because they employ normative concepts. Yet, as I will shortly suggest, 
only the first two are necessarily linked with reasons. 
In this chapter I will use the broad characterization, for I think this presents the 
least risk for misunderstanding. I want to stress, however, that the argument I will give in 
this chapter could go through on either characterization, although it would require 
substantial reframing were I to use the reasons characterization.54  
I turn, then, to the evaluative/practical distinction itself, a distinction I take to be 
within the normative domain. I will mostly avoid talking explicitly about natural goodness 
while explaining the distinction itself, for I want to show the soundness of the distinction 
                                                
 
sense, for it express a prediction or expectation, and could be restated in purely descriptive 
terms (see Broome 2013: 9-11). So when the broad characterization holds that facts and 
judgments are normative in virtue of employing concepts or terms like good, bad, should, 
ought, health, defect, it should be taken to exclude the non-normative concepts we sometimes 
express with these terms. 
54 For example, I could not frame the evaluative/practical distinction as a distinction within 
the normative domain. I would have to say that the category of the evaluative is not 
normative, since the evaluative, as we will soon see, is not essentially linked with reasons. 
This would be fine, however, for the important point is that evaluative facts are distinct 
from non-normative facts, and that is enough to make the point that the normativity 
objection is not quite on target in claiming that natural goodness is non-normative. 
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independently of any concern about Aristotelian naturalism (although I will use an example 
of health, which is a closely related concept). 
 
Practical Facts 
A fact is a practical fact just in case it either is a reason or is necessarily linked with reasons. 
Thus there are two classes of practical facts. Getting clear on the difference between them 
will be important for discussion downstream. 
Consider, first, facts that are reasons. Reasons are facts that weigh in favor of, or 
support, some action.55 For example, suppose Emad is looking to buy a car, in order to 
have a reliable means of transportation. The fact expressed in the proposition: 
3 Sally’s car has a good gasoline engine 
might be a reason for Emad to buy her car. If so, it would be a practical fact for Emad. 
Consider also the fact expressed in the proposition: 
4 That suture was tied incorrectly. 
Suppose Jillian is a senior surgeon overseeing Brad, a younger doctor in his residency phase 
of training. While watching Brad complete a surgery, she notices something amiss and 
utters the statement in 4. In most circumstances, the fact she expresses would be a reason 
for Brad to retie the suture. I will call practical facts, such as those expressed in 3 and 4, 
first-order practical facts. First-order practical facts directly weigh in favor of some action. 
Any fact can be a reason for someone to do something in some circumstances. 
This is because our reasons are often determined by the best means to our ends, and the 
particular means that turn out to be best are largely a function of our circumstances, which 
                                                
 
55 This “weighing in favor of” characterization of reasons comes from Scanlon (1998: 
Chapter 1), but is now widely used. 
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of course are infinitely (or almost infinitely) variable. So any fact can be a first-order 
practical fact. 
 The second class of practical facts are those that are necessarily linked with reasons. 
There are two ways facts can be linked with reasons in this way. One is if there are first-
order facts that are necessarily practical. Some philosophers think some states of affairs are 
intrinsically bad, in the practical sense of ‘bad’, such that their intrinsic properties give us 
reason to avoid them. Parfit, for example, believes states of affairs involving one’s own 
agony are like this. Their intrinsic properties give everyone a reason to want to avoid such 
states of affairs.56 If he is right, the fact that j-ing would result in a period of agony 
whereas g-ing would not is, all else being equal, a reason to g. And this fact would not only 
be practical; it would be intrinsically practical, because the intrinsic properties of agony give 
us reason to avoid it. In this respect, certain facts about agony are necessarily linked with 
reasons. 
Another way in which facts can be necessarily linked with reasons is by employing 
concepts that entail there is reason for someone to do something. Returning to our 
example of Emad looking to buy a car, suppose the goodness of the gasoline engine in 
Sally’s car does indeed provide Emad a reason to buy her car. Then there is a further fact 
also, namely, the fact that 
5 Emad has a reason to buy Sally’s car.  
And if the goodness of Sally’s car’s engine is a conclusive reason for Emad to buy the car, 
then there is also the further fact that  
6 Emad ought to buy Sally’s car.  
                                                
 
56 See Parfit (2011a: 73-82, also 84). 
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Facts like 5 and 6 are about what we have reason to do. So I will call them second-order 
practical facts.57 These facts are necessarily linked with reasons in virtue of the concepts they 
contain. For although “Emad has a reason” does not tell us what that reason is, it entails 
there is a reason out there. Likewise, “Emad ought to buy Sally’s car” also does not tell us 
what reason Emad has, but it does entail there is a reason out there; and, given a natural 
reading of ‘ought’, entails the reason is conclusive.58 So if 5 and 6 do indeed express facts, 
then it necessarily follows that there is some first-order practical fact out there which is a 
reason for Emad to buy Sally’s car.  
First-order facts, by contrast, are not always necessarily practical. Above I imagined a 
case in which the fact that  
3 Sally’s car has a good gasoline engine 
is a reason for Emad to buy Sally’s car. This was because I was supposing that Emad was 
looking to buy a car, that Sally was looking to sell her car, and that the reason why Emad 
wanted a car was for reliable transportation. But notice that the fact expressed in 3 is 
practical only if these other circumstances hold. If they do not, 3 may not be practical at all. 
For example, if Sally’s car is not for sale, then 3 is not a reason for Emad or anyone else to 
buy the car. It could of course be a reason for someone to do something else—perhaps for 
Sally to drive it rather than the barely running pickup in her garage—but it need not be. 
                                                
 
57 Above I said almost any fact could be a first-order practical fact given some set of 
circumstances. Even facts such as those expressed in 5 and 6 could be first-order facts 
relative to different actions. For instance, 6 might be a reason for Emad to drive to the bank 
and request a cashier’s check. In general, then, the designation of practical facts as first-
order or second-order is always relative to some action. This point does not affect the 
substance of my argument, so I leave it implicit. 
58 This understanding of ‘ought’ is shared by Raz (2011:24-5) and Foot (2001: Chapter 4), 
who hold that reasons are logically prior to ‘should’ and ‘ought’ claims. See Broome (2013: 
Chapter 4) for a different view. 
66 
The fact expressed in 3 could obtain without being a reason for anyone to do anything. So 
even when the fact expressed in 3 is practical, it is not necessarily so. I suspect that a great 
many of the facts that serve as reasons in every-day deliberations are not necessarily practical. 
This will be important later. 
In what follows, when I refer to practical facts I will usually be referring to first-
order practical facts, unless the context makes clear otherwise.  
 
Evaluative Facts 
I turn now to the other main category within the normative domain: the category of the 
evaluative. Evaluative facts are distinguished by two key features. First, they are irreducibly 
normative, in that their representation in thought or speech require concepts like good, bad, 
should, ought, health, defect, and so on—concepts which are widely recognized as normative. 
Evaluative facts cannot be reduced to purely descriptive facts without loss of conceptual 
content. Yet, second, they need not have any connection with reasons.59 I will unpack each 
feature in turn.  
That evaluative claims and facts cannot be reduced to the descriptive shows up 
both in cases involving artefacts and cases involving organisms. Consider first cases of 
artefacts. The claim that a gasoline engine is good cannot be reduced to purely descriptive 
                                                
 
59 A cautionary note is in order here. Note that if one operates with the reasons 
characterization of the normative, as many philosophers do, the category of evaluative facts 
as I have described it is ruled out by definition. For on the reasons characterization, there 
cannot be facts that are both normative and not linked with reasons. But this is strictly a 
problem of terminology. If I wanted to use the reasons characterization of the normative, I 
would simply describe the category of evaluative differently—as being neither normative 
(because not linked with reasons) nor descriptive. The important point here is that, in 
addition to descriptive facts and reason-related facts, there is a third category of facts which 
are neither descriptive nor inherently reason-giving. 
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claims about the engine. For suppose I were to describe Sally’s car engine in exhaustive 
detail: its cylinders are q diameter and can maintain r compression; its fuel injectors have s 
flow rate, and spray the fuel in a u pattern; it burns v percent of the fuel/air mixture, runs at 
w temperature, generates x horsepower, and so on. All these descriptions still do not add 
up to the claim that the engine is a good one. In order to make that claim I need to know 
what properties a non-defective gasoline engine has. That is, I need to have some 
conception of what a gasoline engine is and what it does qua gasoline engine. Only when I 
have some grasp on this am I in position to say that Sally’s car engine is good, on the basis 
of it having properties q-x.  
The very same point applies to proposition 3 above about the suture being tied 
incorrectly. One cannot determine this on the basis of facts about the configuration of that 
particular suture. One must also know how the suture, in that type of case, is supposed to be 
tied. 
Consider now a case that involves an organism rather than an artefact, and the 
concept health rather than the concept good. Suppose you have a garden. Being a mojito 
connoisseur, you like to grow mint. And suppose I wander by one day, observe its strong 
but flexible stems and full, vibrantly green leaves, and pointing to it, say, “Wow, that is a 
healthy patch of mint.” Notice that the only way I can judge your mint patch to be healthy 
is because I know something more than just the descriptive facts about your mint plant. 
For, once again, suppose I begin describing your patch of mint. It has stems of a thickness, 
b flexibility, and c color. Its leaves are colored d, with an e hue, textured f-ly, and measure g 
centimeters long and h centimeters wide. It is disposed to do i in such and such conditions, 
and j in thus and so conditions. I keep filling out the descriptions until I have listed every 
possible descriptive fact about your patch of mint. Still, on the basis of these facts alone I 
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cannot conclude that it is healthy. In order to infer that an individual is healthy, we need to 
know what a non-defective specimen of that type of organism is like. I know that stems of a 
thickness, b flexibility, and c color indicate health and not defect only because I have some 
prior grasp on the non-defective mint form of life. If I came upon your mint patch not 
knowing the first thing about mint, I could not infer that it was healthy.  
I could, of course, take a guess, though, and if I was well acquainted with plant life, 
I might be able to guess accurately. This is because there are general patterns in nature. In 
general, strong green stems and vibrant green leaves indicate health in plants, and in 
general shriveled, yellow leaves indicate defect of some sort. But this is not universally true. 
For example, drying out and turning yellow is part of the seasonal cycle of the plant species 
cynodon dactylonn, also known as Bermuda grass. So if, knowing nothing about Bermuda 
grass, I came upon a patch of it during the winter when it was yellow and dried, and on 
that basis concluded that it was in some way defective, I would be mistaken. Thus, like the 
fact that the gasoline engine is a good one, the fact that the mint patch is healthy cannot be 
reduced to a set of descriptions.60  
 Notice that in all these examples, the evaluative concept applies only because there 
is a set of facts, in addition to those about the individual object in question, which serve as 
a kind of standard or benchmark for the individual object. It is in this respect that 
evaluative claims and the facts they express go beyond purely descriptive claims about the 
object’s properties, configuration, or operation, and thus cannot be reduced to them. This 
is why it makes sense to think of facts such as that Sally’s car has a good gasoline engine, 
                                                
 
60 See Lenman (2005) for a different view of health, which he uses to criticize Aristotelian 
naturalism. I think there are good reasons to reject Lenman’s view, but I cannot explore 
that issue here. 
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that the suture is tied incorrectly, and that your patch of mint is health, as normative—
indeed, irreducibly normative. 
 The second feature of evaluative facts is that they need not be reasons. This means 
that nothing in their structure or content entails anyone has reason to do anything. So they 
are logically and conceptually independent of reasons. This feature is perhaps the more 
controversial of the two, but, I think, not hard to see with a bit of reflection. We can again 
begin with examples of artefacts, such as the examples I have been considering. Once 
again, consider the claim that 
3 Sally’s car has a good gasoline engine. 
Above I used this fact as an example of a reason. But clearly 3 is not reason-giving in all 
cases. For, as we saw, if Sally’s car is not for sale, then 3 is not a reason for anyone to buy 
it. And there could even be circumstances in which 3 is a reason, but that the goodness of 
the engine is a reason to respond negatively rather than positively. Suppose Sally discovers 
that a terrorist is planning to commandeer her car for a suicide mission and the only way 
she can stop the mission is by disabling the engine. It is clear that Sally should not promote 
or preserve the good of the engine! Similarly, for the other example:  
4 That suture was tied incorrectly. 
In most cases, this would be a reason to redo the suture. But, again, 4’s practical 
significance derives entirely from other facts. If the suture was tied for practice purposes 
on a bit of rubber, 4 might not provide reason to retie the suture. In some cases it might 
provide reason to keep practicing, but then again, it might not. 
 A similar point holds in the mint case. The fact that your patch of mint is a healthy 
patch of mint might indeed give you reason to do something—perhaps to pick some leaves 
from it for your next mojito, or perhaps to protect it from weeds and other bugs that might 
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weaken its vigor. But then again, the same fact—that your patch of mint is healthy—might 
also not give you or anyone else reason to do anything. In fact, it seems that when it is 
reason-giving, that is only in virtue of its relation to other facts about someone’s ends. For 
example, when the fact that your mint patch is healthy gives you a reason to pick some 
leaves from it, that is only because you need some leaves in the first place. So even though 
the fact that the mint patch is healthy can be a reason for someone to do something, it need 
not be. There is no necessary connection between that fact and what anyone has reason to 
do.  
So far I have given examples to show that some normative facts have no necessary 
connection with reasons. We can go further than this, though, and see why there can be 
such examples in the first place. Evaluative concepts apply whenever there is a standard or 
benchmark against which individual items can be measured. Evaluative standards can arise 
where there is a functional or operational system, such as a gasoline engine, or a suture, or 
a biological organism. This is because functional systems have constitutive norms, and 
these can serve as evaluative standards for particular instances of that system.61 Part of 
what it is to be a gasoline engine is to be a device that converts heat energy to mechanical 
energy. To the extent that an individual engine cannot do this, it is a defective engine. To 
the extent that it can, it is a good one. That is what explains the evaluative fact that Sally’s 
car engine is a good one. But note that in general there is no necessary link between the 
constitutive norms of functional systems and what we have reason to do. Just because a 
thing must do x in order to be a good one of its kind does not mean we therefore have 
                                                
 
61 The normativity of constitutive standards is garnering a fair bit of attention in the 
literature. See Korsgaard (2009a), Railton (1997) and Velleman (2000) for especially 
illuminating discussions on the normativity of constitutive standards. 
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reason to promote its doing x. Whether we have reason to do so depends on other facts. 
That is why there are evaluative facts—a whole lot of them, I suspect—that have no 
conceptual or logical link with reasons.  
I conclude, then, that there are indeed evaluative facts, which are irreducibly 
normative and yet they have no necessary connection with reasons. If I am right, then 
there is indeed a distinction between two types of normative fact. I want to stress that in 
proposing such a distinction I do not take myself to be proposing anything novel. Quite 
the contrary, for the general idea of such a distinction is rather common in the literature.62 
What has been overlooked, however, is the relevance of this distinction for debate about 
the normativity objection. The evaluative/practical distinction opens up the possibility that 
the whole interconnected system of facts and judgments about life forms and natural 
goodness fall into the evaluative domain. In the next section I will develop what I call the 
parity argument to show that this is indeed the case. Then I will bring out two important 
implications of the parity argument for Aristotelian naturalism. 
 
3. The Parity Argument 
The parity argument goes like this: 
P1 All facts about non-human natural goodness/badness are evaluative. 
P2 Facts about non-human natural goodness are on par with facts about 
human natural goodness and badness.  
P3 So all facts about human natural goodness are evaluative. 
                                                
 
62 For example, one can see the evaluative/practical distinction, or something very close to 
it, in Barandalla and Ridge (2011: 377-378), Crisp (2012: 58), De Caro and Macarthur 
(2010: 1), Kolodny (2005: 549), Shakel (2014: 405), Thomson (2008: Chapter 1), Wiggins 
(1998: 95), Williams (1985: 135). 
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In elaborating this argument, I will assume that facts about natural goodness and badness 
are normative. I have already shown how the concept of health is irreducibly normative, 
and it is fairly clear how a parallel argument could be run to show that natural goodness is 
also irreducibly normative. But in this context we need not bother filling out that argument 
because I want to show that we can grant the Aristotelian naturalist claim that facts about 
natural goodness are normative, and still show that there is a problem having to do with 
the connection between natural goodness and reasons.  
Consider, then P1, that all facts about non-human natural goodness are evaluative. 
We can make our way toward this premise in several smaller steps. The first step is that 
some facts about non-human natural goodness/badness are not practical. Consider the 
following case. Suppose I am out walking one day and I see an apple tree whose leaves on 
its outermost branches are dried, brown, and hanging downward from their branch. The 
tree has fire blight, a bacterial disease that starts at the branch tips and works inward. In 
this respect, the tree has a serious natural defect. The apple tree I am imagining is a wild 
tree, growing along a walking path which winds through a wooded area. I notice the apple 
tree, register the fact that it has fire blight, and then continue to walk along my way. Now 
although this is a fact about natural goodness, in itself it has no connection with reasons. 
My registering the fact about the tree’s disease does not give me or anyone else reason to 
do anything. Of course, in a different case, the tree’s fire blight could give me a reason to do 
something. If the tree is in my orchard, and I have reason to grow apples, then I might 
have reason to try to battle the blight. But in such a case the fact about the tree’s natural 
defect becomes a reason only because it stands in some relation to other practical facts—
such as the fact that I have reason to grow apples. But that is not the sort of case I have in 
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mind. In my case, the tree is a wild apple tree. This is an easily imaginable case of a 
normative fact that is not practical. 
It turns out there are many such examples. Consider the facts expressed in the 
following sentences. 
5 “The Spanish Bluebell under that tree over there is etiolated,” 
 said as you observe the long, weak stems and yellowed leaves; 
6 “The cockroaches living in my woodpile are thriving,”  
said as you watch them scramble for cover; 
7 “The Canadian Goose flying overhead has an injured wing,” 
said as you notice it struggling to keep its place in the formation; 
8 “That wild boar has rabies,” 
said as you observe it from a distance through binoculars; 
     10 “The wolf lying on that rock over there is infected with mange,” 
  said as you give it wide berth on your way up the Alaskan trail; 
and I could go on. All these statements express facts about the natural goodness or 
badness of various kinds of non-human organisms. They are normative, but it is very easy 
to imagine cases in which these facts have no practical significance whatsoever.  
 Now, here is the next step closer to P1. If some facts about non-human natural 
goodness and badness have no practical significance, then of course they are not 
intrinsically practical, for they are not practical at all. But if they are not intrinsically 
practical, then no fact about non-human natural goodness and badness is intrinsically 
practical. This is because a fact is intrinsically practical when its practical significance is 
explained by reference to intrinsic features of that fact—such as its normative content, or 
perhaps its structure. But if some facts about non-human natural goodness and badness are 
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not intrinsically practical, then they have no intrinsic features that can ground practical 
significance. And thus, any fact about non-human natural goodness or badness, considered 
in itself, will lack intrinsic features that can ground practical significance. It follows, then, 
that all facts about non-human natural goodness and badness are evaluative, for they are 
normative, but have no necessary connection with reasons. This is not to say that facts 
about non-human natural goodness are not reason-giving. As we saw in the case of the tree 
with fire blight, sometimes non-human natural goodness or badness is reason-giving. My 
point is that when such facts are reason-giving, there must be something else that makes 
them so.  
 The second premise, P2, holds that facts about non-human natural goodness are 
on par with facts about human natural goodness and badness. Aristotelian naturalists 
maintain that facts about non-human natural goodness and human natural goodness are on 
par in two crucial respects. First, they both employ the same species-relative notion of 
goodness. According to Aristotelian naturalism, an organism is naturally good when it 
exemplifies those properties and operations that characterize its life form.63 This holds for 
any organism, including humans. Second, facts about non-human natural goodness are 
structurally identical to facts about human natural goodness. To see this, first consider this 
idea as it relates to judgments rather than facts. In Chapter 1 we saw that judgments of 
natural goodness and defect about individual organisms presuppose, and follow from, two 
other types of judgments: vital descriptions and natural-historical judgments. Natural 
historical judgments provide the evaluative standard. Vital descriptions characterize the 
organism itself. A judgment of natural goodness or defect expresses how well or poorly an 
                                                
 
63 See Foot (2001) and Thompson (2004), and Chapter 1. 
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organism measures up to that standard. A similar structure holds for facts about natural 
goodness and defect. Facts about natural goodness supervene on two other sets of facts: 
facts about how things are for a particular organism, which we might call object-facts, and 
generic facts about the nature of that organism’s life form, or type-facts. Facts about non-
human natural goodness and human natural goodness share this structure.  
Philippa Foot clearly notes the parity between facts about the natural goodness of 
plants and of humans when she says: “The meaning of the words ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is not 
different when used of features of plants on the one hand and humans on the other, but is 
rather the same as applied, in judgments of natural goodness and defect, in the case of all 
living things.”64 Indeed, it is common for Aristotelian naturalists, when explaining the 
notion of human natural goodness, to begin with natural goodness judgments about plants 
and then show that the logical structure of such judgments does not change when we move 
to human goodness. This is because they want to show a continuity between moral 
evaluations and the natural goodness judgements we make all the time about non-human 
forms of life. Julia Annas, for example, endorses this kind of continuity when she says: 
What is so helpful for ethics from this kind of biological naturalism is that we find 
that the normativity of our ethical discourse is not something which emerges 
mysteriously with humans and can only be projected back, in an anthropomorphic 
way, onto trees and their roots. Rather, we find normativity in the realm of living 
things, plants and animals, already. It is part of the great merit of the work of 
Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse to have stressed this point. (Annas 2005: 
13)  
I think Aristotelian naturalists are exactly right about this continuity. What the continuity 
shows, though, is that facts about the natural goodness of humans are normative in exactly 
the same sense as facts about the natural goodness of plants and non-human animals; i.e., 
                                                
 
64 Foot (2001: 47). See also Hursthouse (1999: 224). 
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both types of fact are evaluative. So even facts about human natural goodness are evaluative. 
Thus concludes the parity argument. Again, this is not to say that facts about human 
natural goodness and badness cannot serve as reasons. They can and often do. It is to say 
that when they do, that is only because they stand in some relation with other facts—a 
relation which somehow explains their practical significance.  
 One might object that this was too fast. P2 claims that facts about non-human 
natural goodness are on par with facts about human natural goodness and badness. But 
one might think they are also not on par in important respects, the most obvious being that 
one type of fact is about humans and the other is not. We, the inquirers, are humans. And 
one might think this is precisely the difference that makes facts about human natural 
goodness intrinsically practical where facts about non-human natural goodness might not 
be.65 Now, I cannot see how the mere fact that the subject of a natural goodness fact is 
human rather than non-human could make a fact intrinsically practical. What I can see, 
though, are a few closely related considerations that might lead one to think this.  
First, one might think that facts about human natural goodness are motivating, and 
this is what makes them intrinsically practical—unlike, say, facts about the natural 
goodness of cockroaches or wild boars. But this cannot support the idea that facts about 
human natural goodness are intrinsically practical. Although reasons typically motivate, a 
fact can motivate without being a reason. Someone could be motivated to do an action A 
precisely because A-ing would inflict the maximum amount of pain on another creature. It 
does not follow that this fact—that A-ing would inflict the maximum amount of pain on 
                                                
 
65 I thank Alex Gregory for pressing this objection in conversation. 
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another creature—is a reason for anyone to A. So a fact’s being motivating does not make 
it intrinsically practical. 
One might grant this, however, and modify the original thought to the idea that 
facts about human natural goodness are motivating for rational humans, and this is what 
makes them intrinsically practical.66 A rational human would not, according to this 
suggestion, be motivated by such facts as that A-ing would inflict the maximum amount of 
pain on another creature. So we can rule out the types of cases I mentioned above. But this 
proposal does not work either, for it appeals to substantive considerations about human 
rationality, which are not intrinsic to the natural goodness facts in question. So while one 
might defend the proposal that facts about human natural goodness are practical in virtue 
of their power to motivate rational human agents, this proposal would at most show that 
facts about human natural goodness are always practical, not that they are intrinsically 
practical.67 For similar reasons, it would be of no use to say that while the capacity to 
motivate does not make facts about human natural goodness intrinsically practical, it is at 
least a sign that they are. To the extent that the disposition to motivate is a sign of 
practicality, it is precisely that: a sign that a fact is practically significant, not that it is 
intrinsically practically significant. 
                                                
 
66 See Korsgaard (1986) for a helpful discussion on the distinction between the plausible 
internalist requirement on reasons, that they be capable of motivating a rational agent, and 
the extension of this requirement to the implausible idea that reasons are necessarily 
motivating. 
67 This distinction is important. It could be the case that every fact about human natural 
goodness is practical for someone, and this would not show that facts about human natural 
goodness are intrinsically practical. For it is possible that the explanation of each fact’s 
practical significance appeals not to the intrinsic properties of those facts but rather to 
something else. In the next chapter I will suggest that something like this is indeed the case.  
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Moreover, it is worth noting that Aristotelian naturalists should not be inclined 
toward these sorts of proposals in the first place. They belong most comfortably in the 
neo-Humean tradition, where motivational states are thought to be the ultimate ground of 
reasons.68 Aristotelian naturalists characteristically reject this general approach to reasons. 
True, Philippa Foot thought facts about desire constitute one of several basic sources of 
reasons, but she ultimately tried to explain the practical significance of those facts by 
linking them to facts about natural goodness.69 
Another reason one might think facts about human natural goodness are 
intrinsically practical, whereas facts about non-human natural goodness are not, is that we 
have a special interest in human natural goodness. For a start, facts about our own 
individual natural goodness and defect bear directly on how we experience our lives, by 
bearing on the types of physical and emotional pain or enjoyment we experience, on the 
sorts of activities and relationships we are capable of, and of course on how long we live in 
the first place. But if this is all the objector can say, then the result would be a form of 
egoism, where facts about the natural goodness of some individual are the only intrinsically 
practical facts for that individual. This would not be a happy result for the Aristotelian who 
wants to show that facts about human natural goodness in general are intrinsically practical.  
A thoughtful Aristotelian might, however, appeal to the fact that we are social 
animals by nature, and thus the natural good of other human beings is partly constitutive of 
our own natural good. This seems right, but then this would not cover all the cases an 
Aristotelian would want to cover. For example, it could not explain how facts about, say, 
                                                
 
68 See, e.g., Goldman (2005; 2006; 2009), Lenman (2010), Schroeder (2007) and Williams 
(1981). 
69 See Foot (2001: 61; 2004: 8), and Chapter 2, Section 4(ii) above. I will revisit Foot’s 
account in Section 4 below. 
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the natural defect of a stranger (perhaps she is malnourished and needs food I could give 
her), whose life has no bearing on my own, could be practically relevant for me. Moreover, 
if the mark of a natural goodness fact being intrinsically practical is its constitutive role in 
one’s own natural good, then this would apply to a great variety of non-human organisms 
as well. Many plants, for example, are crucial for oxygen production, and for converting the 
sun’s energy and other elements into forms of food that we can metabolize. 
Like the previous strategies, then, this line of thinking likewise fails to explain how 
facts about distinctly human natural goodness could be intrinsically practical. I can think of 
no good reason to believe facts about human natural goodness are relevantly different 
from facts about non-human natural goodness. Given the similarity in their conceptual 
content and structure, we should conclude that facts about human natural goodness are not 
intrinsically practical. And if they are not, then they are evaluative. Thus, the conclusion of 
the parity argument stands. 
 
4. Revisiting Lott and Foot 
Above I said that the evaluative/practical distinction has important consequences for 
debate about the normativity objection. One important consequence is that it opens up the 
possibility that facts about natural goodness—all such facts—are evaluative, and I just 
argued that this is indeed the case. We are now in position to see exactly how this bears on 
debate about the normativity objection. One important implication is that Micah Lott and 
Phillippa Foot’s attempts to connect natural goodness with reasons fail.   
 Aristotelian naturalist attempts to connect natural goodness and reasons fail for the 
simple reason that they assume facts about human nature and natural goodness are 
intrinsically practical. Micah Lott, recall, argues that once one has a grasp on the 
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Aristotelian naturalist understanding of natural goodness, one will see that there is no 
logical gap between judgments about human nature and judgments about what we have 
reason to do (see Chapter 2, Section 4). Philippa Foot likewise takes herself to have shown 
an “intrinsic link” between reasons and natural goodness (see Chapter 2, Section 4, 
although I will raise some complications about Foot in a moment). If the 
evaluative/practical distinction and the parity argument are sound, both Foot and Lott’s 
accounts are mistaken, for facts about natural goodness are evaluative, and evaluative facts 
have no necessary connection with reasons. Of course, Aristotelian naturalists deny 
precisely this, so it will be important to explain why Aristotelian naturalists are so strongly 
inclined to think that natural goodness is intrinsically practical. The evaluative/practical 
distinction can help us here. 
It is common knowledge that some normative terms have a non-normative sense. 
For example, although ‘ought’ is typically thought to be a normative term, it has also a non-
normative use. It can be used to express predictions or expectations, as when I tell my 
children, “Mommy ought to be back by supper time.” I want to suggest that not only is 
there a normative and non-normative sense of some normative terms, there are at least two 
different normative senses of normative terms. For if the evaluative/practical distinction is 
sound, then there are at least two distinct categories of normative concepts: those 
implicated in evaluative facts and judgments and those implicated in practical facts and 
judgments. It turns out we use some of the same terms to refer to concepts in both 
categories. The terms ‘ought’ and ‘good’ are two important cases in point.  
For example, in the evaluative sense, ‘good’ simply means lacking defect or 
dysfunction, and has no necessary connection with reasons. This is why we can talk about a 
good thief and a good specimen of anthrax bacteria just as easily as a good gasoline engine 
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or a good mother. Relative to what thieves characteristically do, there are thieves who are 
good at thievery and those that are not, and we can say this even though we have reason to 
discourage and prevent thievery. By contrast, ‘good’ in the practical sense refers to that 
which we have reason to pursue, or promote, or respect, or otherwise respond to 
positively. This sense of good is sometimes characterized as “the desirable,”70 which makes 
it even clearer that this notion of goodness is distinct from the evaluative notion, for 
evaluative goodness has no intrinsic link with what is desirable. 
Likewise for the term ‘ought’. Philosophers often read ‘ought’ as a technical term 
having to do with reasons. Opinions differ on exactly how to understand the relation 
between ought and reasons, but on a natural reading, ought judgments report that there is 
reason to do something. For example, “Max ought to ensure his children are fed” implies 
that Max has reason to ensure his children are fed. This is the practical ought.71 There is 
also an evaluative sense of ‘ought’. Recall from Chapter 2 (Section 3) that judgments of 
natural standard can be transposed into an evaluative mode. Consider the judgment, “The 
eggplant ought to have a strong stalk.” Like the practical ought, this ought also reports that 
certain other facts hold. But in this case, the facts implied by ‘ought’ are not, or not 
necessarily, reasons. What this judgment implies, on the Aristotelian naturalist schema, is 
that good eggplants have strong stalks, and thus that if an eggplant has a weak stalk, it is 
defective in that respect. Whether we have reason to promote strong stalks in eggplants is 
another matter entirely. 
                                                
 
70 Thomas Aquinas associates goodness with the desirable. For example, in Summa 
Theologica Part I, Question 5, Article 1, he says “The essence of goodness consists in this, 
that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): ‘Goodness is what all 
desire’” (Aquinas 2008). See also Stump (2005: 62).  
71 See Raz (2011: 24-5) and Foot (2001: Chapter 4) for this view of ought judgments. 
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With these two examples in view, I want to illustrate one way in which an 
Aristotelian might be tempted to think natural goodness is intrinsically natural, and then 
connect this with Micah Lott’s account. First I do believe Aristotelians have a powerful 
case that facts about human nature and natural goodness are normative, in the evaluative 
sense. Moreover, as we just saw, there is a conceptual link between natural-historical 
judgments and certain sorts of ought judgments. Since in most contexts ought judgments 
are taken to imply reasons, and if one does not have the evaluative/practical distinction in 
view, we can see how an Aristotelian might be inclined to infer a conceptual connection 
between natural goodness and reasons. But of course this would be a mistake. If facts 
about human nature and natural goodness are evaluative, the only kind of ought judgments 
that follow from them are evaluative ought judgments, which have no necessary link with 
reasons.  
Lott makes precisely this type of error. The core idea he proposes is that because 
there is no logical gap between facts about natural goodness and reasons, having a grasp on 
how humans characteristically function is already to recognize the normative authority of 
certain reasons. As he puts it, “by saying how ‘the human’ eats, copulates, relaxes, etc. we 
are already taking a stand on the sorts of reasons that we ought to recognize” (Lott 2014, 
771; emphasis in original). We can see now the problem in this line of thinking. Lott 
equivocates on ‘ought’. If we read the ‘ought’ as evaluative, then his claim is true. By saying 
how ‘the human’ eats, copulates, relaxes, etc., we are already taking a stand on what sorts of 
reasons ‘the human’ ought to recognize. And since we are humans, we are taking a stand 
on the sorts of reasons we ought to recognize. But all this means is that if we do not 
recognize the reasons we have identified as characteristically human, we are in that respect 
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defective. Nothing necessarily follows about what we actually have reason to do, since the 
notion of defect is an evaluative notion. 
Lott makes the same mistake with respect to the notion of practical rationality. At 
one point he expresses the same general thought by saying that “what is naturally good in 
humans is a life in which practical reason is functioning properly—i.e. a life that is practically 
rational, in the positive evaluative sense” (2014: 771; emphasis in original). Here Lott uses 
the term ‘evaluative’ not in the sense I have been using it but in the reason-related sense, 
for he immediately fills out the thought by saying: 
Therefore any substantive account of human form—any conception we might step 
back from—will already embody some understanding of how we have reason to act 
and to live… With a conception of human form, there can be no gap between what 
is normal and normative. (2014: 771; emphasis in original) 
Lott appears to suggest that the concept properly functioning practical reason is identical to or 
conceptually linked with the concept practical rationality. And once again, this works if we 
interpret ‘practically rational’ as ‘properly functional’. But if we do, then the conception we 
have of the human form remains evaluative from beginning to end, with no necessary 
connection with reasons. If, on the other hand, we take ‘practically rational’ in the sense in 
which Lott means it, then it is a practical concept, and the link he is drawing between it and 
the notion of properly functioning practical reason does not hold. That is, it does not hold 
if the evaluative/practical distinction is sound. And Lott gives us no reason to doubt it.  
 Hence, the fundamental problem with Lott’s attempt to connect natural goodness 
with reasons is that he equivocates on the evaluative and practical senses of key normative 
terms.  
Philippa Foot’s account of the connection between natural goodness and reasons is 
susceptible to the same criticism—or, I should say, is susceptible to the same criticism, on 
a certain interpretation of her view. For although she explicitly takes herself to have shown 
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what she calls a “conceptual connection” and “intrinsic link” between natural goodness 
and reasons, there are also reasons to think she did not have quite the same conceptual 
connection in view as Lott. 
 First, recall the five theses that constitute her account of practical rationality:   
Pluralism There are multiple, irreducibly distinct categories of facts that are 
reasons for action, including desire, self-interest, and moral 
considerations. 
Constitutivism  It is constitutive of human practical reason to recognize facts in 
each category as reasons. 
Parity Some reasons in each category are deliberatively on par with some 
reasons in each other category. 
Basicness  Some reasons in each category are basic. 
Source The distinct categories of facts are reasons because it is naturally 
good for humans to see them as such. 
It is the last thesis that concerns the relation between natural goodness and reasons, and yet 
this thesis is ambiguous, since ‘because’ can be interpreted in more than one way. ‘Because’ 
could express a reason relation, as in the statement, “You shouldn’t kick your cat because it 
will cause her unnecessary pain.” This means the fact that kicking your cat would cause her 
unnecessary pain supports, or weighs in favor of, you not kicking her. On the reasons 
interpretation of Source, facts about human nature and natural goodness are practically 
significant in exactly the same way. Thus, the fact that we need to see moral considerations 
as reasons, which is a fact about what is naturally good for us, supports, or weighs in favor 
of, our taking these considerations as practically significant.  
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There is evidence that Foot understood Source in this way. For example, in the 
first chapter of Natural Goodness, Foot compares the way in which non-human animals do 
what is good for them versus the way in which humans do what is good for them: 
Animals are different…from us in that to do what they should do—what is needed 
and is within their capacity—they do not have to understand what is going on; 
whereas a human being can and should understand that, and why, there is reason 
for, say, keeping a promise or behaving fairly. This last may seem a tall order, but 
this human understanding is not anything hard to come by. We all know enough to 
say ‘How could we get on without justice?’, ‘Where would we be if no one helped 
anyone else?’, or ‘How could we manage if there were no way of making decisions 
for us all?’ Anyone who thinks about it can see that for human beings the teaching 
and following of morality is something necessary.72  
By ‘necessary’ Foot means necessary for human goodness; i.e. natural human goodness. 
Foot, then, appears to be claiming that the fact that teaching and following morality is 
necessary for natural goodness is itself practically significant. Indeed, she presents it as “a 
reason for” following morality. Similarly, at the end of her chapter on practical rationality 
(chapter 4), she returns to a challenge from Gary Watson with which she began the 
chapter: 
When Gary Watson issued the challenge described on p. 53 above, he was asking a 
question that belongs here, since he was wanting to know whether on an objective 
theory of moral goodness and ‘intrinsic link’ could be established between moral 
goodness and reasons for action. My argument in the last few pages has been designed 
to show that there is such a link. (2001: 64; emphasis in original) 
Two paragraphs later, she considers how she would answer a skeptic who asked her “why 
he should do that which the good person must do,” where ‘should’ is clearly asking for a 
reason, and where ‘that which the good person must do’ refers to naturally good actions. 
Foot says “we must try to show him the conceptual connection between acting well and 
acting rationally” (2001: 65). Foot here apparently takes herself to have shown an “intrinsic 
                                                
 
72 See Foot (2001: 16-17). She expressed the same thought in her earlier paper “Rationality 
and Virtue” (1994: 169). 
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link” or “conceptual connection” between acting well, which she understands as naturally 
good, and acting rationally, i.e., action supported by reasons, such that a skeptic, so long as 
he is rational, would have to grant the practical significance of natural goodness.  
If this is how we read Source, then she is subject to the same criticism as Lott. For 
to the extent that she takes ‘practical rationality’ simply to mean properly functioning 
human practical reason, then the whole picture remains evaluative from beginning to end. 
It may be true that properly functioning human practical reason registers certain general 
moral considerations as practically significant. But this is an evaluative fact on the same 
order as the fact that the properly functioning human auditory system detects sounds 
between 20 and 20,000 hertz. Nothing necessarily follows about what we have reason to 
do. So if Foot understands the relation between natural goodness and reasons along the 
lines of the reasons interpretation of Source, then she too illicitly moves between 
evaluative and normative concepts.  
On the other hand, there is some reason to think this is not quite what Foot had in 
mind in claiming a “conceptual connection” between natural goodness and reasons. For 
example, there is a tension between the reasons interpretation of Source and Basicness, 
which claims that some reasons in each of Foot’s three categories are deliberatively basic. If 
Foot endorses this claim, as she certainly seems to, it would be odd for her to say that facts 
in each of the three categories derive their practical significance from facts about natural 
goodness, for this would make facts about natural goodness, so to speak, even more 
basic—in which case facts about desire, self-interest, etc., would not really be basic in the 
first place. So there is reason to look for a different interpretation of Source that would be 
consistent with Basicness. 
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Source claims that the distinct categories of facts are reasons because it is naturally 
good for humans to see them as such. To see how else we might interpret ‘because’, 
consider the claim, “Composites exist because simples exist.” In this case ‘because’ does 
not express a reasons relation, but rather a metaphysical relation which has been called 
“ground.”73 On the ground interpretation of Source, facts about natural goodness are not 
themselves practical reasons but rather somehow make it the case that facts in each of 
Foot’s three basic categories (facts about desire, facts about self-interest, and moral 
considerations) are reasons.  
At times Foot suggests something like this sort of connection between natural 
goodness and reasons. For example, in her 2004 paper “Rationality and Goodness,” she 
discusses the case of a young man—referred to as “the Farm Boy from the 
Sudentenland”—condemned to death for refusing to serve in Hitler’s SS. Prior to his 
execution, he wrote to his parents that he and his friend “would rather die than stain our 
consciences with such deeds of horror.”74 This is a classic case of the problem of the 
rationality of virtue: clearly the Farm Boy did what was virtuous, but how can we explain 
the rationality of his choice given that it ran so contrary to his self-interest? Foot’s solution 
is her account of practical rationality. On Foot’s view, the Farm Boy’s action is rationalized 
by appeal to moral considerations, which on her view are a basic category of reasons. At 
                                                
 
73 Actually, there is a sense of ‘reason’ according to which the phrase following ‘because’ 
does express a reason. For example, we might say “the reason composites exist is because 
simples exist.” But in in this case ‘reason’ is being used in a purely explanatory sense, not a 
practical sense. For a discussion on rounding and reasons see Chang (2009; 2013; 2014). 
According to Chang, the notion of ground was introduced into the contemporary 
metaphysics literature by Kit Fine (1991). It has since received quite a lot of attention. See 
Bliss & Trogdon (2014) for an overview. 
74 Foot quotes the young man’s letter at (2004: 2). She takes the quote from a book of 
letters penned by Nazis-resisters facing execution titled, Dying We Live. 
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the end of her paper, after she has explained the way in which all three of her categories of 
reasons connect in some way to natural goodness, she returns to the Farm Boy example. 
“In the end,” she says, 
it is the need for moral action—the part that justice and other virtues place in 
human life—that makes it possible for actions such as those of the Farm Boy from 
the Sudentenland to be rational actions in spite of the terrible consequences that he 
faced. (2004: 12) 
The language here is intriguing. The fact that humans need to be virtuous, which is an 
evaluative fact about human nature, “makes it possible” for moral considerations to be 
genuine reasons. This suggests that facts about natural goodness might connect with 
reasons in a different way—as being somehow the metaphysical condition of their practical 
significance.  
 I do not know if this is how Foot understood the relation between natural 
goodness and reasons. In my view, her texts are sufficiently ambiguous on this matter that 
it may not be possible to attribute any definitive interpretation. For example, if Foot 
understood the relation between natural goodness and reasons according to the grounding 
interpretation, then it is puzzling why she took such pains to claim that she had shown a 
conceptual connection between natural goodness and reasons. For A can ground B 
without A conceptually or logically entailing B. (The fact that simples exist does not 
conceptually or logically entail that composites exist.) So I must end this discussion with a 
conditional conclusion. If Foot understood the relation between natural goodness and 
reasons according to the grounding interpretation, then she may not be susceptible to the 
same equivocation criticism as Lott. But in this case, her view is woefully underdeveloped, 
for she provides little detail on how this grounding relation is supposed to be understood. 
So even in this case, her view is not a sufficient account of the relation between natural 
goodness and reasons.  
89 
 
5. Conclusion: The Real Problem 
Above I said that the evaluative/practical distinction and the parity argument have two 
important implications for the debate about the normativity objection. The first was that 
Lott and Foot’s accounts of the normativity of human nature and natural goodness fail. I 
conclude this chapter by discussing the second implication, which is that Aristotelian 
naturalism is left with a serious problem on its hands, but it is not the problem expressed in 
standard formulations of the normativity objection.  
To see this, it will help to zoom out and survey the general arc of the argument so 
far. Aristotelian naturalists claim that ethical goodness is a kind of natural goodness. That 
is, moral virtues are natural excellences, where a natural excellence is a function of how 
humans are characteristically constituted and how they characteristically live, which is to 
say, a function of (facts about) the human life form. We ought to act virtuously because 
humans need to be virtuous to live a characteristic human life. The problem, I have argued, 
is that norms such as “humans should be virtuous” are constitutive norms grounded in 
facts about the human life form, and constitutive norms have no conceptual or logical 
connection with practical reasons. Thus, the human life form is not intrinsically practically 
normative.  
Critics would be wrong, however, to conclude that Aristotelian naturalism is a lost 
cause. The parity argument does not in itself undermine Aristotelian naturalism’s core 
thesis. What follows from the evaluative nature of natural goodness is not that facts about 
human natural goodness and the human life form are never practical, but that when they 
are, there must be something else that makes them so. Aristotelian naturalists can accept 
this conclusion and still maintain their conception of ethical goodness as natural goodness, 
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if they can explain how the human life form is extrinsically practically normative in a 
distinctively Aristotelian way.  
What the parity argument ultimately shows, then, is that if Aristotelian naturalism is 
to maintain its core thesis, it has some explaining to do. It needs to explain what it is in 
virtue of which facts about human nature and natural goodness are practical. The reason 
this is a problem is because Aristotelian naturalists have offered no adequate explanation. 
We can understand why. The need for such an explanation is obscured by the thought that 
natural goodness is intrinsically practical, and this thought in turn is buttressed by 
overlooking the evaluative/practical distinction. The result, however, is an explanatory gap 
in the Aristotelian naturalist approach—and, we should note, a gap of great import. Failure 
to explain how facts about human nature and natural goodness become practical would be 
a failure to explain one of the most widely accepted features of moral facts and judgments, 
namely, their practical significance. Such a failure would indeed threaten the credibility of 
the approach. This is the normativity problem.  
Happily, however, the problem of an explanatory gap is a problem that can be 
remedied by proffering a plausible explanation. That is what I propose to do—or rather 
begin doing—in the next chapter, where I enter the second main movement of my overall 
argument.  
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CHAPTER 4: ARISTOTELIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
1. Introduction 
I believe Aristotelian naturalism’s normativity problem can be solved. The solution I will 
propose has two main parts. In this chapter I lay out the structure of the first part of that 
solution.  
 I closed Chapter 3 by noting that Aristotelian naturalism stands in need of a 
plausible account of what makes facts about human nature practically normative. I start in 
Section 2 by explaining what type of account this must be. It is what has come to be called 
a metanormative account of the source of normativity. It is metanormative in that it is not a 
theory about which particular facts or principles are normative, but rather a theory about 
features of practical normativity in general. (That is why the metanormative theory I will 
propose constitutes only one part of the solution to the normativity objection. A 
metanormative theory all by itself cannot get us to the conclusion that facts about human 
nature are normative.) And it is an account of the source of normativity in that it is 
concerned to explain what makes practically normative things normative. This is to explain 
the ground of normativity, as opposed to its nature, or the types of facts that can be 
normative. I will unpack this distinction in more detail below. Interestingly, the main 
figureheads of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism have remained largely silent in the 
metanormative literature on normative source. This means there is much work to be done 
on this score, but it also means there are grounds for hope that if a plausible Aristotelian 
theory can be developed, Aristotelian naturalism will have resources to respond to address 
the normativity problem in a new and powerful way.  
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In Sections 3 and 4 I begin developing what I believe is the most promising 
metanormative theory for Aristotelian naturalists. It is a new version of constructivism I 
call Aristotelian constructivism. As I mentioned above, the label itself is not new. Mark LeBar 
(2004) was the first to use the label for a view he was developing, although he later began 
calling his view Virtue Eudaimonism (LeBar 2013). He is also the only other author active in 
the literature who has attempted to combine a general Aristotelian ethical outlook with a 
constructivist account of practical normativity.75 I will not be engaging with his view in 
detail, however, since Aristotelian naturalists like Foot, Thompson, and Hursthouse would 
not be inclined to embrace it. My version of Aristotelian constructivism is structurally 
different from LeBar’s Virtue Eudaimonism in ways that, I hope, will make it attractive to 
Aristotelian naturalists.76 As far as I can tell, no one else has put forward the sort of view I 
will propose. If I am right, this chapter breaks new theoretical ground. Setting out the view 
in a single chapter, however, requires me to leave many important issues unremarked and 
undeveloped. I will have space only to sketch the barest outlines of the view. So this 
chapter is perhaps best read as the outline of a long-term research project, along with 
enough support to show that such a research program is worth undertaking. 
 
2. Aristotelian Naturalism and Metanormative Theory 
I have already suggested that critics should not deny that facts about human nature and 
natural goodness are practically normative. It is obvious that some such facts are reason-
                                                
 
75 Christine Korsgaard’s recent work (2009; 2011; 2013; 2014) is similar in bent, in that it 
undertakes to bring together an Aristotelian account of goodness with a Kantian 
constructivist account of normativity. 
76 Henceforth I will use the term ‘Aristotelian constructivism’ to refer to my specific 
version of it, and use LeBar’s term ‘Virtue Eudaimonism’ to refer to his version of 
constructivism. 
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giving. If I am holding a glass of straw-colored liquid, and you shout, “Wait! That’s not 
whisky, it’s hemlock!” and if you speak truly, no one doubts you have pointed out a reason 
why I should not drink the liquid. And no one doubts that the reason I should not drink 
the liquid is because it would end my life, and also that ending my life would be naturally 
bad for this organism that I am. So, facts about natural goodness and badness can be 
practically normative. This much is clear. What is in unclear is precisely why or how they 
can be, given that such facts are not intrinsically practical, as I argued in the previous 
chapter. The challenge for the Aristotelian naturalist, then, is to explain what it is in virtue of 
which facts involving natural goodness/badness are practical, when they are practical. Now 
this sort of explanation falls in the purview of what has come to be called metanormative 
theory. Metanormative theories are not about the reasons agents actually have, but rather 
purport to explain the nature of reasons in general. Ruth Chang (2009; 2013; 2014) has 
pointed out in a series of recent papers that there are three distinct types of questions we 
can ask in metanormative theorizing. Getting clear on this three-fold distinction will help 
us understand exactly what sort of explanation the Aristotelian naturalist needs.77 
 
Chang’s three-fold distinction 
The first question we could ask in metanormative theorizing is about what sorts of 
facts are normative. This, Chang suggests, is a question about the bearers of normativity. 
Now as Chang points out, all sorts of facts can be normative. But some are dependent for 
their normative force on others, and the question here is what sort of facts are fundamentally 
                                                
 
77 In the rest of this section I will follow the practice of Chang and most other 
metanormative theorists in using the reasons characterization of the normative. So in this 
section, ‘normativity’ will refer to practical normativity. 
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normative? There are three main views: value theories, on which normativity is grounded 
in facts about values; desire theories, on which normativity is grounded in facts about 
agents’ desires; and hybrid theories, which basically combine the prior two accounts.78 
Second, we could ask what normativity is. This is a question about the nature of 
normativity. Again, there are basically three answers to this question: first, that normativity 
is a sui generis justificatory relation; second, that normativity is motivational force; and third, 
that normativity is a kind of volitional commitment that is both motivating and 
justificatory.79 
The third type of question we could ask is: what makes normative facts normative? 
That is, what is it in virtue of which normative facts are normative? This is a question 
about the source of normativity.80 There are two main views about normative source.81 
Source externalism holds that normativity is grounded in facts external to agents.82 
                                                
 
78 Among the defenders of value theories, Chang includes Parfit (2011), Raz (1997), and 
Scanlon (1998). See also Nagel (1970), Shafer-Landau (2003), Wallace (2006), and 
Wedgewood (2007). Among the defenders of desire theories Chang references Williams 
(1981). See also the early Foot (1978), Railton (1989; 2003), Smith (1994), Schroeder 
(2007). A similar family of views I did not mention in the text are buck-passing accounts, 
on which normative facts are not values themselves, but the underlying facts on which 
values supervene. See Scanlon (1998). The hybrid view is not widely represented among 
philosophers. Ruth Chang (2004) has been its primary defender. 
79 For defenders of the view that normativity is a sui generis justificatory relation, see 
Dancy (2000), Parfit (2011), Raz (1999a), Scanlon (1998) and Shafer-Landau (2003). See 
Williams (1981) and Lenman (2010) for the view that normativity is motivational force, and 
Korsgaard (1996c; 2008c) for the view that normativity is a volitional force that is both 
motivating and justificatory.  
80 See Chang (2009: 243), Chang (2013: 164-5), and especially Chang (2014: 477-82) for 
extensive discussion on the question of normative source.  
81 Chang carves up the positions a bit differently. She says there are three main views: 
externalism, internalism and voluntarism. But I find it simpler to classify voluntarism as a 
species of internalism. 
82 Defenders of source externalism include Scanlon (2014), Parfit (2011) and Raz (1999a). 
Note the similarity between the list of those who defend value accounts of normative 
bearers and the list of those who defend source externalism. There are natural affinities 
between these views. As Chang (2014) points out, however, keeping these questions 
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Versions of source externalism disagree about what sorts of facts these are—for example, 
whether they are natural or non-natural or supernatural, whether they are irreducibly 
normative, or whether they are reducible to non-normative facts. Source internalism, the 
other view on normative source, holds that normativity is sourced in facts that are internal 
to agents. Again, different versions of internalism hold different views on what sorts of 
facts about agents ground normativity. One common type of source internalist holds that 
normativity is grounded in facts about agents’ non-cognitive motivational states.83 Another 
kind of source internalist holds that normativity is grounded in volitional commitment.84 
Yet another kind of source internalist holds that normativity is grounded in some sui generis 
type of evaluative attitude which is different from both desire and volitional commitment.85  
Above I said that the question to be pressed on the Aristotelian naturalist is: what 
is it in virtue of which facts about natural goodness are normative? With Chang’s three-fold 
distinction in hand, we can see this is a question about the source of normativity. 
Remarkably, however, Aristotelian naturalists have engaged very little in mainstream 
metanormative debates about normative source.86 This is surprising because any position 
one takes on the question whether human nature and natural goodness are normative 
                                                
 
distinct is important because failure to do so can hide certain options from view. For 
example, one might hold that the bearers of normativity are facts about values, and also 
that normativity is conferred upon those facts by agents. Korsgaard’s “Two Distinctions in 
Goodness” (1983) made roughly the same point. 
83 Defenders of this brand of source internalism include, among others, Goldman (2005; 
2006; 2009), Lenman (2010), Schroeder (2007) and Williams (1981). 
84 Defenders of this view include Korsgaard (2009) and Chang (2009). 
85 This view is defended by Sharon Street (2008).  
86 There are several philosophers broadly Aristotelian in bent who have engaged in 
questions of normative source—for example, Mark LeBar (2004; 2013) and John 
McDowell (1998: essays 4-10). But neither of these would, I think, qualify as an 
Aristotelian naturalist in the full sense represented by Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse 
and Michael Thompson.  
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presupposes a prior view about what makes anything normative. One might have thought, 
therefore, that the controversy between Aristotelian naturalists and their critics would have 
quickly led to a discussion about the basic source of practical normativity, for this, one 
might think, is where the disagreement between Aristotelian naturalists and their critics 
ultimately bottoms out. But when one looks at the writings of the paradigm Aristotelian 
naturalists, one finds almost no engagement with mainstream theories of normative source. 
If the arguments in Chapter 3 are on the right track, this lack of engagement in 
metanormative theory has been a strategic error. I believe the only viable way forward for 
the Aristotelian naturalist is to begin formulating a metanormative theory about the source 
of (practical) normativity, a task I begin in the next section. 
 
The Attractions of Constructivism 
When we survey the mainstream accounts of normative source, one stands out as especially 
well-suited to take on the Aristotelian naturalist’s theoretical task: constructivism. 
Constructivism can be characterized as the view that valuing is prior to, and the source of, 
value. The core idea, metaphysically, is that practical normativity is mind-dependent, 
grounded in agents’ first-personal conscious engagement with the world. So constructivism 
is an internalist theory of normative source. The prospect of marrying Aristotelian 
naturalism with constructivism might be a bit startling. But in fact, the two views fit 
together remarkably well.87  
For a start, constructivism purports to offer impressive theoretical payoffs with 
minimal metaphysical commitment. To see this, consider first a different mainstream 
                                                
 
87 Christine Korsgaard (1996c; 2008c; 2013; 2014) has done excellent trail-blazing work on 
this score. My view is deeply inspired by her brand of neo-Kantianism.  
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metanormative account, substantive realism.88 On this view, practical normativity is ultimately 
grounded in normative entities or facts that exist independently of the thoughts and desires 
of agents. 89 A central motivation for this view is that it easily explains an important feature 
many people think characterizes ethical discourse—namely, objectivity. According to 
substantive realism, ethical claims are objective in virtue of the fact that they describe or 
refer to fundamental normative entities that are metaphysically independent of the 
thoughts, concerns and desires of agents. The explanatory power of this view comes at a 
cost. The view is plagued by well-known epistemological worries about how we could 
come to know such entities, and metaphysical worries about their nature and whether they 
are compatible with the natural sciences. Moreover, some theorists have argued that 
substantive realism fails to explain a second key feature of ethical claims, namely, their 
close connection with motivation. These objectors claim that it is difficult to see how 
normative entities that are wholly external to agents could engage their motivation in the 
way ethical norms are thought to do—from the inside, so to speak, binding our reason, 
rather than from the outside, like a carrot or stick.90  
Constructivist theories claim to be able to explain both features of ethical discourse 
without the metaphysical cost. How they do this depends in part on the particular version 
in question. I will have more to say about the details of constructivism below, but the basic 
idea is this. Constructivist theories hold that normativity is grounded in the familiar attitude 
of taking something to be, or seeing something as, valuable or calling for some kind of 
                                                
 
88 I borrow this label from Korsgaard (1996c). 
89 Shafer-Landau (2003), Parfit (2011) and Scanlon (2014) hold versions of this view. In so 
describing normative realism I am painting with a broad brush. Below I will note that the 
label ‘realism’ is used in more than one way.  
90 See Sayre-McCord (2017) for an overview of these challenges. See Korsgaard (1996c) and 
LeBar (2013) for a clear version of the latter sort of criticism. 
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response. Valuing attitudes are tightly linked with motivation, which explains the second 
feature of ethical norms. All versions of constructivism also hold that there are constraints, 
grounded either in the very attitude of valuing, or in other features of rationality, that 
determine on which of our valuing attitudes are normatively authoritative for us. So 
constructivism also purports to offer a way of securing objectivity. And it does this without 
reference to the strange sorts of facts postulated by the substantive realist.  
These are some general reasons why an Aristotelian naturalist might be drawn to 
constructivism over competing metanormative accounts. Another feature that should make 
constructivism especially attractive to Aristotelian naturalists is how it is able to employ a 
pair of distinctions elucidated over three decades ago by Christine Korsgaard in her paper, 
“Two Distinctions in Goodness.”91 One of the most interesting moves of that paper was to 
differentiate the final/instrumental distinction from the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. The 
first distinction concerns the status of goals or ends in the rational structure of action and 
deliberation. Final ends are pursued for their own sake, whereas instrumental ends are 
pursued for the sake of some other end. The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, as Korsgaard 
understands it, concerns the metaphysical locus of value. Some unpacking is needed to 
show exactly how constructivism puts this pair of distinctions to work, but we can already 
see how the general idea connects with the Aristotelian naturalist’s problem.  
Distinguishing these two distinctions opens up the possibility of an activity or state of 
affairs being a final end (an ultimate bearer of practical normativity) but not the basic source 
or ground of that normativity. That is, it makes possible the idea that some facts are 
practically significant, in a basic, non-instrumental way (i.e. final ends), while holding that 
                                                
 
91 The paper was reprinted in her 1996 collection, Creating the Kingdom of Ends. 
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their practical normativity is grounded in something extrinsic to those facts, such as 
attitudes of the agent. Hence, by adopting a constructivist account of practical normativity, 
the Aristotelian naturalist can claim that facts about the human life form are non-
instrumentally practically normative, without relying on the false idea that practical 
normativity is grounded in intrinsic features of those facts, such as their evaluative-
normative nature. 
 Moreover, the version of constructivism I will propose—Aristotelian 
constructivism—is not subject to the standard objections an Aristotelian might launch 
against other mainstream constructivist theories. For example, one reason Aristotelian 
naturalists might be suspicious of constructivism is that the two main versions on offer in 
the literature give little or no place to the notion of human nature. Aristotelians also might 
doubt whether constructivism can support the sort of substantive ethical norms associated 
with virtues Aristotelian naturalists have long attempted to defend (say, in favor of keeping 
one’s agreements, or acting contrary to one’s self-interest for the good of others). This is 
because of the two main versions of constructivism on offer, only the Kantian version 
purports to justify the kind of objective norms Aristotelians want. But the Kantian version 
attempts to show that substantive norms can be derived from purely formal principles that 
are constitutive of rational agency, and Aristotelians, along with many other theorists, think 
such a project cannot be done. So Aristotelian naturalists might understandably doubt the 
prospects of constructivism as an Aristotelian-friendly metanormative theory. Aristotelian 
constructivism, however, when suitably developed, is not subject to these worries. So not 
only does it offer a powerful solution to the normativity problem, there is little theoretical 
cost in Aristotelian naturalism wedding itself to the form of constructivism I will propose. 
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In the next section I locate Aristotelian constructivism on the theoretical map, first 
by offering a characterization of constructivism in general, and then by distinguishing 
Aristotelian constructivism from the two mainstream versions of it currently in the 
literature. It will be helpful to begin approaching my characterization of constructivism by 
showing where constructivism falls along several key distinctions. 
 
3. Constructivism 
Metaphysics: Realism vs. Antirealism 
One of the major divisions among normative theorists is the division between realists and 
antirealists. Sometimes this division is characterized as a disagreement over whether there 
are practically normative facts—realists claiming there are, antirealist claiming there are no 
normative facts, only normative claims or judgments. This characterization of the 
realist/antirealist divide is ambiguous, however, and that ambiguity manifests in 
disagreements among constructivists themselves on which side of the realist/antirealist 
divide constructivism falls. Above I contrasted constructivism with substantive realism. But 
realism is construed in the literature in different ways. On one of these construals, 
constructivism counts as a form of realism. On another construal, it does not.  
One could understand realism in a thin way, as consisting in the following thesis: 
Cognitivism  There are true practically normative claims.  
David Copp (2013), Mark LeBar (2013) and Peter Railton (1986) self-identify as realists in 
virtue of endorsing this cognitivist thesis.92 Other philosophers understand realism as 
involving not only Cognitivism, but also the metaphysical thesis: 
                                                
 
92 See also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1988: 5), who says: “Wherever it is found, I’ll argue, 
realism involves embracing just two theses: (1) the claims in question, when literally 
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Independence Practically normative claims are true in virtue of 
representing practical normative facts that exist 
independently of agents.  
I have been calling this view substantive realism. Christine Korsgaard (2008b), Sharon Street 
(2008; 2010), Russ Shafer-Landau (2003) and Karl Schafer (2015) characterize realism in 
this thick way as involving both Cognitivism and Independence. Since the heart of 
constructivism is the idea that practical normativity is mind-dependent, it is no surprise that 
these philosophers classify constructivism as a form of antirealism. 
It is important to see, though, that endorsing Cognitivism does not commit one to 
endorsing Independence. One might think that there are true practically normative 
claims, and even that their truth consists in their expressing practically normative facts, but 
hold that those facts are mind-dependent. If one thinks this, as Copp, Railton and Lebar 
do, and if one understands realism in the thin sense, as consisting only of Cognitivism—
with some species of realism going on to endorse Independence and some not—then one 
can classify constructivism as a form of (thin) realism. Indeed, LeBar (2013: 115-7) argues 
explicitly for this classification.93  
In this study I find it convenient to follow LeBar in treating constructivism as a 
form of thin realism, for this will enable me to speak freely of normative facts. Antirealists 
                                                
 
construed, are literally true or false (cognitivism), and (2) some are literally true. Nothing 
more.” Finlay (2007) contains a helpful overview of the different understandings of 
realism. 
93 Constructivism’s endorsement of Cognitivism is what principally sets it apart from 
expressivism. This notwithstanding, James Lenman (2010; 2012) has developed an 
expressivist version of constructivism. He does this by trimming the last clause off 
Cognitivism, so one is left with the thesis: “There are normative truths,” and he then 
inserts an account of truth that lets one say everything the cognitivist says, but mean by it 
what the expressivist means. 
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typically deny the existence of practical normative facts, framing their views instead in 
terms of practical normative claims and judgments. Although I could frame Aristotelian 
constructivism solely in these terms, I have found it to be more easily and economically 
expressed in terms of facts, keeping in mind that practically normative facts are, on any 
constructivist view, mind-dependent. 
  
Scope: Local vs. Global 
Versions of constructivism vary by scope. Local constructivism94 aims only to explain a 
limited or local domain of practical-normative facts, doing so by appealing to other more 
basic, or at least less controversial, practically normative facts. John Rawls’ (1980) and 
Thomas Scanlon’s (1998) views are often cited as representatives of local constructivist 
theories. Rawls, for example, explains practically normative facts about political justice by 
reference to a decision procedure, illustrated by the image of rational agents standing in the 
“original position,” agreeing to a set of principles while behind a veil of ignorance about 
their place and prospects in society. This view is a form of restricted constructivism 
because Rawls uses practical-normative concepts in his description of the decision 
procedure itself. One example is that the agents in the original position are characterized as 
“rational” (Rawls 1971: 142), where this is understood not only in the purely descriptive 
sense of someone who takes the most efficient means to promoting her own self-interest, 
but also at least partly in the practical-normative sense of what is reasonable for agents to 
do. Scanlon’s constructivism has a slightly different target; he is interested in explaining 
                                                
 
94 I follow Lenman and Shemmer (2012: 3) and Enoch (2009: 323) in using the local vs. 
global terminology. The same distinction has been called: restricted vs. metaethical (see Street 
2010: 367-369), and domain-specific vs. comprehensive (see LeBar 2013: 118). 
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normative facts about morally right and wrong action. On his contractualist view, an action 
is right in virtue of the fact that it can be justified to others on grounds those others cannot 
reasonably reject (Scanlon 1998: esp. chap. 5). As with Rawls, Scanlon explicitly appeals to 
more basic practically normative notions—e.g. justification and reasonable rejection—in order to 
explain his target concepts.  
Global theories, by contrast, attempt to explain what makes any practically 
normative claim or fact practically normative. This aim is generally thought to imply a 
theoretical constraint, namely, that such theories cannot appeal to practically normative 
concepts in their explanation. Do do so would be circular.95 Constructivist theories of 
normative source are attempts to explain what it is in virtue of which any normative reason 
is practically normative, so they are global theories. From now on, when I refer to 
constructivism, I mean the global type, unless otherwise indicated. Aristotelian 
constructivism is a type of global constructivism. 
 
Characterization: Procedure vs. Standpoint 
So, what exactly makes practically normative facts practically normative? Constructivists 
agree that normativity is a construct of the mental states or activities of agents, a 
phenomenon that arises in some way from the relation between agents and the world, and 
in particular from agents’ first-person engagement with the world. Constructivists also 
agree that normativity does not arise directly from an agent’s mental states. As Schafer puts 
it, constructivism does not merely take these mental state ‘materials’ as it finds them, but 
                                                
 
95 Mark LeBar (2013) denies this. His view is explicitly circular in a certain respect, which I 
will explain briefly below. He claims that the circularity is not vicious, however, since it 
fruitfully explains many other otherwise confusing aspects of normative experience and 
practice. 
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rather “transforms them via some ‘procedure of construction’, thereby arriving at what we 
might call the ‘metaethically authoritative’ normative points of view” (Schafer 2015: 691). 
Constructivists disagree, though, not only about what this “procedure of 
construction” is, but also on whether that intermediary step between raw attitudes and 
practically normative facts is best understood as a procedure at all. It used to be common 
to define constructivism in terms of the idea that practical normativity is the result of some 
actual or hypothetical deliberative procedure.96 Perhaps this is because Rawls (1980) framed 
his own version of constructivism in procedural terms, and his version is widely read as 
one of the spearheads of constructivism in the modern literature. The term ‘procedure’, 
however, suggests a linear, temporally extended deliberative process. Even when theorists 
are careful to represent the constructivist procedure as hypothetical, the procedural 
characterization does not well capture the way in which some prominent constructivists 
today think practical normativity arises from agents’ first-personal engagement with the 
world. 
An alternative approach, vigorously defended by Sharon Street (2010), holds that 
normativity arises not out of an actual or hypothetical procedure but out of a practical 
standpoint. To understand what a practical standpoint is, it is helpful to begin reflecting on 
what is involved in being an agent. Agents are things that act. To act is not merely to move, 
nor merely to move by internal motivation. Wind-up toy cars can do that. To be an agent 
                                                
 
96 Following in these footsteps, Darwall, Gibbard and Railton write in their widely cited 
article “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends” (1992: 13) that “the constructivist is a 
hypothetical proceduralist. He endorses some hypothetical procedure as determining which 
principles constitute valud standards of morality.” It is still common to include the notion 
of a procedure in characterizing constructivism while remaining more ecumenical. Thus, 
Lenman (2012: 215) describes constructivism as involving “some procedure we can in 
principle follow or some criterion we can in principle apply.” The second disjunct makes 
room for views like Street’s, as I explain below. 
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one must at least be able to sense the world, to represent it as being a certain way, and then 
to use those representations to direct one’s movements. For human agents, at least, and 
perhaps for all agents, the way in which our representations of the world help guide our 
behavior is by having a certain evaluative cast or valence or significance, which we register 
as calling for some sort of response. To perceive the world in this normatively loaded way 
is to occupy a practical standpoint. As Street puts it, a practical standpoint is “the point of 
view occupied by any creature who takes at least some things in the world to be good or 
bad, better or worse, required or optional, worthy or worthless, and so on…”97 To 
experience the world in this way is to hold a set of a certain type of intentional attitudes 
toward certain states of affairs. For convenience, I will call them value attitudes.98 To 
occupy a practical standpoint is, roughly, to hold a set of value attitudes.  
According to Street, the notion of a practical standpoint is more basic than that of 
a procedure. She suggests that  
the most sympathetic reading of paradigmatic constructivists such as Rawls and 
Korsgaard shows that the notion of a procedure is ultimately a heuristic device, 
whereas the philosophical heart of the position is the notion of the practical point 
of view and what does or doesn’t follow from within it. (Street 2010: 366)  
                                                
 
97 Street (2010: 366). In earlier writings, Street (2008: 208) characterized both 
constructivism in general and her own favored version of it in procedural terms. She rejects 
this characterization in her (2010: 364-66), and several pages later goes on to show how 
both Rawls’ and Scanlon’s view can be redescribed in practical standpoint rather than 
proceduralist terms. 
98 An unresolved issue within constructivist theories concerns the nature of this attitude. 
Some constructivist think it is desire (Lenman 2010; 2013). Others think it is a volitional 
commitment (Korsgaard 1996c; 2009a). Still others think it is a sui generis type of 
motivational state that cannot be reduced to any other type (Street 2008; 2012). Michael 
Ridge (2012) has persuasively argued that constructivists need to say more about the type 
of attitude they have in mind, given the significant theoretical role it plays. I agree, although 
I do not have the space to do so here. I use the term ‘value attitude’ as a neutral 
placeholder. 
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The idea here is that what ultimately makes a deliberative procedure produce outputs of the 
desired sort is a matter of two things: first, the facts that are allowed in; second, how those 
facts are interpreted, assessed, or evaluated in light of certain goals. To interpret, assess, or 
evaluate those facts in light of certain goals, to see only those facts as salient and thus worth 
assessing in the first place, and to have certain goals one sees as worth going for, and worth 
assessing facts in light of, is to grasp those facts from within a certain practical standpoint. 
Thus, for example, to be a Rawlsian agent, instrumentally rational and self-interested, is to 
take facts about what would benefit oneself as being practically salient in a way that facts 
about what would benefit someone else are not. In general, then, one cannot even 
undertake the sort of Rawlsian procedure that could generate principles of justice unless one 
already occupies a practical standpoint. And it is really the nature of that standpoint, 
combined with the content of the inputs, that determines the outcome of the procedure. 
What the notion of a procedure adds to the notion of a practical standpoint is simply a 
helpful way of envisioning what implications follow from that practical perspective. I think 
Street is right that the notion of the practical standpoint lies closer to the heart of practical 
normativity than the notion of a deliberative procedure, and I will follow her in employing 
the practical standpoint characterization of constructivism.  
I began this section by noting that constructivists agree that practically normative 
facts do not arise directly from an agents’ value attitudes, but are generated by some 
“procedure of construction” (Schafer 2015: 691). And I have suggested that this procedure 
of construction is best understood in terms of a practical standpoint. I still need to explain 
how this notion of a practical standpoint can move constructivism beyond pure 
subjectivism. Before I do that, however, it will be helpful to have in hand a general 
characterization of constructivism itself.  
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A Preliminary Characterization of Constructivism 
Constructivism can be understood as a thesis about what makes practically normative facts 
normative or as a thesis about what makes normative judgments true. As a thesis about 
facts, I will say constructivism holds that  
CF Facts are practically normative in virtue of following from within the 
practical standpoint, 
where the practical standpoint is given a formal characterization, for reasons I will explain 
shortly.99 As a thesis about judgments, constructivism holds that  
CJ Practically normative judgments are true in virtue of expressing practically 
normative facts.100 
Constructivism, then, holds that a fact is practically normative, or a practical judgment is 
true, in virtue of some other facts holding, where these include facts about how agents 
perceive and interpret the world. This idea clearly sets constructivism apart from the sort 
of realist view that understands our practical cognitive engagement with the world in terms 
                                                
 
99 Not all constructivists would endorse this generic characterization, precisely because I 
am using the practical standpoint rather than the procedural characterization. In 2010 
Sharon Street (2010: 364) wrote that there is no uncontroversial way of describing 
constructivism “at the present time,” and I think little has changed since the time of that 
publication. No matter. It is not my purpose to offer a neutral characterization, but rather 
to offer a general characterization that will help me situate Aristotelian constructivism with 
respect to other mainstream views. 
100 This formulation is inspired by Sharon Street’s (2010: 367), but it differs in that Street 
thinks constructivism is a form of antirealism, and thus characterizes constructivism in 
terms of the truth conditions of normative judgments rather than in terms of facts. On her 
view, normative judgments are true in virtue of being entailed from within the practical 
standpoint. Apparently, however, she is open to framing constructivism in terms of facts, 
for in one place she says “one way to present metaethical constructivism is as claiming that 
normative facts are constituted by facts about what is entailed by the ‘rules of practical 
reason’ in combination with the non-normative facts” (2010: 373).  
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of recognizing mind-independent normative properties—a theory Garrett Cullity and Berys 
Gaut have aptly called the “recognitional view,” and has since been known as 
recognitionalism.101 According to constructivism, there are no mind-independent practically 
normative properties there to recognize. There are just the mind-independent, non-
normative facts (such as that one’s neighbor needs help), and the agents’ registering them a 
certain way, or taking them to have a certain significance that bears on her actions. 
 Two key features of this characterization of constructivism need clarification. First, 
why must the practical standpoint be characterized in formal terms? The answer is that 
global constructivism purports to explain what makes any practically normative fact 
normative. If the thesis is that practical normativity in general arises from within, and follows 
from, a practical standpoint, then we must characterize the practical standpoint in a way 
that could apply to any possible occupant of that standpoint. Street explains it thus:  
To give the practical point of view a formal characterization is to give an account 
of the standpoint of valuing or normative judgment as such, where this involves 
giving an account of the attitude of valuing that does not itself presuppose any 
substantive values but rather merely explicates what is involved in valuing anything 
at all. Unlike their restricted counterparts, metaethical constructivist views, if 
successful, do not take the truth of any given substantive normative claim for 
granted. Instead, they explain what a creature must be doing to count as a valuer at 
all, and explain how standards of correctness in the normative domain get 
generated by this attitude. (Street 2010: 369)  
This notwithstanding, some versions of constructivism hold that no substantive practical 
judgments follow from a purely formal description of the practical standpoint—that in 
order to get substantive conclusions about what some particular agent (such as you or me) 
have reason to do, we must appeal to a substantive description of the practical standpoint. 
I will return to this shortly.  
                                                
 
101 Cullity and Gaut (1997: 4). 
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The second feature in need of clarification is the central notion of “following from 
within the practical standpoint.” Suppose I have some end E. Having an end involves 
holding a value attitude toward the state of affairs expressed in E. Thus, E is part of my 
practical standpoint. There is always a specific way (or range of ways) in which I can pursue 
an end. Call this a means. The necessary means to my ends are determined by facts about 
my particular circumstances. Let us suppose that the necessary means to my end E will be 
some activity A. So then E and facts about my circumstances ground the fact that 
7 A-ing is a necessary means of pursuing E. 
Now it is partly constitutive of holding a value attitude toward E that I take myself to have 
reason to undertake the necessary means to E.102 So if I become aware of the fact 
expressed in 7, then, so long as I hold E as my end, i.e. so long as E is part of my practical 
standpoint, I must take 7 to be practically normative. I must do so because that is partly 
constitutive of taking E as my end.103 This, then, is how a practical fact can follow from 
within the practical standpoint. Notice that what follows from my practical standpoint is 
not the content of the practical fact expressed in 7. That is already fixed by the content of 
my final end and the facts about my circumstances. Rather, what follows from within my 
practical standpoint is 7’s practical significance. The basic idea here is that an agent’s 
                                                
 
102 Kant (1996: 70 [4:418]) endorsed a version of this principle which he called the 
hypothetical imperative. Today it is usually called the instrumental principle. Arguments in support 
of this principle appear in Street (2008: Section 7) and Korsgaard (2009: 68-70). There is 
disagreement on how the instrumental principle should be formulated, in part because 
while some version of the principle seems a crucially important part of rationality, there is a 
danger of bootstrapping if it is not formulated with care. Take, for example, a version of 
the principle that says “If I have some end E, then I have reason to take the necessary 
means to E.” But this is clearly false, because I do not have reason to take actions in 
pursuit of evil ends. Merely having an end cannot give me a reason to pursue it. There is 
much disagreement on how exactly the principle should be formulated. For a selection of 
the discussion, see Korsgaard (2008d), Raz (2011), Schroeder (2005) and Wallace (2001).  
103 See Street (2008: 227-229) for an extended discussion of this idea. 
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reasons are a function of her ends and her circumstances. And the status of practical facts 
as reasons is grounded in constitutive facts about what it is to hold a value attitude. 
 Let us see how all this works in a concrete example. Suppose that one of my ends is 
protecting the well-being of my children, and suppose that my family lives in an old house 
whose ventilation system is full of mold, which triggers life-threatening allergic reactions in 
my children. I discover this and also learn that there is no effective way to clean the system, 
and thus that moving to a cleaner dwelling is the only way in my power to remove the 
allergen threat. So long as I hold the end of protecting the well-being of my children, then I 
must take myself to have reason to undertake the necessary means. So I must take myself 
to have reason to move to a cleaner house. I must do so, because, given the empirical facts, 
that is a constitutive part of holding the end of promoting the well-being of my children. 
Another way of putting this is that failure to take myself to have reason to move to a 
cleaner house would not display insensitivity to the reasons I have. Rather, it would 
indicate that promoting the well-being of my children is not really my end after all.  
In this scenario, two practical-normative facts are entailed from within my practical 
standpoint. First, there is the second-order fact that I have reason to move to a cleaner 
house. This fact entails there is a reason to do something, but it does not express the 
reason itself. The actual reason on which I would act, in this case, is the fact that moving to 
a cleaner house would remove the allergen threat. This is a first-order practical fact. Its 
content, of course, is not intrinsically practical. It is simply a fact about what is and is not 
possible in the world, given the circumstances. But it becomes practically normative for me 
in virtue of its standing in a means-end relation to my end. That is, its practical significance 
follows from within my practical standpoint.  
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Now given what I have said so far, constructivism might seem to yield complete 
subjectivism.104 The above characterization of constructivism references “the” practical 
standpoint, but there are many possible practical standpoints, in the sense of many 
different sets of value attitudes an agent could hold. And it seems that, for all that has been 
said so far, one could generate reasons simply by adopting certain ends. Although on this 
view it is true that an agent’s reasons are a function of her ends combined with her 
circumstances, and although it is also true that agents do have some choice over their ends, 
most constructivists believe there are some constraints on which ends actually generate 
reasons. We are now in position to explain how this can happen. This brings us to the 
fourth and final distinction I will discuss. 
 
Generality: Kantian vs. Humean 
Recall Schafer’s point above about how constructivism avoids subjectivism. He said that 
constructivism does not merely take our attitudes as it finds them, but rather “transforms 
them via some ‘procedure of construction’, thereby arriving at what we might call the 
‘metaethically authoritative’ normative points of view” (Schafer 2015: 691). According to 
Schafer, it is the constructive procedure that ensures constructivism is not subjectivism. But 
the practical standpoint characterization avoids using the notion of a procedure, so it needs 
some other way of blocking the slide into subjectivism. It does so by specifying the 
                                                
 
104 I am understanding subjectivism along the lines of Elizabeth Anderson’s definition: 
Subjectivism is the view that the mere existence of a favorable subjective state 
taking x as its object (thinking that x is valuable, wanting x, identifying with an ideal 
that endorses x) makes x valuable to the person in that state. If this were so there 
would be no room for error or genuine disagreement in value judgments when 
people know their subjective states. (1993: 91) 
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practical standpoint in further detail, thereby restricting the value attitudes that count for 
determining which facts are practically normative, and thus opening up the possibility of 
divergence between the value attitudes that constitute the practically normative standpoint 
and the value attitudes an agent happens to hold at any given moment. The two main types 
of constructivism result from specifying the practical standpoint in different ways.105 
Kantian forms of constructivism hold that the relevant practical standpoint—the 
standpoint that grounds practically normative facts—is the standpoint of rational agency 
itself.106 As the most generic specification of the practical standpoint, we can call this the 
rational-agential standpoint. The general Kantian constructivist schema, then, is: 
KCF Facts are practically normative in virtue of following from within the 
rational-agential standpoint.  
The general schema for normative judgments remains the same.107 The rational-agential 
standpoint consists in a set of value attitudes the objects of which are purely formal 
properties. Chief among these will be the properties of universalizability, and of being the 
necessary means to a valued end, both of which correspond to the well-known Kantian 
principles, the categorical imperative and the hypothetical imperative. Suppose, for 
example, that my end is to achieve relational harmony with my family, and a necessary 
                                                
 
105 See Schafer (2012: Section 2) for a different way of specifying the practical standpoint. 
He considers three ways of characterizing the perspective on which normative truth 
depends. The truth-value of normative judgments about an individual agent A could be 
grounded in (1) A’s normative perspective, (2) the normative perspective of the judger, or 
(3) the normative perspective of the one assessing the judgment. Street (2008: 224) 
considers options (1) and (2) and selects, without much discussion, option (1). I follow 
Street on this point. 
106 Defenders of global Kantian constructivism include Bagnoli (2002; 2013a), Korsgaard 
(1996; 2008b, 2009), and O’Neill (1989). See also Schafer (2015) for a sympathetic 
discussion of the nature and merits of Kantian constructivism. 
107 Again, anti-realists can avoid reference to normative facts by transposing KCF into a 
thesis about judgments.  
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means to this end is to forgive a wrong done to me by a family member. What we have 
here is a maxim, an act-end package.108 This maxim is universalizable in Kant’s sense that I 
could consistently will that everyone act on this maxim in similar circumstances.109 So 
insofar as I am a rational agent, I will take this end as having pro tanto practical normative 
significance. And since the means of forgiving the wrong is necessary to the end of 
achieving relational harmony, then so long as I will this end, I commit myself to the means. 
As Kant says, “[w]hoever wills the end also wills…the indispensably necessary means to it 
that are within his power” (1996: 70 [4:418]). Thus, when possible actions exemplify these 
formal features, the rational agent will see or register those possible actions as practically 
normative precisely in virtue of exemplifying those formal features. This is what it is to 
occupy the rational-agential standpoint.   
Kantian constructivists think that taking these formal features as practically 
significant generates certain constraints on the sorts of substantive facts one can take as 
practically significant. So although Kantian constructivism specifies the practical standpoint 
in purely formal terms, it also holds that certain substantive reasons arise from within it. 
For example, Kantians hold that occupying the rational-agential standpoint commits an 
agent to valuing both herself and her own ends and other rational agents and their ends.110 
Thus, the power of the Kantian version of constructivism is that, at the level of 
metanormative theory, it need only defend a very thin, formal conception of the practical 
                                                
 
108 Here I am following Korsgaard’s (2008a: 216-219) interpretation of Kant’s view about 
the nature of a maxim. She says that a maxim describes an action, where the description 
includes both the discrete act and the end for which it is done. The general structure of a 
maxim is “do-this-act-for-the-sake-of-this-end” (p. 218). 
109 As Kant puts it, “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim 
should become a universal law” (Kant 1996: 57 [4:402]). 
110 See Korsgaard (1996; 2008). See Street (2012) for a response. 
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standpoint, yet it is supposed to turn out that the rational-agential standpoint entails a 
substantive practical standpoint, which yields substantive facts about what we have reason 
to do.  
The other main version of constructivism has come to be called Humean 
constructivism. Its most energetic and prolific defender has been Sharon Street.111 
According to Street, Humean constructivism is defined negatively as a rejection of the 
Kantian view that “substantive moral conclusions are entailed from within the standpoint 
of valuing as such” (Street 2012: 41). Instead, Humean constructivism holds that 
substantive reasons arise only from within the practical standpoint of particular agents. We 
can therefore sketch the view as follows: 
HCF Facts are practically normative for some agent S in virtue of being entailed 
from within S’s practical standpoint.  
Like the Kantian version, the general schema for normative judgments remains the same. 
On the Humean view, the value attitudes that constitute my practical standpoint may or 
may not align with those that make up your standpoint, and that is okay. Thus, Humean 
constructivism supports a version of relativism. In theory at least, one might have reason to 
do anything.  
But Street’s view is not a full-blown, unrestricted subjectivism. Even though what I 
have reason to do is a function of my value attitudes, just because I happen to take 
                                                
 
111 See Street (2008; 2010; 2012), although more recently Street has started exploring the 
prospects of a more objectivist approach (see Street 2016). An expressivist version of 
Humean constructivism is defended by James Lenman (2010; 2012). Bagnoli (2011: section 
4) classifies David Velleman (2009) as a Humean constructivist and Lenman and Shermer 
(2012: 4) classify Harry Frankfurt as a Humean constructivist. 
 There are other views in the literature too. David Copp (1995; 2005) e.g., argues, 
roughly, that the relevant standpoint is neither the individual nor the generic agent's 
standpoint but the standpoint of society. 
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something as valuable does not ipso facto make it practically normative for me. I can be 
mistaken about the reasons I have, in at least two ways. First, many of the practically 
normative facts that follow from a practical standpoint are a function not only of what the 
individual takes to be valuable, but also of the empirical facts, for the empirical facts 
determine the necessary means to my ends. Thus, one sort of normative mistake can occur 
when I get the empirical facts wrong. If my children are displaying allergy symptoms, and I 
think they are suffering from a food allergy when their symptoms are actually caused by, 
say, mold spores in the ventilation system, I might falsely judge that I have reason to 
change their daily diet. Another sort of normative mistake occurs when I have conflicting 
v-attitudes. For example, in a cool moment I might judge that praise and blame is 
unwarranted in cases where someone had no control over their behavior. This might be a 
deep and settled judgment. Now suppose at 2 a.m. my child comes down with the flu the 
night before my dissertation defense. Two hours later, in a foul mood from staying up with 
my child, I blame my child for catching the flu. That is, I take her to be blameworthy. In so 
doing I am making a normative mistake, judged by the lights of my own practical 
standpoint.112 Thus, even though Humean constructivism is relativistic in the sense that the 
reasons an agent has are a function of that agent’s value attitudes, the view is not a 
simplistic affirmation that something is valuable for an agent simply because the agent 
takes it to be. 
Aristotelian naturalists would not be inclined to embrace either the Kantian or the 
Humean version of constructivism. As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, the 
fact that Kantian constructivism concerns itself with generic rational agency rather than 
                                                
 
112 This example is based on an example from Street (2008: 230, n. 38). 
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specifically human agency is already a count against it, for Aristotelian naturalists 
characteristically take ethics to be closely tied not only to the generic features of agency, 
but also to the substantive needs and capacities of the human animal.113 In addition, there 
are well-known concerns (and not only from Aristotelians) about whether the Kantian 
project of pulling substantive norms out of a purely formal hat can really succeed at all.  
Humean versions of constructivism also leave little theoretical significance for the notion 
of human nature, but for the opposite reason: they place all the theoretical weight on 
features of individual agents. The result is a kind of restricted relativism that Aristotelian 
naturalists would like to avoid.  
Aristotelian constructivism shares the same basic structure as both Kantian and 
Humean versions, but differs from them in ways that, I hope to show, will make it 
attractive to Aristotelian naturalists. Before I explain the view, though, I need briefly to 
                                                
 
113 Michael Thompson points the point starkly when, contrasting a Kantian approach to 
ethics with an Aristotelian approach, he writes: 
One mark of Aristotelianism is the special position it gives to the concept human in 
practical philosophy, in particular the preference it gives to this concept over the 
abstract concepts person and rational being. It is an essential characteristic of the 
Kantian approach that it makes these latter concepts central. I do not think we are 
practicing anything that merit the title of Kantianism except where we are led into 
the project of articulating a conception of how to live, and how to orient oneself in 
life, and how to reason practically, that would apply as much to the Martians or 
Venusians carefully described in Kant’s “Universal Natural History” as it does to 
us. If my action is properly linked to a thought or consideration—that is, if my will 
is ‘morally’ determined—then a ‘law’ is operating in me that can also operate 
among the imagined Martians, just as a single law of gravitation operates in me and 
them considered simply as bodies… On an Aristotelian view, the closest one could 
come to such a thing—somehow to be found “in” many agents and in some sense 
potentially linking consideration and action in them—is the specifically human life 
form itself, which is ex hypothesi not found in the imagined Martians. If I hazard a 
few general remarks under the heading “how to live”, supposing them to have 
application in my own case, then, for the Aristotelian, the life form I bear provides 
the measure of widest generality I can intelligibly aspire to attach to them. 
(Thompson 2008: 7-8) 
117 
explain why my version is worth exploring, given that Mark LeBar (2008; 2012; 2013) has 
already developed an Aristotelian form of constructivism he calls Virtue Eudaimonism. 
LeBar’s view is complex and I cannot do it justice in a few paragraphs. I will only offer a 
general sketch and explain why I think Aristotelians will not find his view appealing.  
 
LeBar’s Virtue Eudaimonism 
Lebar (2013: Chapter 1) begins by defending a certain conception of practical rationality. 
On his view, which he bases on Aristotle, practical rationality consists in a framework of 
hierarchically ordered ends, organized under an ultimate end. An ultimate end is one that 
derives none of its normative force from some further end, and which contributes 
normative force to all other ends we seek (p. 16). Following Aristotle, LeBar argues that 
any particular individual can have only one ultimate end, and that there is only one ultimate 
end shared by all human practical reasoners, namely, the end of living well. With ends 
come reasons: “we have reasons to act for the sake of, and only for the sake of, our ends” 
(p. 14). So reasons are normative in virtue of their relation to our ends. The normativity of 
our ultimate end comes not from some other end, but from our wisely judging it to be 
normative (p. 111), where the measure of wise judgment is how well that judgment 
contributes to our living well. Thus, practical wisdom and living well are the key concepts on 
which the entire theory hangs.  
The relation between these two notions is complex. LeBar holds that although each 
of the two concepts can be characterized independently of the other, “what each concept 
picks out in the world cannot be characterized without essential reference to the other” (p. 
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286).114 Here is how the interdependence works. First, LeBar holds that we cannot make 
any substantive claims about what living well amounts to without appealing to the concept 
of practical wisdom. For LeBar, a well-lived life is a life of virtue, and we cannot properly 
characterize or identify a life of virtue without reference to practical wisdom (p. 81). This is 
because, first, all the virtues have a cognitive component, so they cannot be exercised 
without practical wisdom (pp. 81, 83). Thus, we cannot even describe a virtuous life 
without bringing in the notion of practical wisdom. Second, LeBar thinks there are no 
truths about living well that are both general and substantive enough to be useful for 
ethical purposes (p. 100). Thus, any substantive claim about the content of living well must 
be a claim about the life of some particular individual, and in such cases, it takes practical 
wisdom to determine what living well amounts to for that individual. So making any 
substantive claims about what living well consists in requires practical wisdom. The same 
holds the other way around: we cannot identify instances of practical wisdom without 
employing the notion of living well. For, on LeBar’s view, practical wisdom is simply 
practical reason exercised wisely or successfully, where success is measured by how well 
those exercises of reason contribute to a good life. 
 One feature of LeBar’s view that would give Aristotelian naturalists pause is his 
stance on the kind of knowledge we can have of human nature. While LeBar readily grants 
the Aristotelian point that, in general, “what constitutes a good life for us is determined by 
our being the kind of creatures we are” (p. 100), he also thinks we can say little in the way 
of general claims about our nature that could support general, ethically useful claims about 
what is good for individual human beings. It is not that we can make no general and 
                                                
 
114 In this sense, LeBar’s view is circular. He discusses this circularity and why he thinks it is 
not problematic in Lebar (2013: Chapter 11). 
119 
substantive claims about human nature. LeBar says, for example, that we are social beings, 
and that “social relations with other people is an element of the good life of paramount 
importance to [Virtue Eudaimonism]” (p. 89). But for LeBar, this general claim is of little 
ethical use, because the way in which social relations contribute to our living well depends 
so much on the particular circumstances of one’s life. This view contrasts starkly with the 
way in which general claims about human nature figure in, say, Rosalind Hursthouse and 
Philippa Foot’s defense of certain ethical norms.115 On their view, we can come to know 
facts about human nature that are both general and sufficiently substantive to support 
substantive ethical norms. For this reason, I think Aristotelian naturalists would not find 
LeBar’s Virtue Eudaimonism an attractive option. Hence, there is a need for other 
approaches such as my own to follow LeBar in harnessing the advantages of 
constructivism for Aristotelian-inspired ends, but to do it in a way more congenial to the 
Aristotelian naturalist project. 
Having sketched a theoretical map by marking four key distinctions, and indicating 
where Aristotelian constructivism falls with respect to those distinctions, I am now ready 
to unpack the view itself.  
 
4. Aristotelian Constructivism 
Aristotelian constructivism can be conceived as lying in between Kantian and Humean 
constructivism. Like Kantian versions, and unlike Humean ones, Aristotelian 
constructivism specifies the practical standpoint in more general terms than the standpoint 
                                                
 
115 See Hursthouse (1999: 209), Foot (2001: 44-45) and Anscombe (1981b: 18-21). At one 
point in her discussion, Foot asks, “Why then should there be surprise at the suggestion 
that the status of certain dispositions as virtues should be determined by quite general facts 
about human beings” (2001: 45)? 
120 
of any particular agent. But like Humean versions, and unlike Kantian versions, Aristotelian 
constructivism maintains that substantive normative conclusions cannot be derived from a 
purely formal characterization of the practical standpoint, and that an agent’s reasons are 
tied with facts about the agent herself. But whereas Humean constructivism holds that an 
agent’s reasons are tied with facts about her individual practical standpoint, Aristotelian 
constructivism holds that an agent’s reasons are tied with facts about the agent’s life form 
or nature.  
Aristotelian constructivism has two levels. Level 1, the most generic level, purports 
to offer an entirely general, global account of the source of practical normativity. Level 2 
takes the generic schema of level 1 and applies it to a specific life form.  
In its most generic form, then, and as a first approximation, Aristotelian 
constructivism is the thesis that facts are practically normative for some agent in virtue of 
following from within the practical standpoint of that agent’s life form. The basic idea here 
is that there are facts about how a particular type of organism characteristically “sees” the 
world, practically speaking, and it is this species-level description of the practical standpoint 
that fixes the boundaries of an individual agent’s reasons.  
This idea can be made a bit sharper by tying it to the notion of practical reason. I 
am understanding practical reason as the complex cluster of cognitive, affective and 
motivational capacities that enable agents to conceptualize possible courses of action, 
evaluate them, and form intentions on the basis of those deliberations.116 Thus, practical 
reason is what enables agents to register and evaluate the world practically, to represent 
                                                
 
116 See McDowell (1998: 171-2) and Thompson (2004: 4) for this conception of practical 
reason. 
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phenomena under practical concepts. So we can frame level 1 Aristotelian constructivism 
more precisely by employing the notion of practical reason:   
ACF Facts are practically normative for an agent S of some life form L in virtue 
of following from within the practical standpoint of L practical reason.  
Three brief observations are worth noting. First, it seems plausible to suppose that 
practical reason wherever it is found will exhibit certain formal features, such as 
conformance to the hypothetical imperative. Because of this, the Aristotelian can turn to 
the Kantian approach for insight and take on board whatever principles the Kantian 
correctly identifies as constitutive of rational agency. These principles will characterize the 
practical standpoint of any rational life form. 
Second, however, Aristotelian constructivism also holds that practical reason as 
instantiated in actual organisms has a substantive form or configuration, and that this 
configuration can differ among different life forms. Practical reason is, after all, a natural 
power, so it should be no surprise that it might manifest differently in different types of 
creatures, just as the power of sight manifests differently across different types of creatures 
(I will return to this point in more detail below). I do not know whether any non-human 
organisms actually possess practical reason. It seems to me likely that some dolphin species 
and some primate species do, but I need not insist on this. The point is that it is clearly 
possible for other forms of life to possess practical reason, and if they do, it is also possible 
that it is configured somewhat differently in them than in us. This is important because it 
suggests the determinate shape of practical reason as it is found in the human organism is 
partly a contingent feature of our developmental history, and thus partly an empirical—
perhaps to some extent, an empirically open—question. I will return to this issue below. 
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Third, as a completely general theory that could apply to any rational form of life, 
Aristotelian constructivism resonates with the spirit of Aristotelian naturalism, which aims 
to situate human agents and their reasons within the larger natural world of living things.117  
Now, the way we move from level 1 Aristotelian constructivism to level 2 is simply 
by indexing the level 1 thesis to a particular life form. We are seeking an account of human 
reasons. Thus we get: 
ACHF Facts are practically normative for a human agent S in virtue of following 
from within the practical standpoint of the human life form, understood as 
the standpoint of human practical reason.  
The idea, then, is that there are general truths about how human beings are practically 
oriented toward the world. Together, these truths specify a practical standpoint. And the 
facts that are practically normative for us are those that follow from within that standpoint. 
Notice that the view affords an objectivist, but species-relative account of human reasons. 
If the reasons we have is ultimately a function of the human practical standpoint, and if 
there are objective facts about the content of that standpoint, then there are objective facts 
about what reasons we have.  
Notice that when we move from level 1 to level 2, we move from a global theory 
that purports to explain practical normativity in general to a theory that is more restricted 
in scope. One might think that level 2 Aristotelian constructivism should therefore be 
classified with what above I called local theories, such as Rawls’ and Scanlon’s views. Recall 
that their basic strategy was to explain a certain set of normative facts in terms of more 
                                                
 
117 See, again, Annas (2005: 16) and Foot (2001: 16). 
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fundamental and logically prior normative facts. But this is not Aristotelian 
constructivism’s strategy, and it is important to see why.  
At the heart of Aristotelian constructivism is the idea that practical normativity is 
indexed to particular life forms. This follows from the core constructivist notion that 
practical normativity is metaphysically grounded in the practical standpoint of agents, and 
on the idea that practical standpoints are always indexed to some life form. Practical facts 
are never practical full stop; they are always practical for some type of agent. It is not as though 
level 1 posits certain basic normative facts, which are then appealed to at level 2. Level 1 
explains what it is to be a reason in the first place, and secures the idea that what it is to be 
a reason is the same for humans as it is for dolphins or any other type of rational agent. 
Still, the facts that actually count as reasons for any particular organism will be different 
depending on what type of organism is in question. So unlike local versions of 
constructivism, Aristotelian constructivism does not attempt to explain some subset of 
practically normative facts (e.g. facts that are practical for humans) in terms of more 
general and more basic normative facts. On Aristotelian constructivism, there is no such 
set of more general and more basic facts.118 So even though level 2 Aristotelian 
constructivism is more restricted in scope than the fully global level 1 version, it should not 
be considered a local form of constructivism either. 
 
                                                
 
118 It could well be the case that there is a set of facts that are practical for both humans 
and dolphins. It could also be the case that there is some set of facts that are practical for 
rational agents of any type. But if so, this is because those facts are entailed from within the 
standpoint of each type of rational agent. So if there is such a common set of facts, it 
would be explained by the Aristotelian constructivist thesis as applied to each life form. 
That is, our identification of such a set would be logically posterior to the Aristotelian 
constructivist thesis, and thus not something the thesis could itself appeal to in an attempt 
to explain practical normativity. 
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5. Conclusion 
At the close of the last chapter I identified the real problem with Aristotelian naturalism as 
an explanatory gap. Aristotelian naturalists need to explain what makes human nature 
normative, and no such explanation has been offered. They claim that moral goodness is a 
kind of natural goodness, but have no explanation of the normativity of natural goodness. 
This is the normativity problem. I claimed that the normativity problem can be solved. The 
solution comes in two parts. In this chapter I unpacked the first part. 
I began by asking what kind of explanation is needed to fill the explanatory gap in 
Aristotelian naturalism. It became clear that Aristotelian naturalists stand in need of an 
account of the source of practical normativity. I outlined several reasons why constructivism 
is the most promising theory of normative source for Aristotelian naturalists, and why 
Aristotelian constructivism is the most promising version of constructivism. The core idea 
of Aristotelian constructivism is that what makes facts normative for human beings is that 
their practical significance follows from within the human practical standpoint. To see how 
Aristotelian constructivism connects to facts about human nature and natural goodness we 
need to have some account of what the human practical standpoint consists in. Since 
practical reason is the power that enables us to occupy a practical standpoint to begin with, 
I glossed the notion of “following from within the human practical standpoint” in terms of 
following from within the standpoint of human practical reason. Developing an account of 
the human practical standpoint then becomes a matter of developing an account of human 
practical reason. This brings us to the second part of the answer to the normativity 
problem. In the next chapter I unpack this second part.  
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CHAPTER 5. HUMAN PRACTICAL REASON 
 
1. Introduction 
So far described, Aristotelian constructivism has no practically normative implications. This 
is as it should be. A metanormative account of the source of practical normativity is not 
meant to produce substantive conclusions about what we have reason to do. Take, for 
example, Humean constructivism, which holds that facts are normative for some agent in 
virtue of following from within that agent’s standpoint. This tells us nothing about the 
reasons that agent has. To begin to see our way toward actual reasons, we need to bring in 
an account of that agent’s practical standpoint. Likewise, to see our way toward actual 
reasons in the Aristotelian naturalist framework, and to see how natural goodness connects 
with reasons, we need to bring in an account of the human practical standpoint. When we 
do this, however, we move beyond our metanormative account of the source of practical 
normativity. Noting this is important because it means endorsing Aristotelian 
constructivism does not, on its face, commit one to any particular account of the structure 
and content of human practical reason. For example, Aristotelian constructivism is neutral 
with respect to well-known debates about whether all human ends terminate in a single end 
(an ultimate end), whether there is one single ultimate end for all humans, and if so, 
whether that ultimate end consists in some single specifiable substantive activity (such as 
contemplation), or whether it consists in multiple distinct activities. Aristotelian 
constructivism does not settle any of these questions. 
At the same time, however, level 2 Aristotelian constructivism and a substantive 
account of human practical reason are dialectically interdependent in the following respect. 
Without a substantive account of the content of human practical reason, Aristotelian 
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constructivism would be explanatorily impotent for the purposes I am presenting it. I am 
offering it as part of a strategy to explain the practical normativity of human nature. But 
Aristotelian constructivism itself does not imply that human nature is practically normative. 
So I need, as I mentioned at the close of the previous chapter, to connect the Aristotelian 
constructivist thesis with the Aristotelian naturalist’s notion of human nature. That is the 
task of my account of human practical reason. On the other hand, without the Aristotelian 
constructivist thesis about the source of practical normativity, the account of human 
practical reason I will propose would do nothing to address the normativity problem. For 
we would still be left with the question of what makes practically normative facts practically 
normative. Answering that question is of course the job of Aristotelian constructivism.  
Keeping in mind, then, the logical independence of Aristotelian constructivism 
from any particular account of human practical reason, I will now propose the account I 
think most plausible. I want to emphasize that the account is limited in two important 
ways. First, given that the nature and structure of human practical reason is a vast topic 
exceeding the reach even of book-length treatments, the brief sketch I will offer in the next 
section should not be considered a defense of an account, and may not even qualify as an 
account. It is perhaps best conceived as a sketch of a research program which, if explored 
in more detail, would yield a full-blown account of human practical reason. The second 
limitation concerns the substantive conclusions I will propose. They are offered tentatively, 
and I want to flag in advance that this is not merely caution born from the difficulty of 
defending substantive conclusions. It will turn out that the general claims I advance about 
human practical reason place certain limitations on how far philosophy can take us when it 
comes to substantive conclusions about how “the human” normatively sees the world.  
 
127 
2. Overview of the Account 
The account I propose can be summed up in the thesis that human practical reason sees 
the human life form as non-instrumentally practically normative. This is concise, but 
obscure. What does it mean to see the human life form as practically normative?  
In Chapter 2 we saw that to be an organism is to be active. Life is constituted, 
supported and perpetuated by activity. Different forms of life constitute, support and 
perpetuate themselves in different ways. Both dogs and frogs take in water to stay 
hydrated, but dogs do it through their mouths and frogs do it through their skin. We 
humans are organisms, and like any other organism, we actively constitute, support and 
perpetuate ourselves in characteristic ways. These activities are not merely instrumental 
means of supporting our existence as human organisms; they constitute our existence as 
human organisms. So, to see the human life form as non-instrumentally practically 
normative is to see those activities that collectively constitute human living as non-
instrumentally practically normative, as worth going for. 
What activities are these? A full answer to this question would need to rely on a 
comprehensive account of human nature. I will not defend such an account, since this 
would distract from my central task of sketching the structure of the type of account of 
practical reason that can help solve the normativity problem. Grasping that structure will 
be facilitated, though, by reflecting on some example human characteristic activities. So I 
will discuss four example generic activities that are plausibly both characteristic of the 
human life form and seen by human practical reason as non-instrumentally worth engaging. 
They are: 
Living: constituting, maintaining, protecting and developing one’s existence as an 
individual organism, through one’s characteristic life-cycle; 
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Affiliating: participating in, maintaining, protecting and developing one’s social 
attachments; 
Pursuing Understanding: Maintaining, protecting and developing one’s grasp on 
the relations between things; 
Justice: Maintaining, enforcing and restoring basic relations of fairness and 
reciprocity, and the norms that define these relations; 
To say that human practical reason sees these activities as non-instrumentally practically 
normative is to say that when human practical reason is functioning properly, when it is 
non-defective, it takes each of these activity types as worth pursuing, as final ends that 
render intelligible actions undertaken in their pursuit. This is not to say one is defective if, 
in individual cases, one does not pursue one or more of these ends. It is to say that any 
properly functioning human being will see these ends as the sort of thing worth pursuing—
so, for example, when others pursue these ends, one will see their behavior as intelligible, 
even if one thinks the behavior misguided or bad. What would indicate defect is if one 
ceased seeing one of these items as a final end at all—if one just could not see any point in 
pursuing them.119 To see the human life form as non-instrumentally practically normative, 
then, is to see these activities as non-instrumentally practically normative. 
I select the four generic activities above not because they are the only plausible or 
the most important examples (although each of them are very important for human life), 
                                                
 
119 The view bears obvious similarities to Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse’s 
accounts of human natural goodness (Foot 2001: Chapter 2; Hursthouse 1999: Chapter 9). 
Those familiar with contemporary natural law theory might notice some resemblance there 
too, especially with Rhonheimer (2011). My view has indeed been heavily influenced by 
these sources, along with Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (Nussbaum 1988; 
1992; 2000; 2006) and, as I mentioned above, Christine Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian 
constructivism (especially Korsgaard 1996c and 2008c). 
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but because I find them among the most obvious examples. As I elaborate each one, my 
hope is that their status as human characteristic activities and final ends will be made 
plausible. To this extent I will be defending a partial account of human nature. But I want 
to stress that my primary purpose in discussing these four items is illustrative, to put 
enough flesh on this skeletal account of human practical reason to show how it can 
complete the theoretical labors I set for it. 
 It is now time to dissect my proposed account of human practical reason into its 
key claims. There are four: 
1. Human practical reason, like any natural power, can malfunction. So there is such 
thing as its proper functioning.  
2. Some of the standards of proper functioning for human practical reason are 
species-relative. 
3. When functioning properly according to species-relative standards, human practical 
reason takes certain substantive states of affairs as final ends. 
4. Among these final ends are the characteristic activities of the human life form. 
In the next sections I will briefly explain and defend each one.  
 
3. Core Theses 
Proper Functioning 
Human practical reason, like any natural power, can malfunction. So there is such 
thing as its proper functioning. It will help to begin with some simple facts about 
human beings. Humans are rational agents. Not only do they get around on their own 
steam, so to speak, the way they characteristically get around is by conceptualizing certain 
possible actions or action plans, evaluating those possibilities, judging which one is best, 
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and then forming an intention based on that judgment. Even when action is more 
automatic and less reflective, it is still aimed at, and guided by, practical ends. For example, 
slamming one’s foot on the brakes to avoid hitting a child who ran into the street still 
manifests agency—in a way that pulling one’s hand from a hot stove does not.120 So 
humans are rational agents. But that is not all they are. Humans are a specific type of 
physical organism, characterized by certain natural powers and needs. What enables 
humans to be rational agents is itself a natural power, or a cluster of natural powers, which 
we call practical reason.  
Natural powers in general are susceptible to injury, disease, and other forms of 
dysfunction. We can go blind or deaf, or we can lose sensation in our fingers or feet, or 
large portions of our body. These are forms of defect in our sensory powers. In the same 
way, practical reason, too, as one of our natural powers, can operate well or poorly, and can 
malfunction in various ways. A rather obvious type of deficiency in practical reason occurs 
when an agent overlooks an efficient means to her ends in favor of a less efficient means. 
Clowns often specialize in doing this. A clown might pull a chair up to a table and sit 
down. Finding the chair positioned too far from the table, she might fix the problem by 
exerting great effort to move the entire table closer to the chair rather than the other way 
around! Now if the human power of practical reason can operate well or poorly and can 
malfunction, then there is such thing as its proper functioning. If we can characterize some 
of its operations as lapses, deficiencies and dysfunctions, that is only because we have some 
                                                
 
120 See Russell (2009: 11) for discussion on the distinction between deliberation, which 
takes time, and the deliberative structure of rational action which need not have been 
preceded by deliberation. 
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B. Some of the standards of proper functioning for human practical reason are 
species-relative. This follows from the idea that human practical reason is a natural 
power. First note the quantifier “some.” As with any natural power, there are certain 
constitutive features of the power and the experiences it generates that will be common to 
any kind of organism in possession of it. For example, any organism that counts as 
possessing the power of sight must be sensitive to variations in light within a range of 
wavelengths. We might say this is constitutive of having the power of sight. The same 
applies to practical reason. There are constitutive features of the power that will be 
manifest in any type of practically rational creature. The hypothetical imperative is perhaps 
one example. So there are also standards of proper functioning that will apply to any 
practically rational creature.  
At the same time, most natural powers manifest somewhat differently in different 
kinds of organisms. For example, different types of life forms can see different 
wavelengths of light. The wavelengths of light a creature can see is determined by the kind 
of light-sensitive molecules or photopigments in their eyes. Humans, unlike most 
mammals, have trichromatic vision, meaning we have three basic types of photopigments 
in the cone cells of our retina. This makes our retinas sensitive to three different 
wavelengths of light, which, in combination allow us to see a wide variety of colors. Dogs, 
however, have dichromatic vision, since the cone cells in their retina have only two types of 
photopigments. The result is that they are unable to distinguish green, yellow or red objects 
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based on their color. Butterflies, on the other hand, have more than three photopigments, 
enabling them to see colors we cannot.  
If a dog looks at a red Frisbee lying on green grass and cannot differentiate it based 
on color alone, nothing is the matter with the dog. It belongs to the dog’s life form to have 
only dichromatic vision. But if I cannot differentiate the Frisbee from the grass based on 
color alone, something is the matter with my visual system. This is a simple but extremely 
important point. Suppose I am standing next to the dog, the same distance from the 
Frisbee, in the same lighting conditions. The same object is reflecting the same wavelengths 
of light to the dog’s eyes and to mine. If both of our visual systems are operating properly, 
our color experience will be different—even though it was generated by the same external 
physical conditions. What this means is that the phenomenological quality of experience 
generated by our sensory organs is subject to species-level evaluative standards. The color 
experience generated by the dog’s properly operating visual system is different than the 
color experience generated by the human’s properly operating visual system. Thus, what 
constitutes proper functioning in a dog’s visual system counts as abnormal, and possibly 
defective, in a human’s.  
Now, since for the Aristotelian naturalist practical reason is a natural power, I am 
proposing that we understand and evaluate it along the same lines as our power of sight 
(and any other natural power associated with conscious experience), in two important 
respects. First, just as our sensory organs generate color experience, the cognitive and 
affective capacities I am calling “practical reason” generate what we might call practical-
normative experience. Just as grass appears to us as green, certain states of affairs, and even 
possible states of affairs, “appear” to us as good or bad in the practical sense. Of course, we 
cannot literally see possible states of affairs, but we can conceptualize and imagine them, 
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and then register those conceptualized possibilities as worthwhile or to-be-
promoted/protected/respected, or to-be-avoided, and so on. Second, just as there are species-level 
standards for determining the particular quality of color experience a given wavelength of 
light should generate in a particular type of organism, in the same way, there are species-
level standards for determining the particular quality of the practical-normative experience 
a given type of state of affairs should generate in a particular type of practically rational 
organism. That is, the particular states of affairs an organism registers as practically good or 
bad may well vary according to the type of organism in question. So practical reason is just 
like other natural powers in that there are species-level standards that determine when it is 
operating well or poorly.121 
This is important because it means we cannot develop an adequate account of 
human practical reason solely by reflecting on its general features. If we want to know what 
human practical reason is like, we need to focus our theorizing on distinctly human 
experience, and be concerned about the possibility of other types of creatures (such as the 
rational Martian of philosophical lore) not sharing that experience, or our intuitions about 
that experience. Taking this now as our heuristic, we move to the next thesis. 
 
Substantive, not Procedural 
When functioning properly, human practical reason takes certain substantive states 
of affairs as final ends. An end, of course, is an intelligible goal of action. Something we 
pursue or strive to promote or bring about. To call a state of affairs a final end is to say 
                                                
 
121 Aristotle’s understanding of phronesis in Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI might have been 
something like this, although this is controversial. See Thompson (ms) for an argument 
that this is indeed Aristotle’s view. 
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something about how it figures in deliberation. Final ends are non-instrumental. Their 
intelligibility as ends does not depend on their serving some other goal. Rather, their 
intelligibility as ends is basic. Final ends are also the basic source of practical reasons. This 
is because when we act on reasons, we act for the sake of ends.122 So the normative 
significance of those ends is conferred upon more proximate reasons. Recall the moldy 
house example above. The reason I decide to move is because my current house’s 
ventilation system is infected with mold. This fact is a reason in virtue of the 
circumstances—that the mold is causing life-threatening allergies in my children—
combined with an end, namely, the end of promoting the health of my children. This could 
well be a final end, but if not, then its status as an end is explained by its serving some 
further end.   
Now, this third claim says that it is constitutive of properly functioning human 
practical reason to take certain substantive states of affairs as final ends. The contrast here is 
with final ends that are formal. For example, the putative final end of pursuing maximal 
desire satisfaction is a formal final end, because it does not refer to any particular desires. I 
can count as pursuing this end no matter which desires I am satisfying. By contrast, the 
final end of satisfying my desire for pleasure is a substantive final end. I cannot count as 
pursuing this end unless the desires I am satisfying have a particular object. Now, ends can 
be described at multiple levels of generality. In some cases the contrast between formal and 
substantive ends is not entirely sharp, and where we draw the line will depend on our 
                                                
 
122 See LeBar (2013) and Russell (2009) for detailed defenses of this view on how reasons 
derive from final ends. I should also note that intentional actions are not always done for 
reasons, and thus not always in pursuit of ends. See Hursthouse (1991) for a discussion 
about a certain class of actions that are neither performed for reasons nor irrational. 
Hursthouse calls them arational actions.  
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theoretical purposes. But I hope the contrast is sufficiently clear to make my present point, 
which is simply this. When human practical reason is operating properly it cannot take just 
any state of affairs as a final end. Rather, there are constraints on the sorts of things a 
properly functioning human being can take as non-instrumentally practically normative, the 
constraints being determined of course by species-relative standards.  
The account therefore counts as a substantive account of practical reason rather 
than a formal, or what is more often called a procedural, one.123 Procedural accounts hold 
that rationality is a matter of having one’s thoughts and motivations be capable of surviving 
a certain formally specified cognitive process, regardless of the content of those thoughts 
and motivations. For procedural accounts, the only kind of rational mistake we can make is 
in failing to conform to a formal principle of practical reason—for example, failing to do 
what we believe we have most reason to do through akrasia or weakness of will.124 A 
substantive account of practical reason, by contrast, holds that in addition to making this 
kind of mistake, one can also make rational mistakes by failing to take certain substantive 
states of affairs as practically significant (as to-be-done or to-be-avoided). A classic example of 
this sort of mistake is not caring about what happens to oneself in the future—perhaps a 
teenager not caring what happens to her after 30.125 The converse sort of mistake is also 
possible—taking states of affairs as fundamentally practically significant when one should 
not. Classic examples of the latter sort include a man wanting a saucer of mud, not for 
some further purpose, but just to have it; or someone wanting to turn on radios, not in 
                                                
 
123 See Hooker and Streumer (2004) for an overview on substantive versus formal, or what 
they call procedural, accounts of practical rationality. 
124 We can of course make other sorts of mistakes while reasoning. For example, we can be 
mistaken about the empirical facts, and thereby draw mistaken conclusions. But the error 
here would not be a rational error.  
125 See Foot (1972), Hooker and Streumer (2004: 69), and Parfit (2011a: 76). 
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order to serve some other end, but just to do it.126 According to most substantive accounts 
of practical reason, the attitudes displayed in such examples are not merely potentially 
harmful (as in the teenager case) or bizarre (as in the saucer of mud case); they also 
manifest rational error, a lapse in the agent’s power of practical reason. For instance, it 
belongs to human practical to care to some extent about one’s future; and it does not 
belong to human practical reason to strive for a saucer of mud as a final end. 
What we have so far, then, is an account of practical reason according to which 
practical reason is subject to standards of proper operation, that what counts as proper 
functioning is species-specific, and that it is constitutive of properly functioning human 
practical reason to take certain substantively described states of affairs as final ends. This 
brings us, finally, to the last claim. 
 
Characteristic Activities 
Among the human final ends are the characteristic activities of the human life form. 
That is, what properly functioning human practical reason sees as non-instrumentally 
worth going for includes those activities that constitute living a human life. An implication 
of this thesis is that human final ends are what I will call constitutive ends as opposed to 
product ends. This well-known distinction comes from Aristotle’s discussion in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (I.1) between two sorts of ends. “[S]ome are activities,” he says, and 
“others are products apart from the activities that produce them” (Aristotle 1980: NE I.1, 
1094a3-4). The distinction here is between activities done for the sake of producing 
something external to the activity itself (what I am calling product ends), and activities 
                                                
 
126 See Anscombe (2000: 70) and Quinn (1995: 189). 
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done for the sake of the activity itself (what I am calling constitutive ends). If human final 
ends are themselves activities, then they are constitutive ends.  
 This last thesis is difficult to assess without an account of what the human final 
ends/characteristic activities are. In the next section I will fill out the thesis by proposing 
some examples. Although I am confident the examples I mention are indeed both 
characteristic human activities and final ends, the very nature of my account requires that I 
offer them as defeasible proposals. I believe there are important limitations in how far 
philosophy can take us in identifying human characteristic activities—limitations which 
arise from the very theses I have just proposed. Here is why. 
Aristotelian constructivism says that facts are practically normative for agents of 
the human life form in virtue of following from within the standpoint of human practical 
reason. So the reasons we have ultimately depend on the shape or configuration of human 
practical reason. I have just sketched an account of human practical reason according to 
which practical reason is a natural human capacity, subject to species-relative standards of 
evaluations, just like any other natural human capacity. This means the question of how it 
is configured is in part an empirical question—in the same sense in which the configuration 
of the human visual system is an empirical question. To know the characteristic operations 
of the human visual system, I cannot merely reflect on my own experience and infer 
general claims about how “the human” visually experiences the world. I might be color 
blind, after all, or have dark spots in my visual field. To conclude that my color experience 
is characteristic of the human visual system, I need to know about other people’s color 
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experience as well, and acquiring this knowledge is an empirical matter.127 Likewise with the 
natural power of practical reason. To draw conclusions about the shape of human practical 
reason, I cannot merely reflect on my own normative experience and infer general claims 
about how “the human” normatively experiences the world. I need to know something 
about how other humans normatively experience the world, and this is partly an empirical 
matter. In this sense, claims about the substantive shape of human practical reason extend 
beyond the reach of philosophy proper.  
This is not to say that philosophical reflection cannot help identify human 
characteristic activities. Indeed, it can, and it is just as important to see why. Suppose we 
determine eventually that orcas are indeed equipped with practical reason—a simpler form 
than human practical reason, perhaps, but practical reason nonetheless. And suppose I am 
convinced that their practical reason, like ours, is configured with certain substantive final 
ends. Given that I cannot communicate with them, the only way I can figure out what 
those final ends are is by observing how they act in a variety of situations. So the data that 
informs my understanding of their practical reason is exclusively empirical data. Theorizing 
about human practical reason is different, because we as theorists have an inside view of 
human practical reason. Assuming we are non-defective human beings, we have direct 
access to the whole collection of human final ends, and philosophical reflection can help 
identify and clarify them.128 Still, we are in position to draw conclusions about what is and 
                                                
 
127 For this reason, I think Michael Thompson (2004) is too quick in concluding that the 
ethical aspects of the human life form can be known from within, and thus in a sense are 
self-validating.  
128 This point is what led Michael Thompson, expositing Foot, to remark: 
The human form of life is one in which considerations of justice, for example, 
characterize a sound practical reason. But this is not something we properly 
discover from a close study of human life. It must be given to us from inside, so to 
speak. (2003: 7) 
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is not characteristic of human practical reason only on the assumption that our own 
practically rational faculties are operating correctly. And this assumption is verifiable only 
by intersubjective confirmation, which, from the first-person perspective of each individual 
theorist, amounts to empirical experience (observing others’ actions, listening to others’ 
self-reports, listening to others’ observations of other humans, etc.). 
For these reasons, I believe that an Aristotelian constructivist can continue the 
project of identifying and clarifying human final ends through philosophical reflection, 
ultimately one should take as broad an approach as possible, looking across disciplinary 
boundaries for clues about what human beings see as fundamentally worth pursuing or 
worth avoiding.129 Undertaking this sort of project in a systematic and comprehensive 
manner is clearly beyond the scope of this study. What I will do instead is briefly describe 
several activities that plausibly qualify both as human final ends and characteristic human 
activities. I choose them not because they are the only ones, but because they are, I hope, 
the least controversial (which is not to say they will be uncontroversial!), and because they 
will be enough to show how Aristotelian constructivism solves Aristotelian naturalism’s 
normativity problem.  
 
4. Human Final Ends 
The task of arguing that an end is a final end faces inherent difficulties. Precisely because a 
final end is final, there is no deeper value or goal to be identified that confers normative 
status on the item in question. So defending a particular end as final must proceed 
                                                
 
Thompson overestimates the extent to which knowledge of the human life form is free 
from a reliance on empirical data, for reasons explained in the text above.  
129 Allan Gibbard (1990: 27) advocates a similar broad approach when he proposes his 
account of the human psychology that underlies normative judgment. 
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indirectly. One method, which I will employ, is to reflect on what would constitute 
dysfunction in human practical reason as a means of illuminating the practical orientation 
of a human practical reason when it is functioning properly. Such a project must also take 
care to characterize final ends with sufficient generality to avoid mistaking a generic human 
final end from culturally variant specifications of it. With these preliminaries in mind, I 
propose that the following four items are both characteristic human activities and human 
final ends.  
Living: constituting, maintaining, protecting and developing one’s existence as an 
individual organism, through one’s characteristic life-cycle; 
Affiliating: participating in, maintaining, protecting and developing one’s social 
attachments; 
Pursuing Understanding: Maintaining, protecting and developing one’s grasp on 
the relations between things; 
Justice: Maintaining, enforcing and restoring basic relations of fairness and 
reciprocity, and the norms that define these relations; 
Before elaborating each one, a few brief clarifications are in order. In proposing that these 
are final ends, I am not suggesting we act for the sake of them in everything we do. There 
are almost certainly other final ends for the sake of which we act. Even when we act for the 
sake of the final ends I propose, it need not be under the exact descriptions I am using. 
Generic activity types can be specified in a variety of ways. For example, there are multiple 
types of human attachments, friendship being one of them. Suppose I choose to pick up 
my friend from the airport, where the ultimate reason for my action is because that’s what 
friends do. Doing what friends do is a way of engaging in the social attachment of friendship, 
and in so doing I am engaging in the activity I am calling ‘attachment’. Cultural practices 
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often serve to specify final ends and fix norms that govern how humans can pursue those 
ends. Thus, for example, although friendship can arguably be found in every culture, the 
norms surrounding it and thus the way in which participants engage in is likely to vary 
across cultures. It is also possible for there to be ways of pursuing a final end in one culture 
that are impossible in another culture, for example, because a culture’s linguistic 
community does not have the requisite concepts. I mention all of this to stress that the 
account I am proposing is consistent with a great deal of cross-cultural variation.  
 With these preliminaries in place, I can now elaborate each of the four examples. 
 
Living 
I label this item ‘living’ rather than ‘life’ to emphasize that the item in question is an 
activity. It could more accurately but awkwardly be described as living humanly or living out the 
characteristic human life-cycle. My suggestion is that this is both a characteristic human activity 
and a final end. That living is a characteristic human activity is obvious. Humans are 
organisms. We saw in Chapter 2 that organisms are things that must continue striving to be 
what they are in order to continue being what they are. Life essentially involves activity. So 
living out the characteristic human life-cycle is clearly a characteristic human activity.  
It also belongs to the human life form to register the continuance of one’s own life 
as a final end.130 It is easiest to see this by reflecting on cases in which someone no longer 
                                                
 
130 All natural law theorists I am aware of include life among their lists of “basic goods,” 
where basic goods are understood as distinct aspects of human flourishing or fulfillment 
and basic sources of reasons. For a sample, see Chappell (1998: 39), Finnis (2011: 86-87), 
Gomez-Lobo (2002: 10), Grisez (1983: 124), Grisez, Boyle & Finnis (1987: 107), (Murphy 
(2001: 101-105) and Oderberg (2000: 138-143). But natural law theorists are not the only 
ones to claim that life is a final end. Thomas Hurka (1993: 39) can plausibly be interpreted 
as endorsing this view, as can Larry Arnhart (1998: 31). Martha Nussbaum’s view (2000: 
78) comes very close to this view as well, insofar as she treats her list of capabilities both as 
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takes this state of affairs as their final end. Consider cases of suicide that take the person’s 
family and friends by complete surprise. Not all suicides are this way, of course. Some 
suicides are preceded by catastrophic financial failure, or by deep depression, or by 
diagnosis of a debilitating disease that will slowly and inevitably destroy one’s mental and 
physical capacities. When someone commits suicide in these difficult circumstances, we 
may or may not think they are justified, but we can at least understand why they did it. We 
can understand how one’s life might feel like it is going so badly that cutting it short 
appears to be the best way forward—‘best’ not meaning optimal or good, but as the least 
bad of all the bad options. But there are also cases where someone commits suicide and it 
is not preceded by any of these difficult circumstances. The person seems to be living a 
healthy, happy, stable life, and then they take their own life. Such behavior is deeply 
troubling, and not only because of the tragedy. The event is in a certain sense opaque; we 
find it baffling. We resist simply accepting it as something someone would just do, 
believing instead that there must have been something amiss in the person’s life. And so we 
might search for a note, or talk with people who were closest to the deceased, looking for 
clues. We do this because we cannot see any point in their self-destruction. It seems to 
have served no end.  
Notice that this thought—that such suicides are baffling because they appear to 
have no point or serve no end—presupposes certain facts about what sorts of activities are 
and are not ends for human beings. We are baffled by such suicides because killing oneself 
is not the sort of thing that is intelligible as a final end. So if someone really did up and kill 
themselves for no further reason at all, just to do it, it is hard to resist the conclusion that 
                                                
 
essential for any life recognizable as human (see e.g. Nussbaum 1992: 222) and as basic 
values.  
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this would manifest a lapse in practical reason, and one of a very deep sort. In uncovering 
this sort of possible lapse or dysfunction in human practical, we have at the same time 
gained insight into the proper functioning of human practical reason. Part of what it is to 
be a properly functioning human practical reasoner is to see the continuance of one’s own 
life as fundamentally worth pursuing, i.e., a human final end. Here, then, is one example of 
a substantive state of affairs that partly constitutes the human life form, and which it is 
constitutive of properly functioning human practical reason to take as a final end.  
Above I said that staying alive is naturally good for any organism, at least within the 
parameters of its natural life-cycle. This qualification is important, because an Aristotelian 
naturalist need not be committed to the idea that the striving to keep oneself alive life is 
always and everywhere inherently worthwhile. For example, human practical reason could 
be configured such that a psychically healthy human, upon reaching the end of her life-
cycle, no longer sees the continuance of her own life as a final end. I am not claiming this is 
the case, but it certainly could be. Nor is the Aristotelian constructivist committed to the 
idea that intentionally destroying life, even one’s own life, is always and everywhere wrong. 
That is a question about practical reasoning, or how reasons should be weighed, and no 
simple answer to this question can be derived from what I have said so far.131 Whether 
there are reasons that can outweigh the practical significance of continuing one’s own life is 
another question, which I will not address here. 
                                                
 
131 This is one way in which Aristotelian constructivism differs from contemporary natural 
law theory, with which it shares a similar structure. Contemporary natural law theory holds 
that it is always and everywhere wrong intentionally to impede, damage or destroy a basic 
human good, and that this principle of practical reason follows from natural goods being a 
basic source of reasons. See Finnis (2011: 118-125) and Murphy (2001: 204-207). 
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Above I said that the final end of one’s own continued life was an obvious but 
non-trivial example. Here is why it is not trivial. Although on first glance it is not at all 
surprising that an organism should have evolved to take its own life as fundamentally 
worth preserving, I see no reason to think this end is essential to practical reason itself, 
such that any possessor of practical reason must also hold the continuance of their life as a 
final end. It seems coherent to imagine a species whose members possess practical reason, 
but are intensely social, like bees or ants, and who see only the preservation of their 
community as having fundamental practical significance. These creatures view the value of 
their own lives as purely instrumental, as worth protecting only insofar as, and because, it 
contributes to the protection and thriving of the community.132 There seems to me no 
inconsistency in such a possibility. If I am right, then this reinforces a point made earlier, 
that the account of practical reason elaborated here is a substantive account, and that even 
a final end as apparently obvious as the continuance of one’s life is a substantive end that 




By ‘affiliating’ I mean the activity of forming, participating in, promoting and protecting 
social attachments with other people. This general activity, I suggest, is both a characteristic 
human activity and a human final end. Paradigm cases of social attachment include 
friendship and the parent/child relationship. Social attachments often involve a common 
core of shared experience, such as shared life in the workplace, or shared interest, or shared 
traumatic experience such as in active combat—along with mutual trust and affection. 
                                                
 
132 Philippa Foot (2004) describes a similar sort of case. 
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Sometimes our bond with others is consciously experienced as a sense of security or 
tranquility or delight when in the presence of the other. The experience of being attached is 
often more consciously felt in cases of prolonged separation, which can cause mild feelings 
of loneliness or even full-blown terror, as sometimes happens when children are separated 
from their caregivers. 
 Almost no one denies that affiliation is characteristic and ubiquitous in human life.  
Humans are intensely social animals. From infancy, humans need relationships of trust and 
nurture with other human beings to develop into mature, properly functioning, rational 
adults. The bonds between infant and caregiver are crucial in a variety of ways, from giving 
the infant a secure base from which to venture out and explore, to enabling the caregiver to 
“scaffold” or structure the infants’ learning through processes like joint attention, turn 
taking and coordinating bodily movements.133 As humans develop, the need for social 
attachment evolves, but does not dry up. A substantial body of empirical evidence shows 
that the social attachments in mature human relationships are correlated with and in some 
cases causally linked with positive outcomes related to health, mortality, psychological 
development, happiness, and character development, and the absence of them linked with 
negative outcomes, such as depression, greater risk of illness, impaired immune system, 
suicide and premature death.134 Aristotle was not exaggerating when he remarked that 
“without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods” (Aristotle 
1984: Nicomachean Ethics VIII.1, 1155a5), where the translated term ‘friendship’ here 
                                                
 
133 See Fowers (2015: chapter 3; esp. page 75-76) and Narvaez (2013). 
134 See, Almquist (2011), Brewer (2009: 252-265), Fowers (2015: Chapter 3), Healy (2011), 
Hoyos-Valdes (2016), Mullis (2010), Parker & Asher (1987; 1993). After a careful and 
extensive review of the empirical research on adult attachments, Fowers (2015: 85) 
concludes: “Overwhelming evidence indicates that close relationships are central to living 
well as a human being... Adult attachment is clearly related to flourishing and languishing.” 
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refers to a more general category of social attachments that involve reciprocated 
goodwill.135 Although it is sometimes difficult to register the importance of social 
attachments while we are firmly embedded within them, everyone can feel the pain of their 
sudden severance and the isolation and loneliness that arise in their sustained absence.   
Affiliating is also a human final end; it is constitutive of human practical reason to 
see it as fundamentally worth going for. This is not to say a human will see all possible 
attachments as worth going for, or worth preserving if already formed. It is to say that she 
will see affiliation as one among other ends non-instrumentally worth pursuing. Once 
again, it is easiest to see the status of affiliation as a final end by reflecting on what it would 
be like for someone to cease seeing affiliation in this way. I will focus on friendship.136 
Suppose Thomas and Siddhartha are long-time friends. Over the years, through the 
shared experience of helping each other out when the other is in a scrape, confiding in each 
other about their ambitions, their fears, their marital challenges, and just spending time 
together hiking, camping and other recreation activities, they have developed a full-blown 
friendship. They both know the other “has their back.” They would trust each other with 
their lives. Then one day, unexpectedly, Thomas tells Siddhartha they will no longer be 
friends. Completely surprised, confused, and hurt, Siddhartha asks why. Has he 
unintentionally offended Thomas? Did Thomas learn something new about Siddhartha 
that broke his trust? Was he starting to find Siddhartha annoying or irritating, or otherwise 
                                                
 
135 See Brewer (2009: 240-244) for helpful discussion on Aristotle’s understanding of 
friendship. 
136 Much has been written on the philosophy of friendship. See Badhwar (1993) for a 
helpful compilation of well-known papers on friendship. This collection, however, lacks 
substantive engagement with non-Western traditions. For engagements with friendship in 
the Confucian tradition, see Yuanguo (2007) and Mullis (2010). For an insightful discussion 
on affection and its role in friendship, see Lewis (1988: Chapter 3). 
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bothersome? Was he feeling constrained by the relationships, and wanting to form 
friendships with new people? If Thomas were to answer yes to any of these questions, his 
action would at least be intelligible, even if we think it would not be justifiable. But suppose 
Thomas answers no to all these questions. Nothing bad happened, he insists. The reason 
the friendship will end, says Thomas, is not because he is intentionally terminating it, but 
because he no longer sees any point in friendships anymore, and friendship obviously 
cannot survive in those conditions.   
Now it seems to me that this situation, if vividly imagined, induces the same sort of 
bafflement as cases of unexplained suicide. Thomas’s termination of the friendship seems 
to demand explanation, and yet he maintains there is no explanation. And, again, as in the 
case of unexplained suicide, it is difficult to resist drawing either one of two possible 
conclusions. One is that there is in fact a reason why Thomas is terminating the 
relationships, and either he is not being forthright or he is somehow deceiving himself. The 
other possible conclusion is that something has gone wrong with Thomas’s psychic 
faculties, that his practical reason is malfunctioning in some way. He is failing to attribute 
practical significance to an activity properly functioning humans see as practically 
significant. Now if Siddhartha could rule out the first conclusion, he would be forced to 
the second. And this suggests that it belongs to properly functioning practical reason to 
register friendship as inherently worthwhile.137  
                                                
 
137 This claim has been defended by a variety of theorists who are friendly to the 
Aristotelian tradition. As with the basic good of life, all the contemporary natural law 
theorists classify friendship as a basic human good. Both of Martin Seligman’s well-known 
accounts of human well-being—his authentic happiness theory (Seligman 2002) and his 
later theory on flourishing (Seligman 2011)—posit “positive relationships” as a human final 
end, although he uses different terminology. In his phraseology, positive relationships are 
one of several things people will choose to pursue for their own sake, when uncoerced. 
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The final end of friendship differs from the final end of life in an important way. 
Suppose that instead of losing his grip on the practical salience of friendship, Thomas lost 
his sense of the basic practical significance of his own continued life. Because life is a final 
end, there is no more fundamental value we could cite that would persuade Thomas of the 
value of his continuing to live. However, we could, perhaps, show him some other activity 
or state of affairs that he does see as valuable, and the pursuit of which necessarily requires 
his continued living.138 If we were successful, Thomas might continue to eat, drink, sleep, 
and engage in other life-sustaining processes for the purpose of staying alive, where staying 
alive would be purely instrumental for some other purpose. The same could not happen, 
however, in the case of friendship. Friendship often brings benefits that can be recognized 
as independently valuable, such as enjoyment, growth in knowledge, and improved 
conversational skills. If Thomas valued these results, he might be persuaded not to sever 
his relationship with Siddhartha, in the same way that we earlier imagined him choosing to 
continue living. But although we could imagine Thomas in this way continuing his 
relationship with Siddhartha, it would no longer count as engaging in friendship. 
Friendship is not the sort of social attachment that can be cultivated in a purely 
instrumental way, for by its nature it requires mutual and non-instrumental goodwill.139 People 
do of course form social bonds for instrumental purposes, and we do sometimes call this 
                                                
 
Blaine Fowers (2015: Chapter 3) develops evolutionary argument, rooted in attachment 
theory, for the same idea. 
138 I recall as a child hearing a woman recount a time earlier in her life when her husband 
was dissuaded from committing suicide by a friend who simply asked him, “Who will care 
for your wife when you are gone?”   
139 I am referring here to the sort of friendship Aristotle described as friendship for its own 
sake, rather than for the sake of pleasure or utility (1984: Nicomachean Ethics VIII.4), and 
what is now often called “character friendship.” See Brewer (2009: 241), who attributes the 
term to John Cooper 
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‘friendship’, as when I become friends with people who regularly show up for a pickup 
game of basketball or Ultimate Frisbee, but who would rapidly fall out of my life if they 
lost interest in the game. But this is not the sort of relationship in which Thomas and 
Siddhartha were engaged, and not the sort of friendship we most value. In that deeper kind 
of friendship, one’s interest and desired good for the other cannot be instrumental. It must 
therefore operate as a final end in one’s practical reasoning. 
 
Pursuing Understanding 
My third suggested final end and characteristic activity is the pursuit of understanding. 
Non-defective human beings will see the pursuit of understanding as non-instrumentally 
worth pursuing, and engaging in this pursuit is characteristic of human life. 
 Writers who defend similarly structured accounts of practical reason, such as 
natural law theorists, typically include knowledge rather than understanding in their 
catalogue of final ends.140 I think the plausibility of this depends on one’s conception of 
knowledge. On the conception operative in most contemporary epistemology, knowledge 
is propositional and consists roughly in true belief plus warrant. On this conception, I think 
knowledge is probably not a final end. Explaining why will help me elaborate what I mean 
by the epistemic state that is a final human end, namely, understanding.141  
I begin by considering a bad but instructive objection to the view that knowledge is 
a final end. One could object that knowledge is not a final end because the intelligibility of 
pursuing it depends on the value of the object of knowledge. Taking action to learn about 
                                                
 
140 See, for example, Chappell (1998: 39-40), Finnis (2011: 64-80), Gomez-Lobo (2002: 20), 
Grisez, Boyle & Finnis (1987: 107) and (Murphy (2001: 106-108). 
141 I do not assume that understanding is the only epistemic state that is a final end for 
human practical reason, but it is the only one I will discuss. 
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the origins of the universe is inherently worthwhile; taking action to learn how many blades 
of grass fill the university quad, not for some other end, but simply to know, is not.142 So 
knowledge in itself cannot be a final end. I think this objection fails. While we might think 
it a colossal waste of time to count grass blades for the sole purpose of determining how 
many of them fill the quad, it is nevertheless an intelligible activity. We can understand 
someone taking an interest in it, even if that interest seems bizarre.143  
 There is a different argument against the view that knowledge is a final end, and it 
comes into view by considering the grass counter again. Notice, first, that the intelligibility 
of her actions depends entirely on her being interested in learning how many grass blades fill 
the quad. If she were to lose interest in this fact, the intelligibility of her grass blade 
counting would indeed fade from view (assuming, as I am, that the knowledge is not being 
sought for some instrumental purpose). This is easiest to see for trivial bits of knowledge, 
like how many grass blades fill the quad, but I think the point generalizes. It seems 
intelligible for someone to take steps to know some fact only if they find that fact 
interesting. Continuing to take steps toward knowing some fact when one has no interest 
whatsoever in that fact (and no instrumental reason to pursue that knowledge), would be 
unintelligible, pointless.144 The intelligibility of pursuing knowledge depends, it seems, on 
the knowledge (or the facts that are the object of that knowledge) being of interest to the 
                                                
 
142 My grass counting example is inspired by Rawls’s similar case (1971: 432). 
143 I agree with Mark Murphy’s (2011: 108) response to this objection. He argues that our 
aversion to the grass blade counter’s activities stems from our judgment that there are 
better things to do with one’s time, not from the fact that the activity itself is unintelligible. 
144 I think this holds even in the case of knowledge of facts most of us would find very 
important, such as how the universe began. Imagine someone pursing knowledge of how 
the universe began as an end in itself, not for some other end, and yet had utterly no 
interest in how the universe began. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that such a person 
would be rationally defective. 
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seeker. That is the first premise. The second is that in finding something interesting, we 
have not yet struck practical bedrock. Granted, in most contexts, if one asks, “why are you 
learning about that?” it is sufficient to reply, “I find it interesting.” Yet, it is always 
reasonable and coherent to ask why one finds something interesting, or what it is about the 
fact in question that one finds interesting. We may not always be able to explain 
immediately (or explain at all) why we find something interesting, but there always is a 
reason. Facts can be interesting for practical reasons. I am focusing, though, on the 
epistemic domain. I suggest that facts are interesting chiefly when they improve our 
understanding.  
Understanding, as I use the term, involves more than merely knowing facts, and 
may not require propositional knowledge at all (see Zagzebski 2009: 142-145).145 It involves 
grasping connections between things, seeing how something relates to something else.146 
The types of things that can be related, and the ways in which they can be related is vast. 
For example, understanding a machine involves knowing how and why its various 
components cause changes in its other components. Understanding a theory involves 
grasping its necessary concepts and theses and knowing the logical and conceptual relations 
between them.  Grasping connections is enlightening because connections make 
phenomena intelligible; they explain phenomena. I suggest, then, that it is the role that facts 
                                                
 
145 Zagzebski (1994: 49) writes, “Understanding is not a state directed toward a single 
propositional object at all.” Instead, understanding involves grasping propositions “as part 
of and because of one’s understanding of a system or network of truths…” 
146 In so characterizing understanding I follow Lynch (2004: 53-54), Riggs (2003: 217), 
Roberts and Wood (2007: 45), and Zagzebski (1994: 49-50; 2009: 141-149). 
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play in understanding that usually explains why they are interesting to us. And it is 
understanding, not knowledge alone, that humans find inherently worth pursuing.147  
Having explained what I mean by understanding, and having clarified it by contrast 
with (a certain conception of) knowledge, I hope the pursuit of understanding can plausibly 
be recognized as a human final end. Understanding is so integral to the way in which we 
cognitively engage the world that I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like for 
someone not to see the pursuit of understanding as non-instrumentally worth pursuing. We 
can imagine someone who takes the pursuit of understanding to be non-instrumentally 
worthwhile only in limited domains. But the creature who utterly fails to see understanding 
as worth attaining, any domain, seems something other than human.  
Pursuing understanding is also a characteristic human activity. This, too, seems 
clear. The only way I can imagine that this claim would appear implausible is if one has a 
rather esoteric conception of understanding. For example, if one thinks of the pursuit of 
understanding is what philosophers do, or mystics, or sages, then one might rightly doubt 
that pursuing understanding is a characteristic human activity. But it should be clear now 
                                                
 
147 I am fully aware that this line of thought makes sense only on a what Zagzebski (1994: 
47) calls an “atomistic approach” to knowledge, on which knowledge is conceived as true 
belief (plus warrant) of discrete, true propositions. More holistic conceptions of knowledge 
have been around for a long time. Arguably, both Plato and Aristotle’s conception of 
knowledge included what I am calling understanding (see REFS). This does not detract 
from my point, however, for my purpose is not to defend any particular conception of 
knowledge but to distinguish between two epistemic states. I have no qualm with those 
who think the atomistic state I am calling ‘knowledge’ is not really knowledge. In this 
connection, it is worth noting that Roberts and Wood (2007), though they defend a more 
holistic conception of knowledge, come very close to agreeing with my main conclusion 
when they claim that 
propositional knowledge, as it is understood by many contemporary 
epistemologists, is something of an abstraction from knowledge. It is seldom by itself 
the kind of knowledge that fully functioning human beings (including, we believe, most 
epistemologists) seek” (p. 42; emphasis added).  
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this is not what I mean by understanding. I have in mind the more basic intellectual activity 
of grasping connections between things. Conceived in this basic way, the pursuit of 
understanding is woven into almost every aspect of human life and culture. Myths, 
histories, religions—these are largely motivated by the pursuit of understanding: the desire 
to grasp how humans relate to God, or to each other, or to non-human animals; how life 
now relates to death, and the hereafter; how emotions relate to actions; how one fits into 
one’s family narrative; and a host of other relations. In fact, anytime I ask why I should do 
something, where I am asking not to challenge the answer but simply to grasp the reason, I 
am seeking understanding as a final end, for I am attempting to grasp the rational 
connection between some fact and a possible action. 
 
Pursuing Justice 
Pursuing justice, I suggest, is a human final end and a characteristic human activity. I have 
in mind here a very basic conception of justice as a kind of reciprocity or fairness in 
exchange. This would include keeping one’s agreements, as that secures the possibility of 
temporally extended exchanges. In proposing justice as a final end and characteristic 
human activity I am following Philippa Foot (2001; 2004), who claimed that it belongs to 
human practical reason to take the protection of certain basic relations of justice as both 
non-instrumentally worth pursuing, and that it is characteristic of the human life form to 
engage in practices, such as the practice of promising, that support or constitute these 
relations (see Chapter 2, Section 4 (ii)). I offer this suggestion more tentatively than the 
others, as it seems to me more controversial and needs more elaboration and defense than 
I can give it here. Still, I can note a few brief considerations in its defense. 
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 It seems to me that humans do see certain basic norms of justice as non-
instrumentally worth following. Humans seem to have a basic sense of standing with 
respect to others, and a keen awareness when that relation of balance or proportionality 
has been violated. Formulating, following and enforcing basic norms that govern that 
relation do indeed seem to be characteristic of human life.  
One might resist this suggestion by appeal to our evolutionary heritage. One might 
be skeptical of the idea that evolution could have produced organisms who not only 
conform to basic norms of justice, but see doing so as non-instrumentally worthwhile. 
Psychologist Blaine Fowers has recently argued, however, that our best evolutionary 
science to date supports the idea that basic norms of justice are evolutionarily adaptive in 
large social groups, and thus, from an evolutionary perspective, a natural human good 
(Fowers 2015: Chapter 6). This is because cooperation is highly adaptive, and successful 
cooperation in large groups requires social norms that are recognized and sanctioned by 
others in the community. If basic norms of justice are adaptive, it seems plausible to 
suppose that environmental pressures would favor individuals who took these norms as 
non-instrumentally worth following over those who viewed fair cooperation purely as an 
instrumental means to promote self-interest. For it would be very costly to try to calculate 
in each case whether a given instance of cooperation would serve one’s interests. If this is 
right, we might expect that humans would have evolved to see the norms of fair 
cooperation as inherently worth pursuing (rather than, say, strictly instrumental means used 
to promote self-interest).  
Another possibility is that what was favored by evolutionary pressures was not the 
disposition to recognize and promote certain basic relations of fairness and proportionality 
but rather (the traits in) individuals, or groups of individuals, who developed social 
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practices that inculcated those justice-oriented dispositions into young developing humans. 
I have in mind here parenting and education practices such as telling certain types of 
stories, patterns of praise and blame, disciplinary practices, etc., that would result in the 
development of a justice-oriented practical standpoint.148 In this scenario, the way in which 
human practical reason comes to grasp justice as a final end would be through habituation 
into a set of social practices, but would for that be no less a part of the human life form.  
Like all final ends, our grasp of justice is filtered through the cultural practices in 
which our practical standpoints were formed. The types of social relations and exchanges 
human beings see as just vary to some extent across cultures. Although there are some 
constraints (evolutionary, if not also conceptual) on what human beings could come to see 
as just, it might be the case that there is very little substantive content in the conception of 
justice that is part of human practical reason. Thus, for example, it seems to me possible 
that two different cultural communities could develop practices and norms that the other 
would reject as unjust, and yet both of them be compatible with the rather spare 
conception of justice I have in mind. 
                                                
 
148 John McDowell (1998b: especially Section 10) refers to this as the development of a 
“second nature.” He thinks, though, that the perception of something as a final end is 
inculcated into someone’s practical standpoint, that means it is not part of the person’s 
nature proper. But just because an outlook or disposition or ability is acquired by education 
does not mean it is not part of the thing’s life form. Male zebra finches, for example, learn 
how to sing properly from other males, often their father. Finches who are not taught still 
develop a song, but are put at a severe reproductive disadvantage. But no one would 
conclude that singing properly is not part of the zebra finch life form. In this case, we 
would say the male zebra finch develops its song by learning from other males. Whether a 
given disposition or activity belongs to a life form is not determined by whether it is 
learned as opposed to “hard-wired,” but by the role of that disposition or activity in the 
characteristic life of that type of organism. See Thompson (ms) for a detailed critique of 
McDowell on this point.   
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With these qualifications in mind, I hope the suggestion that justice is a human 
final end and characteristic human activity seems plausible. As with my other suggestions, 
however, it is defeasible and subject to refutation from further reflection and evidence. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As I already stressed, I offer the four activities of living, affiliating, pursuing understanding and 
pursuing justice primarily to illustrate the structure of my proposed account of human 
practical reason. Almost certainly there are other examples that qualify both as 
characteristic human activities and final ends. In my view, plausible candidates include, 
among others, the activities constitutively involved in health, integrity, autonomy and 
achievement. But as I said above, to defend a comprehensive catalogue of human 
characteristic activities would be to defend a full-blown account of human nature. This 
would be a huge task, one that I have argued needs to be carried out across disciplines, and 
would in any case detract from the main purpose of this study. I have said enough to 
illustrate the structure of the general theory of human practical reason I am proposing, and 
to see how it fits with the Aristotelian constructivist thesis.  
In summary, the view I have developed so far can be summed up in the following 
theses.    
(I) [Level 1 Aristotelian constructivism] Facts are practically normative for an 
agent S of some life form L in virtue of following from within the practical 
standpoint of the L life form. 
(II) [Level 2 Aristotelian constructivism, applied to humans] Facts are 
practically normative for a human agent S in virtue of following from within 
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the practical standpoint of the human life form, understood as the standpoint 
of human practical reason.  
(III) [Account of human practical reason] Properly functioning human practical 
takes the characteristic activities that constitute the human life form as final 
ends. 
In the next chapter I will explain exactly what Aristotelian constructivism does for the 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
By way of conclusion I will review the ground I have covered. Aristotelian naturalism’s 
core thesis is that ethical goodness is a kind of natural goodness, and thus that ethical 
norms are a rooted in natural norms. Moral virtues are natural excellences, and the reason 
we should be virtuous is because possessing and expressing the virtues is necessary to live 
in the way characteristic of the human life form.  The normativity objection claims this 
approach cannot be right because ethical norms are normative, whereas natural norms are 
not. There might indeed be facts about how it is best for humans to live relative to facts 
about human nature. But facts about human nature are not normative.  
I argued that this objection is not quite on target, because on a widely held 
conception of normativity, facts about human nature are normative. Still, this conclusion is 
no boon for the Aristotelian naturalist, since facts about human nature (and facts about 
human natural goodness which arise from them), do not possess the right type of 
normativity. I distinguished between two types of normative facts, evaluative and practical, 
and argued that evaluative facts have no necessary connection with what we have reason to 
do. Normative facts about human nature and natural goodness are evaluative. So, 
arguments that show virtue to be necessary to live a characteristically human life still do not 
show why we have reason to be virtuous. So, Aristotelian naturalists have not explained the 
practical relevance of facts about human nature and natural goodness. This does not mean 
facts about human nature and natural goodness are not practically normative. Rather, it 
means when such facts are practically normative, they are not intrinsically so, and thus their 
practical normativity cannot be explained by reference to their evaluative-normative nature.  
The upshot is that Aristotelians have some explaining to do. If they want to retain 
their core thesis, that ethical goodness is a kind of natural goodness, they need to be able to 
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explain the practical significance of natural goodness. And they need to be able to do this 
without claiming that natural goodness is intrinsically practically normative. No such 
explanation has been offered. This explains why the normativity objection continues to 
haunt Aristotelian naturalism. It also means Aristotelian naturalism does indeed have a 
normativity problem.  
I have argued, however, that the problem has a solution, which comes in two parts. 
The first is, for my purposes, the most important, for it is the key theoretical component 
Aristotelian naturalist’s lack. The problem is to explain what makes human nature 
practically normative. This is a task that falls in the domain of metanormative theory, and 
specifically theories of the source of practical normativity. Constructivism, I argued, is an 
attractive account of the source of practical normativity for the Aristotelian naturalist, for it 
opens up the possibility that the states of affairs and activities—we might say, the values or 
goods—that we take to provide final justification for action are the ultimate bearers of 
practical normativity, but not its ultimate source. Aristotelian constructivism, I argued, is, 
for the Aristotelian naturalist, the most promising account of constructivism, for it avoids 
the worries associated with the mainstream Kantian and Humean versions. 
The second part of the solution is a generic account of practical reason. On this 
view, practical reason is conceived as a natural power, capable of dysfunction, and thus 
subject to norms of proper function or proper operation. These norms are, like the norms 
governing other natural human powers, species-relative, which means there is a distinctly 
human form or configuration of practical reason. It is constitutive of properly functioning 
human practical reason to grasp certain substantive final ends, and these include the 
characteristic activities of the human life form. Since the Aristotelian naturalist 
understanding of human nature just is an understanding of how humans are 
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characteristically constituted and how they characteristically live, to take the characteristic 
activities of the human life form as final ends just is to take human nature (or a key aspect 
of it) as practically normative. 
Aristotelian constructivism, when wedded to this account of practical reason, 
solves the normativity problem, because it explains the practical normativity of human 
nature, and by extension, facts about what is naturally good or bad for human organisms. 
Hence, to the extent that the virtues can be shown to be natural excellences—thus 
constitutive of any non-defective human life—the accounts I have provided explain why 
we have reason to be virtuous. It is because we have reason to engage in the characteristic 
activities of the human life form, and because being virtuous is constitutive of the human 
life form. To put it a bit differently, lacking virtue constitutes natural defect in the human 
organism, and we have reason to avoid defect because we have reason to engage in those 
activities that characterize the non-defective human life form. What makes the pursuit of 
human nature practically normative for us is that its practical significance follows from 
within the human practical standpoint, and what it is to be practically normative for human 
beings just is to follow from within that standpoint. 
The upshot, then, is that Aristotelian naturalism no longer has a normativity 
problem. The explanatory gap has been filled. Aristotelian naturalists can retain their core 
thesis, because now they can explain what makes facts about human nature and natural 
goodness practically normative. And they can do this without appealing to the evaluative-
normative nature of those facts as somehow grounding practical normativity.  
With my proposed solution in hand, I suggest Aristotelian naturalists should deal 
with the normativity challenge by forcing the critic to unpack it further to uncover the 
motivations behind the objection. Does the critic sincerely doubt that facts about natural 
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human goodness are practically significant—e.g., that life, affiliation, friendship and 
understanding are worth pursuing? Does she wholly fail to see these characteristic human 
activities as practically significant? If so, she occupies a radically different practical 
standpoint, and philosophical argument will be powerless to persuade her otherwise. Our 
imagined critic does not fully occupy the human practical standpoint and is in that respect 
defective qua human. What such a critic needs is not philosophical argument but therapy.  
But almost no critic presses the normativity objection from that radical direction. If 
the critic instead accepts the practically normative significance of such activities and is 
instead questioning whether the Aristotelian naturalist has an adequate account of that 
normative significance, then the critic should be challenged to pause and reassess. 
Aristotelian constructivism suitably developed, along with my proposed account of human 
practical reason, offers a robust account of the normative significance of human nature. 
For this reason, I believe the adoption and development of Aristotelian constructivism to 
be the most promising way of moving Aristotelian naturalism past the normativity 
objection. In taking on Aristotelian constructivism, Aristotelian naturalists would of course 
be taking on not only the strengths but also some of the general challenges to 
constructivism as a metanormative theory. But in facing these challenges, Aristotelian 
naturalists would be standing shoulder to shoulder with their Kantian and Humean 
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